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INTRODUCTION

What is the moral content of constitutional rights? In one sense,
the "moral reading "of the Bill of Rights proposed, most famously,
by Ronald Dworkin, is surely correct:
The clauses of the American Constitution that protect individuals
and minorities from government are found mainly in the so-called Bill
of Rights - the first several amendments to the document - and the
further amendments added after the Civil War. . . . Many of these
clauses are drafted in exceedingly abstract moral language. The First
Amendment refers to the "right" of free speech, for example, the
Fifth Amendment to the process that is "due" to citizens, and the
Fourteenth to protection that is "equal." According to the moral
reading, these clauses must be understood in the way their language
most naturally suggests: they refer to abstract moral principles and
incorporate these by reference, as limits on government's power.1

The Bill of Rights, by means of open-ended terms such as "freedom
of speech, ""equal protection, "or "due process, "2 refers to moral
criteria, which take on constitutional status by virtue of being thus
referenced. We can disagree about whether the proper methodol
ogy for judicial application of these criteria is originalist or non
originalist. The originalist looks, not to the true content of the
moral criteria named by the Constitution, but to the framers ' beliefs
about that content;3 the nonoriginalist tries to determine what the
criteria truly require, and ignores or gives less weight to the fram
ers' views.4 Bracketing this disagreement, however, it is surely cor
rect to say - as Dworkin and many other prominent constitutional
scholars have said5 - that the Constitution, through the open
ended clauses of the Bill of Rights, incorporates parts of morality.
Yet there is also a sense in which this "moral reading "of the
Constitution is mistaken, or at least needs to be qualified. Constitu
tional rights have a special formal structure - a formal structure so
familiar to us that this structure, and therewith its significance, have
1. RoNALD DwoRKIN, FREEDOM'S LAw: THE MORAL READING OF nm AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 7 (1996) [hereinafter DwoRKIN, FREEDOM'S LAw]; see also RONALD
DwoRKIN, TAKING RioHrS SERIOUSLY 132-37 (1977) (advancing moral reading of the Bill of
Rights) [hereinafter DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHI'S SERIOUSLY].
2. U.S. CoNST. amends. I, XIV, V.
3. See, e.g., RoBERT BoRI<, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 143-85 (1990) (defending
ori�alism).
4. See Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in the Administrative State: Beyond the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 759, 781 n.69 (1997) (citing leading
nonoriginalists); Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49

OHIO

ST. L.J. 1085 (1989) (describing disagreements between originalists and

nonoriginalists)
5.

.

See Adler, supra note 4, at 781 n.69 (citing sources).
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become invisible. I will call this structure the "Basic Structure. "
Constitutional rights are rights against rules. A constitutional right
protects the rights-holder from a particular rule (a rule with the
wrong predicate6 or history); it does not protect a particular action
of hers from all the rules under which the action falls. 7 As a conse
quence of the Basic Structure,a constitutional right has only deriva
tive moral content - or so this article will try to show. To say that
X's treatment pursuant to a rule R violates X's "constitutional
rights,"or that the treatment is "unconstitutional,"does not entail
that the treatment itself is morally wrong,or morally problematic,
or that there is moral reason to overturn the treatment ceteris
paribus, or that the treatment violates X's moral rights, or that
moral wrong has been done to X, or anything like this. All the
statement entails is that there exists moral reason to repeal or
amend the rule R.
Let us begin by considering a famous and,for my purpose,ex
emplary case: the flag-desecration case, Texas v. Johnson. 8 Mr.
Johnson,who had burned an American flag during a political dem
onstration, was prosecuted for and then convicted of violating a
Texas statute that read: " 'A person commits an offense if he inten
tionally or knowingly desecrates . .. a state or national flag.' "9 He
was sentenced to one year in prison and fined $2,000. Johnson chal
lenged his sanction on constitutional grounds,claiming that it vio
lated his right to free speech under the First Amendment. When
the case reached the U. S. Supreme Court,the Court agreed with
Johnson's claim, and overturned his sanction. 10 Crucially, the
Court did not hold that Johnson was constitutionally immune from
sanction,under any statute,for the actions that had prompted the
State's prosecution. "We . . . emphasize that Johnson was prose
cuted only for flag-desecration - not for trespass,disorderly con
duct,or arson."11 Rather,what violated Mr. Johnson 's rights was
6. By the "predicate " of a rule, I mean the act-description contained in the rule's canoni
cal formulation. See infra text accompanying note 58 (discussing the concept of "rules" and
their "predicates").
7. See Lawrence A. Alexander, Is There An Overbreadth Doctrine?, 22 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 541, 545 (1985) ("The Constitution's individual rights provisions by and large do not
protect specific conduct per se. ..Rather, the Constitution ordinarily limits the types of
.

reasons that government may act upon in regulating conduct.").
8. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
9.

Johnson, 491 U.S. at 400 n.l (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.§ 42.09 (West 1989)).
See 491 U.S. at 418.

10.

11. 491 U.S. at 413 n.8. Although the Court did state that Johnson had not stolen the flag
he burned, 491 U.S. at 412 n.8, this statement should not, in my view, be read to imply that
Johnson's conviction was unconstitutional only by virtue of his action's being innocent under
every description. See 491 U.S. at 412 n.8 (stating that "[o]ur inquiry is, of course, bounded
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being sanctioned pursuant to a rule with the wrong rule-predicate
- one that targeted the wrong type of action. As the Court ex
plained: "'A law directed at the communicative nature of conduct
[such as a law prohibiting "flag desecration "] must ... be justified
by the substantial showing of need that the First Amendment re
quires,' "1 2 and the State of Texas was unable to make that substan
tial showing.
Texas v. Johnson exemplifies what I have called the Basic Struc
ture: that constitutional rights are rights against rules. Mr.
Johnson 's very action of flag-desecration might also have been an
action of destroying government property (if the flag he desecrated
had belonged to the government),13 or pollution (if the flag was
burned, and dangerous chemicals were thereby released into the
atmosphere),or battery (if the flag was burned in close proximity to
a bystander,who was badly injured), or perhaps, as the Court sug
gested,arson, disorderly conduct, or trespass. 14 Had Mr. Johnson
been sanctioned under a rule that employed one of these constitu
tionally unobjectionable predicates, no constitutional right of
Johnson's would have been violated. 15 Indeed, nothing in the
by the particular facts of this case and by the statute under which Johnson was convicted"
(emphasis added)); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 313 n.1, 319 (1990) (overturning
charge against flag burners pursuant to federal flag-mutilation statute, without disturbing
charge against certain claimants for causing willful injury to federal property); R.A.V. v. City
of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 379-80, 396 (1992) (overturning charge against teenager pursuant to
Minnesota ordinance prohibiting hate speech, where teenager's particular action was burning
a cross inside the fenced yard of a black family). See generally infra Part I (describing how
constitutional rights generally function as shields against rules, not shields for actions). Why,
then, did the Court even note that Johnson was innocent of theft? Perhaps because the
Court thought this fact relevant to his as-applied challenge. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 403 n.3
(sustaining Johnson's as-applied challenge to flag-desecration statute without reaching his
facial challenge); infra text accompanying notes 140-45 (discussing how as-applied adjudica
tion is consistent with the proposition that constitutional rights do not shield actions).
12. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406 (emphasis deleted) (quoting Community for Creative Non
Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586, 622 (1983) (Scalia, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom. Clark v.
Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
13. See United States v. Haggerty, 731 F. Supp. 415, 416, 422 (W.D. Wash. 1990) (over
turning charge pursuant to federal flag-mutilation statute, for action of burning flag belong
ing to U.S. Postal Service, without disturbing charge pursuant to statute prohibiting wilful
injury to federal property), affd. sub nom. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
14. On the nature of actions as particular things that can be picked out under multiple
descriptions, see infra text accompanying notes 63-67. It appears that, in fact, Mr. Johnson's
particular action of flag-burning did not fall under the further description of "battery." See
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 399.
15. It remains open to discussion whether and, if so, when the application of a no-trespass
rule to speech will violate the First Amendment. Compare Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946) (holding that the application of a no-trespass law to a speaker, who was on the prem
ises of a company town, violated the First Amendment) with Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507
(1976) (declining to recognize free speech right to picket on premises of shopping center, and
distinguishing Marsh). See generally infra text accompanying notes 354-64 (discussing viabil
ity of First Amendment challenges to rules that pick out nonexpressive properties of actions).
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Court's decision precluded Texas from sanctioning

Mr.

Johnson

pursuant to an unobjectionable rule, in a future prosecution, for the
very action of his that had given rise to the flag-desecration prose
cution.16 Where the State of Texas had gone wrong was in prose
cuting Johnson under the wrong rule - under a rule that
prohibited "flag desecration." And what violated Mr. Johnson's
First Amendment rights, in Texas v. Johnson, was being sanctioned
for his action under that rule - not being sanctioned for that action

simpliciter.
Consider, now, two possible accounts of the moral content of
Johnson's First Amendment rights. First, consider what I will

Mr.

call the Direct Account.

The Direct Account
To say that some treatment of X (sanctioning X pursuant to a
rule, or subjecting X to the duty that the rule announces) "vio
lates X's constitutional rights" entails the following: the treat
ment is directly wrong, and X has the legal right to secure
judicial invalidation of the treatment. "Directly wrong" means
that there is sufficient moral reason17 for the court to invalidate
the treatment (overturn X's sanction, or free X from the duty),
quite independent of any further invalidation of the rule under
which the treatment falls.
On the direct account of Texas v. Johnson, itis morally improper to
sanction Mr. Johnson for "flag desecration," even if his action hap
pened to have been an action of property-destruction, pollution, or
battery. To sanction him for "flag desecration" is to sanction him
on the wrong grounds - on the basis of his

speech,

rather than the

harmful, nonexpressive properties of his action - and there is
moral reason for the State of Texas not to do that. To be sure, if Mr.
Johnson was a polluter, batterer, or property-destroyer, he ought to
16. See Montana v. Hall, 481U.S. 400, 402 (1987) ("It is a 'venerable principl[e] of double
jeopardy jurisprudence' that '[t]he successful appeal of a judgment of conviction, on any
ground other than the insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, poses no bar to
further prosecution on the same charge' [i.e., a charge that would otherwise be the same for
double jeopardy purposes]." (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quotingUnited States
v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 90-91 (1978))).
17. Throughout this article, I use the term "moral reason" in a generic way, which is
meant to be neutral between consequentialist and deontological moral views. To say that
"moral reason" obtains to overturn a claimant's treatment, or a rule, means that: (1) over
turning the treatment or rule does not violate any deontological constraints, and is required
under applicable consequentialist criteria; or (2) overturning the treatment or rule is required
by deontological constraints. On the difference between deontological and consequentialist
moral views, see generally SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, THE REJECTION OF CoNSEQUENTIALISM 1-40
(1994).
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be sanctioned. But he ought to be sanctioned pursuant to the right
kind of rule, and it is not a matter of moral indifference which rule
the State of Texas deploys against
By contrast, what

him.

I will call the Derivative Account

of constitu-

tional rights says something quite different.

The Derivative Account
To say that some treatment of X (being sanctioned pursuant to
a rule, or subjecting X to the duty that the rule announces)
"violates X's constitutional rights" entails the following: there
is sufficient moral reason to change in some measure the scope
of the rule, and X has the legal power to secure the invalida
tion - the repeal or amendment

-

of the rule,

including his

own treatment. There may or may not be moral reason to
overturn X's treatment,

ceteris paribus.

On the derivative account of

Texas v. Johnson,

it would be (or

might be)18 a matter of moral indifference which rule the State of
Texas deployed against Johnson, if Johnson's action of flag
desecration also happened to have been an action of property-de
struction, pollution, or battery.

If his action happened to have been

wrongful under a different description, there would be (or might
be) nothing at all morally problematic in sanctioning

Mr.

Johnson

pursuant to the flag-desecration statute. Rather, what is morally
problematic, on the Derivative Account, is for

Texas to have in
place a statute that prohibits flag-desecration. This is morally prob
lematic because some actions covered by that statute are innocent
actions.

Some actions of flag-desecration do not have further,

wrong-making properties such that they are properly sanctioned or
coerced - they are not also actions of property-destruction, pollu
tion, battery, etc. - and therefore Texas is morally required to re
peal or amend the flag-desecration statute.19

Mr. Johnson's own action of flag-desecration may have

been in

nocent of further wrong-making properties; it may not have been.
18. I say "might be" here to signal the following: The Derivative Account does not entail
that it is a matter of moral indifference which statute Texas uses to sanction Johnson. Rather,
on the Derivative Account, the propriety of a claimant's particular treatment is simply not
the proper moral focus of reviewing courts. Instead, their proper moral focus is on whether
the underlying rule should be repealed or amended. See infra section III.A.3 (explaining
how, within the Derivative Account, the judicial decision to uphold or invalidate a claimant's
treatment depends upon the extent to which the court revises the underlying rule). So the
proponent of the Derivative Account in Johnson will say that, although the choice of rule
with respect to Johnson may make a moral difference, that is not entailed by his having a
constitutional right.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 315-42 {detailing how rule against "flag
desecration" violates liberties, by including otherwise innocent speech-acts within its scope).
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But that is irrelevant to Johnson's constitutional claim.

On the

Derivative Account, his case is simply an occasion20 for the review
ing court to invalidate - to repeal or amend - Texas's statute.
Because the statute does moral wrong to someone (whether Mr.
Johnson, or other persons), the reviewing court rightly invalidates
the statute, including but not limited to the sanction
has received.21

Mr.

Johnson

Which of these two accounts, direct or derivative, is the correct
account of the moral content of constitutional rights? To put the
distinction between the two most succinctly: on the Direct Ac
count, constitutional adjudication essentially involves the invalida
tion of the rights-holder's own treatment

(her sanction, or her duty),

while on the Derivative Account, it essentially involves the judicial
repeal or amendment of rules. Which of these two accounts best
describes the connection between constitutional law and morality?

In

this article, I will argue that the Derivative Account is the

correct one. The Derivative Account provides an elegant, unified,
and morally straightforward view of constitutional rights and consti
tutional adjudication. It holds true, I will claim, not just for the free
speech rights at stake in Texas v. Johnson, but for the entire array of
substantive constitutional rights that figure in modem constitu
tional law: rights to speech,22 to religious freedom,23 to equal pro
tection,24 and to substantive due process.25 The Direct Account, by
contrast, turns out to involve a view about morality - about the
moral significance of the description under which someone is sanc
tioned, coerced, or otherwise set back by a legal rule - that is mor
ally untenable, at least for purposes of constitutional law. And
20. For a similar view of the particular cases that federal courts adjudicate as mere occa
sions for broader, constitutional change, see Owen M. Fxss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice,
93 HAR.v. L. REv. 1, 11 {1978).
21. Indeed, there is nothing in the Derivative Account itself that requires the judicial
invalidation of the statute to include an invalidation of the claimant's own treatment,
although the standing component of Article III may impose such a requirement. See infra
text accompanying notes 401-08, 574-78 (arguing that requirement of personal benefit to the
claimant is extrinsic to the Derivative Account).
22. See U.S.CoNsr.amend.I ("Congress shall make no law ...abridging the freedom of
speech").
23. See U.S. CoNsr. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free
exercise [of religion]").

24. See U.S. CoNsr.amend.XIV ("nor shall any State ...deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws").
25. See U.S. CoNsr.amend.XIV ("nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law"); U.S.CoNsr.amend.V ("nor shall any person ...
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"); infra text accompany
ing notes 53-60 (explaining article's focus on free speech, free exercise, equal protection and
substantive due process rights).
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although the Direct Account may be attractive to constitutional
lawyers and scholars on

institutional grounds - because it is consis

tent with a certain, purist view about the limited powers of federal
courts - that view should be rejected. The purist view is that fed
eral courts lack the legal power to repeal or amend rules; the legal
force of the court's judgment extends only to the parties, and there
fore the judicial focus in constitutional cases can only be, as the
Direct Account claims, the moral propriety of the claimant's own
treatment.26 But the purist view is wrong; federal courts
the power to repeal or amend rules, and they

can,

do

have

consistent with

Article III of the Constitution,27 adopt the rule-centered rather
than claimant-centered perspective required by the Derivative
Account.
This article has three Parts. Part I sets the stage for my argu
ment, by demonstrating that the Basic Structure obtains. This is, I
should emphasize, a

descriptive claim.

My claim is that the follow

ing description of the current constitutional case law, as set forth by
the U.S. Supreme Court and followed by the lower federal courts, is
true: constitutional rights are rights against rules. Things could be
different; constitutional rights could be structured as shields around
actions, rather than shields against rules; but they are not. The Ba
sic Structure is

our official structure, as constitutional

doctrine now

stands. This is true across the Bill of Rights, not just of free speech.
For example, it would violate the gender-discrimination component
of the Equal Protection Clause to sanction X pursuant to a rule that
prohibits "the purchase of alcohol by men under twenty-one,"28
even if X's action is sanctionable under some other rule (such as a
rule against credit-card fraud). It would violate the race
discrimination component of the Equal Protection Clause to sanc
tion a black person under a law banning interracial marriages,29
even

if

the black person is also a bigamist. Or - to switch from

equal protection to religious freedom - it would violate the free
exercise rights of members of the Santeria religion (who engage in
ritual animal sacrifice) to sanction them pursuant to a law targeted
26. See infra section III.B (describing possible institutional objections to the Derivative
Account).

27. See U.S. CoNST. art. III,
"Controversies").

§ 2 (confining federal judicial power to "Cases" and

28. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (invalidating, under Equal Protection Clause,
statute prohibiting sale of low-alcohol beer to men but not women between the ages of 18
and 21).
29. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating, under Equal Protection
Clause, statute prohibiting interracial marriages).
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at Santeria,30 even for their ritual sacrifice of eagles, cougars, pan
das and other endangered species.
Parts II and ill are the heart of the article.

In

Part II, I reject

the Direct Account. This Part considers, and finds wanting, a wide
array of possible defenses for the Direct Account: for the claim
that X's constitutional right entails the existence of moral reason to
overturn X's own treatment, independent of further invalidating
the rule under which that treatment falls. Some of these defenses
are, on balance, unpersuasive: for example, the view that (in gen
eral) a necessary condition for a morally and constitutionally justi
fied sanction is that the sanctioned person be sanctioned under the
right kind of rule.31 Some of these defenses, albeit persuasive or
even compelling, explain at best a limited set of constitutional
rights: for example, the view that sanctioning or coercing a black
person under a law that contains the predicate, "black," is to stig
matize and thereby directly wrong her.32 And some of the defenses
are simply question-begging: for example, the standard appeal to
the "illegitimate purpose" of the legislator, such as a purpose to
suppress speech, as somehow morally tainting the treatments meted
out pursuant to the law that the legislator enacts.33
Part III, in tum, argues in favor of the Derivative Account. On
the Derivative Account, the reason X's constitutional rights can be
violated by one rule, even

if the very action she performed is prop

erly sanctioned or coerced under a different rule, is quite straight
forward. It is straightforward to explain how, given two different
rules that intersect to cover the very same action, the moral criteria
set forth in the Bill of Rights require that one of the rules, but not
the other, be repealed or amended. Freedom of speech requires
that a rule against "flag desecration" be repealed, because some
actions of flag-desecration are innocent, and the ones that are

not

innocent will fall under other rules. Conversely, freedom of speech
does not require that a rule against "arson" be repealed, because all
actions of arson are seriously wrong. It is, or may be,34 a matter of
moral indifference whether the arsonous flag-desecrator is sane30. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)
(invalidating, under Free Exercise Clause, statute prohibiting animal sacrifice that was
targeted at the Santeria religion).
31. See infra section II.A.1.
32. See infra section 11.B.2.
33. See infra note 278 (arguing that the idea of an illegitimate legislative purpose or moti
vation is ambiguous, and that the different ways in which this ambiguous idea might be made
more precise do not, in fact, underwrite the Direct Account).
34. See supra note 18.
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tioned for "flag desecration" or, instead, for "arson"; but it is

not a

matter of moral indifference, under the First Amendment, whether
we leave in place a rule against "flag desecration." Similarly, as I
shall argue, it is, or may be, a matter of moral indifference whether
the thieving, nineteen-year-old, male drinker is prosecuted pursu
ant to a gender-discriminatory rule prohibiting the sale of alcohol to
nineteen-year-old men, or pursuant to a neutral law prohibiting
credit-card fraud; but it is

not a matter of moral indifference, under

the Equal Protection Clause, whether we leave in place the gender
discriminatory rule. And so forth for the rest of the Bill of Rights.
Part III also raises and rebuts possible institutional objections to
the Derivative Account. These include, inter alia, the purist view of
the powers of federal courts. Federal courts do, indeed, have the
legal power to repeal or amend rules, and Article III of the Consti
tution permits them to adopt the rule-centered perspective required
by the Derivative Account. The remedies that federal courts enter
in constitutional cases - including not merely class-action cases,
but also individual cases, whether enforcement actions or anticipa
tory suits brought by claimants - should

always

be understood as

repealing or amending rules. This is technically plausible, morally
attractive, and consistent with the concept of "adjudication" em
bodied in Article III.
Finally, the conclusion to the article surveys the doctrinal impli
cations of the arguments advanced in Parts I, II, and III. Although
the methodology of the article is theoretical, not doctrinal, my ulti
mate purpose is a doctrinal one. Constitutional theory is ultimately
important because of its practical import, for the practices of re

will want Roe v.
will , or may, want it

viewing courts and other institutions. Originalists

Wade35 to

be decided one way; nonoriginalists

decided a different way. So too, as we shall see, the defenders of
the Direct and Derivative Accounts will disagree on a wide variety
of doctrinal matters. These include matters such as timing, remedy,
and the propriety of facial invalidation. The paradigmatic constitu
tional suit for the Direct Account is a retrospective as-applied chal
lenge by a claimant who has already acted and been sanctioned
under a rule,36 while the paradigmatic constitutional suit for the
35. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see Adler, supra note 4, at 780-85 (describing debate between
originalists and nonoriginalists over legitimacy of Roe).
36. See, e.g., In re R.MJ., 455 U.S. 191 (1982) (retrospective, as-applied challenge under
Free Speech Clause); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (retrospective, as-applied chal
lenge under Free Exercise Clause); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (retrospec
tive, as-applied challenge under the substantive component of the Due Process Clause); see
also Loving v. Vrrginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (retrospective challenge under Equal Protection
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Derivative Account is a prospective facial challenge to a rule, by a
claimant who has yet to act and seeks first the rule's immediate
repeal.37

In recent years,

these matters - in particular, the propri

ety of facial invalidation38 - have generated heated controversies
among scholars and at the Supreme Court. 39 This article provides a
theoretical foundation for addressing such matters. Although it is
beyond the scope of this article to defend a specific position on the
numerous doctrinal questions implicated by the morally derivative
Clause). See generally infra text accompanying notes 290-92, 588-91 (discussing the status of
sanctions, within the Direct Account, as the paradigmatically concrete setbacks to claimants).

37. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997) (anticipatory, facial challenge to rule,
under Free Speech Clause); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520 (1993) (anticipatory, facial challenge to rule, under Free Exercise Clause); Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (anticipatory, facial challenge to rule, under the
substantive component of the Due Process Clause); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (an
ticipatory, facial challenge to rule, under Equal Protection Clause). See generally infra text
accompanying note 598 (discussing timing of constitutional suits, within Derivative Account).
38. See generally Michael Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN.
L. REv. 235 (1994) (discussing distinction between facial and as-applied challenges, and sur
veying case law).
39. The controversy about facial challenges was triggered by the Court's announcement,
in United States v. Salerno, that: "A facial challenge to a legislative Act is . . . the most
difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). Since
this announcement, the Justices have heatedly debated the propriety of facial invalidation,
particularly in the area of abortion rights. See Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, 517 U.S. 1174,
1175 (1996) (denying certiorari) (memorandum of Stevens, J.); Fargo Women's Health Org.
v. Schafer, 507 U.S. 1013, 1013 (1993) (denying stay) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Ada v.
Guam Socy. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 506 U.S. 1011, 101 (1992) (denying certiorari)
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Casey, 505 U.S. at 972-73 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part).
The Justices have debated the propriety of facial challenges in many other areas as well,
including free speech, see National Endowment for the Arts v. Fmley, 118 S. Ct. 2168, 2193-96
(1998) (Souter, J., dissenting); Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2355-56 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part); Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v.
FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 631-34 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in
part); United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 429-36 (1993); Edenfield v. Fane, 507
U.S. 761, 779-81 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); the Establishment Clause, see Bowen v.
Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 626-30 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); equal protection, see Romer
v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 643 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); the Takings Clause, see Pennell v.
City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 15-19 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); and other aspects of substantive due process, such as assisted suicide, see Washington v.
Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2302, 2304-05 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgments of
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997), and Vacca v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997)).
Ripeness became a matter of some controversy in Reno v. Catholic Social Services, 509
U.S. 43 (1993), which dismissed as unripe a challenge by certain would-be beneficiaries to a
benefit-conferring rule, on the grounds that the claimants had not yet applied for and been
denied the benefit they sought. Reno calls into question the availability of prospective chal
lenges to benefit-conferring rules. See Reno, 509 U.S. at 67-70 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
the judgment) (criticizing majority's ripeness holding); 509 U.S. at 77-83 (Stevens, J., dissent
ing) (same); 2 KENNETH CuLP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 15.14, at 381-84 (1994) (same).
Fmally, the scope of judicial remedies has, in recent years, been much debated by consti
tutional scholars, in the form of a dispute about the legitimacy of Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1
(1958). See infra notes 502-05 and accompanying text (describing this dispute).
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will show just how wide

ranging the doctrinal implications of the Derivative Account are.

In particular, and

most profoundly, the Derivative Account ex

plicates the basic doctrinal structure of modem constitutional law.
Every constitutional lawyer and scholar knows well the various
rule-validity "tests" around which constitutional adjudication is
structured: narrow-tailoring tests, under the First Amendment, that
require rules regulating speech to be sufficiently closely tailored to

sufficiently important interests;40 antidiscrimination tests under the
Equal Protection Clause, that require rules discriminating on the
basis of race41 or gender42 to be more or less strictly scrutinized;
and the parallel antidiscrimination test, for rules discriminating
against religious groups or practices, that has become canonical for
the Free Exercise Clause.43 But what is the function of these famil
iar tests? What do they accomplish? The proponent of the Direct
Account

will claim this:

To sanction or coerce X pursuant to a rule

that fails a test is to do moral wrong to X; it is to inflict a treatment
upon X such that moral reason obtains

ceteris paribus to

overturn

X's treatment.44
But this is incorrect. On the Derivative Account - the correct
account - the pervasive and familiar constitutional tests, governing
the predicates and history of rules, are simply tests for whether a
rule should be judicially repealed or amended. The essential func
tion of constitutional courts is to assess rules against these kind of
moral tests, and to repeal or amend those rules that are moral fail
ures. This is what my article tries to show.
40. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (describing strict, narrow-tailoring
scrutiny for content-based rules regulating speech); Clark v. Community for Creative Non
Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (describing intermediate, narrow-tailoring scrutiny for
content-neutral rules regulating speech).
41. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) ("[R]acial classifications [should] be sub
jected to the 'most rigid scrutiny,' and, if they are ever to be upheld, they must be shown to
be necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible state objective, independent of
racial discrimination." (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944))).
42. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) ("[T]o withstand constitutional challenge
. . . classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be sub
stantially related to the achievement of those objectives.").
43. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877, 879 (1990) (holding that state may
not seek "to ban . . . acts or abstentions only when they are engaged in for religious reasons,
or only because of the religious belief that they display" but that "the right of free exercise
does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of
general applicability' " (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens,
J., concurring in judgment))).
44. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 1-4 (arguing that a
separate and special overbreadth doctrine does not exist, and that instead both the Court's
overbreadth decisions and its ordinary constitutional decisions are grounded upon the right
of claimants to be judged in accordance with a constitutionally valid rule of law).
•

•

.
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I.

THE BASIC STRUCTURE

A constitutional right provides a legal advantage, of some kind,
for the rights-holder.45 But what kind of advantage is that? We can
imagine a legal world in which constitutional rights were structured

as protective shields around certain types of actions. A particular
action of some person would either have this protective shield - if
the action were, say, sufficiently harmless, or sufficiently important
to the actor - or not. If the action bore the protective shield, then

the rights-holder would be legally immune from being sanctioned

for performing the action, or coerced not to perform it, pursuant to

any rule.

Conversely,

if a

particular action of some person did

not

have the protective shield, then the state would be free to sanction

the actor for performing the action, or to coerce the actor not to

perform it, pursuant to any rule. Protected actions would be pro
tected, not just from discriminatory or overbroad rules, but from

perfectly neutral, ordinary rules as well. Conversely, unprotected

actions could be legally sanctioned, or coerced, pursuant to rules

that discriminated on the basis of race, gender, viewpoint, or reli
gion. This would just be how constitutional rights

worked. 46

But of course constitutional rights work nothing like this.47

Constitutional rights in our own legal world are structured," not as
shields around particular actions, but as shields against particular

rules. What violates X's constitutional right, what she has a consti

tutional right against, is for a particular rule to be (fully) in legal

45. See CARL WELLMAN, REAL RlGKrS 8-11 {1995) (defining a legal right as a complex of
favorable Hohfeldian positions, that is, claim-rights, liberties, immunities, and powers, that
function to confer a legal advantage upon the rights-holder).
46. This is not a crazy idea, given the centrality of actions to morality. At bottom, any
particular action is either morally permissible, or morally impermissible - the latter either
because the action breaches a deontological side-constraint, or because it makes the world
worse in some manner picked out by a consequentialist standard. See GEOFFREY SCARRE,
UTILITARIANISM 129 (1996) (noting that many philosophers now believe that the criterion of
overall well-being is best construed, within utilitarianism, as a criterion for evaluating partic
ular actions, not for evaluating rules somehow generalized from actions); SCHEFFLER, supra
note 17, at 80-114 {discussing deontological, i.e., nonconsequentialist, side-constraints).
,47. I am certainly not the first to note the point that a person's constitutional claim is
more or less a function of the rule pursuant to which he is sanctioned or otherwise set back,
and not solely a function of the action he performed. Scholars who have previously noted
and discussed this feature of constitutional law include Larry Alexander, see Alexander,
supra note 7, at 544-47; and Henry Monaghan, see Monaghan, supra note 44, at 4-14. How
ever, the point is far from universally recognized. See, e.g., GERALD GUNTiiER, CONSTITU
TIONAL LAW 1192 (1991) ("[In First Amendment challenges outside the overbreadth context]
the Court asks simply whether the challenger's activities are protected by the First Amend
ment."); Monaghan, supra note 44, at 5 (noting that "many co=entators assume that con
ventional constitutional challenges are invariably restricted to such fact-dependent claims of
privilege").
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force:48 a rule with the wrong predicate or history. We saw that
point in the flag-desecration case: sanctioning

Mr. Johnson

for de

stroying a government-owned flag pursuant to a rule prohibiting
"flag des�cration" would violate his constitutional rights, while
sanctioning him for destroying a government-owned flag pursuant
to a rule prohibiting the "destruction of government property"
would

not.

As we shall see in a moment,

Texas v. Johnson exempli

fies the structure of substantive49 constitutional rights across the
Bill of Rights.
I

will call

this the Basic Structure of constitutional rights. Con-

stitutional rights are rights against rules.

The Basic Structure: Rights against Rules
A constitutional right is a legal right that is targeted against a
particular rule - a rule with the wrong predicate or history.
Specifically, a constitutional right furnishes the rights-holder a
legal power to secure, in some measure,50 the judicial invalida
tion of a particular rule. To say that X's constitutional rights
have been violated entails that a reviewing court should at X's
instance invalidate, in some measure, a particular rule.51 It
does

not entail

that any other rule should be invalidated, in any

measure.

In particular, then, constitutional rights are not shields for
actions. To say that sanctioning X pursuant to a particular rule
violates her constitutional rights does

not entail that the partic

ular action at stake, by virtue of which X has been sanctioned,
is constitutionally protected from being sanctioned pursuant to
all other rules.52 Similarly, to say that it violates X's constitu48. "Fully" here is meant to be neutral between the Direct and Derivative Accounts. The
Direct Account says that the rule should not be fully in force, insofar as the claimant is
sanctioned or coerced; the Derivative Account says that the rule should not be fully in force,
insofar as it is properly amended or even wholly repealed.

49. See infra note 60 and accompanying text (explaining focus on substantive challenges).
50. Again, "in some measure" is meant to be neutral between the Direct and Derivative
Accounts. See supra note 48.
51. This article is concerned with constitutional rights, insofar as these arc enforced by
reviewing courts. It remains an open question whether the concept of a judicially unenforced
constitutional right is even coherent. See Adler, supra note 4, at 775-79 {discussing judicial
enforcement of constitutional rights). In any event, the central problem addressed here is
whether the legal rights that figure in constitutional adjudication are morally direct or deriva
tive. That is a sufficiently discrete and salient problem, see infra section 111.B (presenting
institutional arguments against judicial repeal of rules), to merit separate attention.
52. The Basic Structure presupposes some concept of sanctioning X "pursuant to" a legal
rule, such that sanctioning X "pursuant to" Rule1 can be constitutional, while sanctioning her
"pursuant to" Ru!� can be unconstitutional. What, precisely, does this involve? The answer
to that question - what it means, precisely, for state officials to be guided by a legal rule is difficult and controversial, involving large issues about the nature of law and of rule-guided
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tional rights to subject her to the legal duty a particular rule

announces does

not entail that actions within the scope of that

duty are constitutionally protected from coverage by all other

rules.

The claim I advance, in this Part of the article, is simply a descrip
tive claim. I claim that the Basic Structure is, in fact, our structure:

that it holds true of our practice of constitutional adjudication. My

claim is not that constitutional adjudication need be structured this

way - structuring constitutional rights as shields for actions is cer

tainly a conceptual possibility - nor do I claim, here, that the Basic

Structure is better than an act-shielding structure. Rather, the plan

of this article is to

describe,

in this Part, the existing structure of

constitutional rights; and then to determine, in Parts II and ill ,
whether the Direct Account or Derivative Account provides a

more plausible account of the connection between constitutional
rights, thus structured, and morality.

Relatedly, note that my description of the Basic Structure is

neutral between the Direct and Derivative Accounts. A constitu
tional right furnishes some kind of legal advantage against a partic

ular rule. The Direct and Derivative Accounts are

both

consistent

with, and build upon, this basic, descriptive claim. Where they dif

fer, crucially, is as to the precise nature and moral grounding for the

legal advantage that a constitutional right secures. On the Direct
Account, a constitutional right advantages X by empowering her to
secure the judicial invalidation of her own

treatment

- her own

sanction or duty - by virtue of there obtaining sufficient moral

reason to overturn that treatment. On the Derivative Account, a

constitutional right advantages X by empowering her to secure the

judicial invalidation of

the rule under which her

treatment falls, by

virtue of there obtaining sufficient moral reason to invalidate that
rule.
We shall pursue this contrast at much greater length in Parts II

and III. Let us start, however, at the foundation: by seeing how

constitutional rights under the Free Speech Clause, Free Exercise

behavior. The answer I have in mind (although I believe that the arguments presented in this
article for the most part do not depend upon a specific conception of rule-guidance or of law)
is as follows: state officials (1) believe, or claim to believe, that X has performed an action
prohibited by Rule1 or failed to perform an action required by Rule1; and (2) given that
eventuality, take or claim to take Rule1 as authoritative for issuing the disadvantageous direc
tive that constitutes X's sanction. See infra text accompanying notes 312-14 (distinguishing
nonmoral fact that state officials take rules as authoritative, or claim to do so, from moral fact
that the enactment of rules changes the moral reasons bearing upon officials); note 54 (defin
ing "sanction").
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Clause, Equal Protection Clause, and the substantive component of

the Due Process Clause, function not as shields around particular
actions, but as shields against particular rules.

Why these particular provisions? I concentrate, in this article,

on these provisions both because they refer to moral criteria,s3 and
also because they are the main constitutional provisions by virtue of

which sanctionss4 or duties can violate substantive constitutional

rights.ss Sanctions and sanction-backed duties deserve special focus
53.

See DwoRKIN, FREEDOM'S LAw, supra note

1, at 7.

54. By "sanction" I mean something like this: a legal directive, addressed to a person by
name, that constitutes a disadvantage for him (paradigmatically, a legal duty to pay a fine or
serve a term of imprisonment), and that state officials impose pursuant to a conduct
regulating rule. See JosEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REAsoN AND NORMS 157 (1990) (noting that
"most sanctions consist in the withdrawal of rights or the imposition of duties"). Sanctions
can, of course, be either civil or criminal, but because free speech, free exercise, substantive
due process, and equal protection doctrines are indiscriminately applied to rules backed by
civil and criminal sanctions, see infra text accompanying notes 68-129 (summarizing doc
trines), I will not distinguish between the two. The Derivative Account explains in a crisp
way why the doctrines are indiscriminate in this manner. Conduct-regulating rules can vio
late liberties and breach antidiscrimination norms whether the sanctions that back them up
are civil or criminal. See infra sections III.A.1-2.
55. This leaves to one side Eighth Amendment challenges to special types of sanctions,
such as the death penalty, see, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188-207 (1976) (opinion
of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.), or the conditions of the claimant's imprisonment, see,
e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-35 (1994). The Eighth Amendment does not,
under current jurisprudence, normally provide a viable basis by which to challenge an ordi·
nary sentence of imprisonment, see Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (rejecting
proportionality challenge to life sentence); see also Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (re
jecting claim that law against public intoxication prohibited mere status, and that sanction
pursuant to such law therefore violated Eighth Amendment). The Eighth Amendment does
prohibit excessive fines, but the jurisprudence on that is inchoate, see United States v.
Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. 2028, 2033 (1998) (holding forfeiture unconstitutional, under Excessive
Fmes Clause) ("This Court has had little occasion to interpret, and has never actually applied
[until now], the Excessive Fmes Clause."), as is the due process jurisprudence on the exces
siveness of punitive damages, see BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), which likewise is not
discussed here.
My statement also, clearly, leaves to one side double-jeopardy challenges, Ex Post Facto
Clause challenges, and others that arise where the claimant has not merely been sanctioned
pursuant to a single, preexisting rule. What we need to understand first is why, in that simple
and standard case, sanctioning X under one clear and preexisting rule can violate his consti·
tutional rights, even though his action may be wrongful under another description. See infra
text accompanying notes 163-64 (further discussing double jeopardy).
Will not other parts of the Bill of Rights, along with free speech, free exercise, equal
protection, and substantive due process, also advantage X in this way? In practice, the an
swer, currently, is no. For example, the "regulatory takings" component of the Takings
Clause is certainly applicable to duty-conferring laws, such as laws for landowners, see Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); but the Takings Clause, properly
understood, is not a protection against sanctions and duties. Rather, it is a complex kind of
benefit-conferring provision. See, e.g., Williamson County Reg!. Planning Commn. v. Hamil
ton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985) ("The Fifth Amendment does not proscribe the taking of
property; it proscribes taking without just compensation."). As for the Establishment Clause,
although that provision in theory covers conduct-regulating rules addressed to private par
ties, see, e.g., Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 305-06 (1985)
(rejecting "entanglement" challenge, by religious foundation, to requirements of Fair Labor
Standards Act), in practice successful challenges to such rules are not a significant part of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
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because these are the most elementary and accepted sources of con
stitutional violations:56 whatever else might be "unconstitutional,"
sanctioning an action, or coercing actors to perform or refrain from
actions, surely can be.57 Relatedly, I use the term "rule" to mean
what, more precisely, might be called a "prescription" or a "conduct
rule": a rule that prohibits or requires certain types of actions, that
has a canonical, written formulation, that becomes legally . authori
tative through enactment, and that functions as a decision rule by
which legal officials impose sanctions on those who perform, or fail
to perform, the actions that the rule prohibits or requires.58 By the
In any event, Takings Clause and Establishment Clause challenges (and, for that matter,
excessiveness challenges under the Eighth Amendment or due process) can be readily assimi
lated to the argument structure presented in this article. If the Basic Structure holds true of
such challenges - if, for example, X's sanction can constitute a regulatory taking of his
property even though the very action involved can be sanctioned under a different rule; or if
X's sanction can be excessive under one rule but need not be, for the very same action, under
another - then the arguments presented in Part II against the Direct Account would apply.
As for constitutional challenges to special types of sanctions (such as the death penalty, or
harsh conditions of confinement), I am less sanguine that the Basic Structure holds true of
such challenges, although, again, if it did the arguments presented in Part II would apply. I
will not even speculate here about the relevance of such arguments to double jeopardy or ex
post-facto type challenges; that is simply too far beyond the scope of this article.
56. Consider, by contrast, the continuing scholarly debates about the propriety of consti
tutional challenges to the denial of benefits. See Symposium, The Unconstitutional Condi
tions Doctrine, 72 DENV. U. L. REv. 859 (1995).
57. Joel Feinberg expresses this point elegantly at the very beginning of his famous trea
tise on the criminal law. In explaining why his project is to answer the question, "What sorts
of conduct may the state rightly make criminal?" Feinberg explains: "My reason for restrict
ing the inquiry to the criminal law is partly methodological. Even if one were concerned to
give a complete account of social power, one would begin with the relatively blunt and visible
forms of political coercion where interferences with liberty are 'writ large.'" JOEL FEINBERG,
HARM TO OTHERS: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 3 (1983).
I say "coercing actors to perform or refrain from actions" rather than "imposing a duty
upon actors," given the justiciability problems (within the Direct Account) raised by duties
that are not clearly coercive. See infra text accompanying notes 290-92, 588-97.
58. See GEORG HENRIK VON Wrumrr, NORM AND ACTION: A LomCAL ENQUIRY 7
(1963) (defining "prescription" in this sense) ("Prescriptions are given or issued by someone.
They 'flow' from or have their 'source' in the will of a norm-giver or, as we shall also say, a
norm-authority. They are, moreover, addressed or directed to some agent or agents, whom
we shall call norm-subject(s). . . . In order to make its will known to the subject(s), the
authority promulgates the norm. In order to make its will effective, the authority attaches a
sanction or threat of punishment to the norm.''). For philosophical discussion of the different
types of rules, including what I am calling "prescriptions," see id. at 1-16; FREDERICK
SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DE
CISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 1-15 (1991); MAx BLACK, MODELS AND METAPHORS
95-139 (1962).
Meir Dan-Cohen, in a well-known article, has explained that the conduct-regulating and
decision-authorizing aspects of a prescription may come apart. The state may use one de
scription of actions to tell the public what it should or should not do, and another to tell its
officials which actions or failures to act should be sanctioned. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision
Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HAR.v. L. REv. 625,
626 (1984). For ease of exposition, I assume that the state's conduct rule and decision rule
are one and the same; however, nothing in my critique of the Direct Account or defense of
the Derivative Account depends upon that assumption.
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description of actions contained in

the rule's canonical formulation, such that actors are obliged to re
frain from performing, or to perform, any particular action falling
under that description, and state officials are authorized to sanction
any non-complying actor. Finally, my discussion focuses upon sub
stantive rather than procedural challenges - that is, I ignore
Fourth Amendment,59 Sixth Amendment, procedural due process,
and other such challenges to the investigatory and adjudicatory pro
cedures by which a civil or criminal sanction is imposed upon the
claimant - because the theoretical as well as doctrinal problems of
procedural rights are quite distinct.60 It is enough to show in detail,
as this article attempts to do, that substantive constitutional rights
are better explained by the Derivative Account.
* * *

It is hard to imagine a crisper formulation of the proposition
that constitutional rights do not shield actions than the following
passage from Supreme Court's opinion in the R.A. V. 61 case.
Rules - even the rules that the state uses to regulate conduct and impose sanctions need not, as a conceptual matter, have a canonical formulation. See John Calvin Jeffries, Jr.,
Legality, Vagueness and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REv. 189, 190-201
(1985) (describing nineteenth-century institution of common-law crimes); SCHAUER, supra, at
14 (noting that "specificity, conclusiveness [and) authoritative formulation [are not] neces
sary conditions for the existence of a mandatory rule"). Persons sanctioned by the state
pursuant to a non-canonically formulated rule will have a constitutional vagueness or retro
activity claim, see Jeffries, supra, at 190-201; it is beyond the scope of this article to analyze
the moral content and power of this constitutional right, and to decide whether it is itself
morally direct or derivative. Assume that the right fails; X is sanctioned pursuant to a
common-law rule. Then, on the Derivative Account, the judicial decision overturning X's
sanction simply amounts to a repeal or amendment of the common-law rule (whether that is,
in turn, styled an interpretation of the rule, or an override). That would be my construal, for
example, of Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307-11 (1940) (overturning, on free speech
grounds, conviction of speaker for common law breach of the peace).

59. For an illuminating analysis, in the Fourth Amendment context, of a problem (Why
do guilty persons have a Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches?) quite
parallel to the problem discussed here (Why do persons who are guilty under some descrip·
tion have substantive constitutional rights against being sanctioned or coerced pursuant to
the wrong kind of rules?), see Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in Fourth
Amendment Jurisprudence, 96 CoLUM. L. REv. 1456 (1996).
60. In general, procedures are valuable either instrumentally (as a mechanism by which
to secure good outcomes) or because of the intrinsic value of participation. See Jerry L.
Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U. L. REv.
885, 886 (1981); Robert S. Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes - A Plea for
"Process Values," 60 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 4 (1974). The substantive rights under discussion
here have a moral grounding that is, I believe, at least partly distinct from this moral ground
ing for procedural rights. See infra sections III.A.1-2. And even if this is untrue, see JoHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST. A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 73-104 (1980)
(presenting "process theory" of constitutional rights), the problem of explaining why a con·
stitutional right can be violated by virtue of a flawed rule-predicate whose application by
enforcement officers and courts is procedurally perfect, will prove sufficiently complex to
merit separate attention.
61.

R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,

505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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The proposition that a particular instance of speech can be proscrib
able on the basis of one feature (e.g., obscenity) but not on the basis
of another (e.g., opposition to the city government) is commonplace
and has found application in many contexts. We have long held, for
example, that nonverbal expressive activity can be banned because of
the action it entails, but not because of the ideas it expresses - so
that burning a flag in violation of an ordinance against outdoor fires
could be punishable, whereas burning a flag in violation of an ordi
nance against dishonoring _the flag is not. Similarly, we have upheld
reasonable "time, place, or manner" restrictions, but only if they are
"justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech."
And just as the power to proscribe particular speech on the basis of a
noncontent element (e.g., noise) does not entail the power to pro
scribe the same speech on the basis of a content element; so also, the
power to proscribe it on the basis of one content element (e.g., ob
scenity) does not entail the power to proscribe it on the basis of other
content elements.62
This passage describes not just the Free Speech Clause of the First

Amendment, but all the provisions of the Bill of Rights that, within

current constitutional jurisprudence, secure judicial protection for
actors from sanctions and sanction-backed duties.
Let us begin with free speech. The Free Speech Clause concerns
a special kind of action: a speech-act. Speech-acts, like actions
more generally, are what philosophers call "particulars" or "to
kens."63 That is, an action is a particular thing - specifically, a
particular bodily movement - that can be picked out under differ
ent descriptions, which describe the various properties that one and
the same bodily movement has.64 "Property," here, denotes some
type, or class, of bodily movements - for example, the type, or
class, of bodily movements that cause a certain kind of effect, or
that constitute a certain kind of event.65 A particular finger-pulling
of yours can, at once, be an action of "shooting a gun," "killing a
human being," "disturbing the neighbors," and "stopping an in62. 505 U.S. at 385-86 (citations omitted) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491
U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
63. On the distinction between "tokens" or "particulars," and "types" or "universals,"
see D.M. ARMSTRONG, UNIVERSALS: AN OPINIONATED INTRODUCTION 1-7 (1989).
64. See MICHAEL S. MooRE, Acr AND CruME: THE PHn.osoPHY OF ACTION AND rrs
IMPUCATIONS FOR CruMINAL LAw 60-77' 280-301 (1993) (analyzing actions as particulars); id.
at 78-112 (arguing that each particular action is a particular volition-caused bodily move
ment). Although the so-called "coarse-grained" view of actions as particulars is not a univer
sal one, see ROBERT AUDI, ACTION, INTENTION, AND REASON 2 (1993) (describing coarse
grained view as "more widely held, and perhaps dominant, at present"), a legal right that
protected one and the same action from sanction pursuant to different rules would, necessar
ily, presume a coarse-grained view. It would identify some particular, dynamic human thing
(call it a "shmaction," if indeed "actions" are fine-grained) that no rule could pick out.
65.

See ARMSTRONG, supra note 63, at 1-7.
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truder," all of which descriptions refer to the diverse states or
events that the very same finger-pulling causes or constitutes.66
Similarly, a particular mouth movement of yours (performed, say,
during an anti-war demonstration in a public park) can, at once, be
an action of "protesting the war," "offending the bystanders," "dis
turbing the wildlife," and "breaking windows" (if your pitch is suffi
ciently shrill). A particular hand-motion of yours can, at once, be
an action of "striking a match," "burning acrylic," "desecrating a
flag," and "battering a bystander."67
So a speech-act, like any action, has multiple properties.68 By
definition,

one

property that a speech-act has is the property of

communicating, of "expressing," a statement. But a speech-act al
ways also has some nonexpressive property - at a minimum, an
innocuous property like producing sound waves, or darkening pa
per. And sometimes, as in the action of burning a flag, or sabotag
ing military production to protest the war, or performing a
"symbolic" assassination, the nonexpressive properties of a speech
act - its causal or constitutive connection to states or events, in
dependent of the fact that the act-token is communicative - can be
quite morally serious. Thus it has long been a staple of First
Amendment jurisprudence, as R.A. V. rightly explains, that a
speech-act can be sanctioned or prohibited by a rule whose predi66. See, e.g., R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 379-81 (speech-act also action of trespass); United States
v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 313 n.1 {1990) (speech-act also action of injuring federal property);
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 784-90 {1989) (speech-act also action of causing
loud noise); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 291-92 {1984)
(speech-act also action of camping); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 369-70 (1968)
(speech-act also action of destroying government documents).
67. It might be objected, again, that I am assuming an unduly coarse-grained view of act
individuation. It is consistent with the status of actions as particulars to say that, where the
same bodily movement falls under two radically different types, we have not one but two
actions. It might be the case that some, but not all, of the different properties that a particu
lar bodily movement has are properties of the same action. See MooRE, supra note 64, at
366-74. I believe, however, that the most plausible act-shielding constitutional right would be
significantly coarse-grained, in this sense: it would delineate some type of action sufficiently
important or harmless that actors, or certain actors (e.g., black actors), should be free to
perform it. But how is the freedom of actors to perform a type of action violated? It is
violated by coercing them not to perform the bodily movement that instantiates the action, or
sanctioning them by virtue of that bodily movement. So, wh�ther or not the rule-predicate
pursuant to which that bodily movement is coerced and sanctioned picks out the same "ac
tion," for nonlegal purposes, it would for purposes of our act-shielding right.
For this reason, in my descriptive efforts I focus on showing that sanctioning or coercing
the very same (significantly) coarse-grained action can be unconstitutional under one de
scription and constitutional under another. But, in any event, my descriptive claims are
equally true, I think, on a more moderately coarse-grained view. Otherwise, why would con
stitutional challenges be styled as facial or as-applied challenges to particular rules? See infra
text accompanying notes 133-34. Therefore, I will not belabor the point through a separate
discussion of the moderately coarse-grained view.
68. Or, more generally, like any token. See ARMsmoNo, supra note 63, at 1-7.

Rights Against Rules

October 1998]

21

cate picks out certain nonexpressive properties of actions, even
though sanctioning or prohibiting the very same speech-act under a
rule whose predicate picks out certain

expressive

act-properties

would be unconstitutional.
The leading case for this doctrine is

United States v. O'Brien.69

O'Brien burned his draft card on the steps of a federal court
house as an act of political protest against the Vietnam War, and

Mr.

was prosecuted and convicted pursuant to a federal statute that pro
hibited destroying or mutilating draft cards.70 The Supreme Court
upheld O'Brien's conviction,71 despite the assumed expressive cast
of his particular action of draft-card-destruction.72 The Court's rea
soning centered on the predicate of the particular statute pursuant
to which O'Brien was convicted.

This Court has held that when "speech" and "nonspeech" elements
are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important
governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify
incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms. . . . Whatever
imprecision inheres in these terms, we think it clear that a govern
ment regulation is sufficiently justified if it . . . furthers an important
or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is un
related to the suppression offree expression; and if the incidental re
striction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.73

In

short,

Mr.

O'Brien's conviction satisfied the First Amendment

because the act-property set forth by the statute's predicate was a

(sufficiently

important) nonexpressive property of actions: the
property of causing draft cards to be damaged.74 Had O'Brien, in
stead, been convicted for violating a rule that prohibited draftees
69. 391 U.S. 367 {1968).
70.
71.

See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 369-70.
See 391 U.S. at 386.
See 391 U.S. at 376 ("[E]ven on the

72.
assumption that the alleged communicative ele
ment in O'Brien's conduct is sufficient to bring into play the First Amendment, it does not
necessarily follow that the destruction of a registration certificate is constitutionally protected
activity.").
73. 391 U.S. at 376-77 (emphasis added).
74. See 391 U.S. at 382 ("In conclusion, we find that because of the Government's sub
stantial interest in assuring the continuing availability of issued Selective Service certificates,
because amended § 462{b) is an appropriately narrow means of protecting this interest and
condemns only the independent noncommunicative impact of conduct within its reach, and
because the noncommunicative impact of O'Brien's act of burning his registration certificate
frustrated the Government's interest, a sufficient governmental interest has been shown to
justify O'Brien's conviction."). The O'Brien reference to the government's "substantial in
terest" implies that rules picking out insignificant nonexpressive act-properties might be
invalid, insofar as these include speech-acts within their scope. I believe this is indeed the
correct interpretation of the Free Speech Clause and the Court's free speech case law. See
infra text accompanying notes 354-64.
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from "protesting the w ar," or "desecrating draft cards," his convic
tion would certainly h ave been unconstitutional.

Although First

Amendment doctrine is dense and complicated, it is at least clear
that

certain rules

that pick out expressive act-properties - specifi

cally, rules that are "content-based" - are subject to intensive
scrutiny and are almost always unconstitutional.75 This was the
case, for example, in

Texas

v.

Johnson.

The statutory term "flag

desecration" picked out an expressive property of actions - to des
ecrate a flag is, necessarily, to perform a bodily movement that

communicates

disrespect - and triggered strict scrutiny by the

Court.76
Consider what

O'Brien's

the First Amendment would look like

if

distinction between rules whose predicates pick out

nonexpressive versus expressive properties of actions did not ob
tain. Either speech-acts with seriously harmful nonexpressive char
acteristics, such as expressive burnings, sabotages, assassinations,
and so forth, would be constitutionally protected: someone who
was speaking as well as harming would h ave a successful First
Amendment defense to

a prosecution for battery, property

destruction, or homicide. Alternatively, expressive burnings, acts of
sabotage, or assassinations could be sanctioned pursuant to grossly
overbroad or discriminatory laws that prohibited, say, "offensive ut
terances," "language disrespectful to the Nation," or "the making
of a misleading statement about the President, by a registered
member of the Independent Party."77
Besides the

O'Brien

distinction between the expressive and

nonexpressive properties of speech-acts, there is a second distinc75. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988); see also Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 123-27 (1991) (arguing that, in
general, content-based laws should not be subject to "compelling interest" scrutiny but rather
should be automatically unconstitutional).
76. Although the Court initially pointed out that Texas had defined "desecration" in a
way that left open the possibility of nonexpressive desecration, see Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397, 403 n.3 (1989) (defining "desecration" as physical mistreatment of flag that causes seri
ous offense), the Court's subsequent analysis belied this point and took "desecration" (even
as defined by Texas) to be expressive. See 491 U.S. at 412 (holding that Texas statute is
"content-based" because the offensive cast of expressive flag-desecration is not a secondary
effect, unrelated to its expressive cast).
77. For a cogent statement of the First Amendment distinction between rules picking out
nonexpressive versus expressive properties of speech-acts, see Alexander, supra note 7, at
545 (" '[C]riticizing the government' is not protected conduct viewed in isolation from the
various ways government might attempt to regulate/criticizing the government.' 'Criticizing
the government' may be validly - constitutionally - regulated if the criticism is broadcast
from a soundtruck at night, and the regulation proscribes the use of soundtrucks at night. . . .
But 'criticizing the government' is not validly regulated if the regulation proscribes, or was
motivated by a desire to proscribe, 'criticizing the government.' ").
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tion, relevant here, within First Amendment jurisprudence. That is
the distinction between low-value and full-value speech. The classic
low-value categories are obscenity, incitement, "fighting words,"
and libel.78 What this means is that a speech-act token falling
within a low-value category - the action of displaying a sexually
prurient, patently offensive movie that lacks serious literary, artis
tic, political or scientific value;79 or inciting a crowd, with likely suc
cess, to imminent lawless action;80 or uttering a face-to-face insult
that, by its very utterance, tends to cause an immediate breach of
the peace;81 or knowingly stating an injurious falsehood about an
other person82 - can be sanctioned pursuant to an appropriate
rule. But it has long been a :fixture of the Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence that sanctioning a low-value speech-act pursuant to
the wrong kind of rule will be unconstitutional. The doctrine that
expresses this proposition, of course, is the First Amendment "over
breadth" doctrine. 83
In [overbreadth] cases, an individual whose own speech . . . may val
idly be prohibited or sanctioned is permitted to challenge a statute on
its face because it also threatens others not before the court - those
who desire to engage in legally protected expression but who may
refrain from doing so rather than risk prosecution or undertake to
have the law declared partially invalid. If the overbreadth is "sub
stantial," the law may not be enforced against anyone, including the
party before the court, until it is narrowed to reach only unprotected
activity . . . 84
.

So, for example, to use the exemplary case of

Gooding v. Wilson, 85

it violated the First Amendment to sanction a political protester
pursuant to a statute prohibiting '"[the utterance of] opprobrious
78. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1992); Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S.
at 127 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).

See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973).
See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
.
81. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). The Chaplinsky Court
79.
80.

defines fighting words disjunctively to include also speech-acts which "by their very utterance
inflict injury," 315 U.S. at 572, but whether the Frrst Amendment category of fighting words
truly includes non-peace-breaching, injurious speech-acts is seriously questionable after

R.A.V.
82.

See New York T!Illes Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 {1964).

83. For scholarly discussions of the overbreadth doctrine, see Alexander, supra note 7;
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853 (1991); Alfred Hill,
The Puzzling First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 25 HoFSTRA L. REv. 1063 {1997);
Monaghan, supra note 44; Martin Redish, The Warren Court, the Burger Court and the First
Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 1031 (1983); Note, The First Amend
ment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HAR.v. L. REv. 844 (1970).
84. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503 (1985).

85. 405 U.S. 518 {1972).
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words or abusive language' "S6 - given the breadth of the statutory
terms "opprobrious" and "abusive" - even though what the pro
tester in fact had said, to a police officer, was, "White son of a bitch,
I'll kill you."S7 Or, to switch from "fighting words" to obscenity, it
would presumably violate the First Amendment to sanction X pur
suant to a law generally prohibiting the display of "pictures of chil
dren not fully clothed" - given the umpteen nonpornographic
pictures of this kind that parents display - even
child pornographer.ss

if X himself is

a

Similar examples could readily be con

structed for incitements9 and libel.
The reader familiar with the First Amendment overbreadth doc
trine, and the Court's conceptualization thereof, may protest at this
point that the application of an overbroad rule to an assaultive pro
tester, or a child pornographer, or another such actor X whose own
speech is proscribable under a different rule, does not actually in
volve the violation of X's "constitutional rights."

Rather, this

reader may explain, overturning X's sanction is simply a prophylac
tic measure designed to protect other,

innocent

speakers falling

under the same rule as X90 But this response misconstrues what I
mean by "constitutional right." The response assumes that consti
tutional rights necessarily have a special and robust moral content;
X's constitutional rights can only be violated, the response assumes,
86.

Wilson, 405 U.S.

at 519 (quoting GA. ConE.

.ANN. § 26.6303 (Harrison Supp. 1971)).

87. 405 U.S. at 520 n.1 (citing Wilson v. State, 156 S.E.2d 446, 449 (Ga. 1967)); see also
Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974) (invalidating Louisiana ordinance that
made it unlawful to "curse or revile or to use obscene or opprobrious language toward or
with reference to any member of the city police," where speaker allegedly cursed and
screamed at police officer (citing NEW ORLEANS, LA., ORDINANCE 828 M.C.S. § 49-7 (1972)).

88. Surely this would be true if "not fully clothed" were defined to include the display of
any body part except for the head, arms, or feet. See Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576,
590 {1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that statute prohibiting nude or sexual photo
. graphs, etc., of children, with nudity defined only to include genitals, pubic areas, and
postpubertal female breasts, is overbroad); cf. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 112-14 (1990)
(rejecting overbreadth challenge to statute regulating child pornography, by virtue of stat
ute's predicate requiring more than nudity); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764-74 (1982)
(same).
More generally, as the Court bas stated in Miller, the foundational obscenity case: "State
statutes designed to regulate obscene materials must be carefully limited . . . . [Obscene] con
duct must be specifically defined by the applicable state law, as written or authoritatively
construed." Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973) {footnote omitted). The obscene
cast of the claimant's own conduct is not a sufficient condition for his constitutional claim to
fail.
89. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-49 (1969) (scrutinizing predicate of crimi
nal syndicalism statute, and invalidating statute because it covered actions not within the
narrow category of incitement).
90. See, e.g., Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503-04 (1985) (explicating
overbreadth as a special prophylactic doctrine that obtains where the speaker's own constitu
tional rights are not violated); Ferber, 458 U.S. at 769-70 (1982) (same); Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-13 (1973) (same).
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if

moral wrong was done to X I do not mean to assume that.
Rather, by "constitutional right," I simply mean a legal right (tech

nically, a legal power) to secure the judicial invalidation, in some
measure, of one or more rules (of a particular rule on the rule
centered view, or of all rules covering a particular action on the act
shielding view).91 This concept of a "constitutional right" is both
plausible and deliberately catholic. It is, by design, consistent with
both the Direct Account and the Derivative Account, and leaves
open, for further debate, what the moral content of constitutional
rights truly is. The Direct Account ought not triumph at the defini
tional stage, by defining "constitutional right" to exclude the very
possibility of constitutional rights having derivative moral content.
And it is, further, clear that "constitutional rights," as here ca
tholically defined, do not have an act-shielding structure in the
overbreadth context. The assaultive protester has a constitutional
right, in my sense, to secure the invalidation of her sanction pursu
ant to an overbroad rule prohibiting "opprobrious words or abusive
language"; neither she nor anyone else has a constitutional right to
secure the invalidation of her sanction, for the very same action,
imposed pursuant to a narrowly tailored rule prohibiting fighting
words. The child pornographer has a constitutional right, in my
sense, to secure the invalidation of her sanction pursuant to an
overbroad rule prohibiting all pictures of unclothed children;
neither she nor anyone else has a constitutional right to secure the
invalidation of her sanction, for the very same action, imposed pur
suant to a narrowly tailored rule prohibiting child pornography.
The First Amendment case that ties together all the doctrine I
have just summarized, and shows, better than any other, how free
speech rights are not act-shielding, is the R.A. V. case itself.

In

R.A. V., a speaker whose speech-act was doubly bad - not only was
the speech-act an instance of low-value speech, but it also possessed
harmful nonexpressive properties - nonetheless secured the invali
dation of his indictment. This particular speaker, a teenager, had
decided to express his views by burning a cross on the front yard of
a black family who happened to live across the street from him.92
The teenager was prosecuted for breaching a Minnesota ordinance
that broadly prohibited racist, sexist, and anti-religious expression:
" 'Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object,
appellation, characterization or graffiti [which] arouses anger,
91.

See supra note 45 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying notes 434-39.

92.

See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 379-80 (1992).
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alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed,
religion or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of
a misdemeanor.' "93 The teenager's particular action was an action
of trespass and perhaps arson,94 and also, the entirt:t Court assumed,
of uttering "fighting, words. "95 But the entire Court also agreed (on
differing rationales)96 that sanctioning the teenager pursuant to the
particular statute Minnesota had chosen would be unconstitutional.
The entire Court concurred in overturning the indictment of our
doubly harmful teenager, by virtue of the Minnesota statute's
flawed predicate.

In

sum, First Amendment cases like

Texas v. Johnson, O'Brien,

the overbreadth cases, and R.A. V. show unequivocally that free
speech rights do not possess an act-shielding structure. In theory,
one might think, constitutional liberties such as liberty of speech
should indeed have an act-shielding structure. What a constitu
tional liberty should do, one might claim, is to shield from all rules
particularly important actions - those actions falling within the
category defined by the liberty (for example, full-value expression,
or religiously motivated conduct) that do not have overriding,
harmful properties.97 But our actual constitutional practices belie
this claim. It is unsurprising then, that when we move from liberties
to equality - from the Free Speech to the Equal Protection Clause
- our practices remain rule-centered rather than act-shielding. For

if

constitutional liberties do not give rise to protective shields

around actions, then a fortiori constitutional guarantees, such as the
Equal Protection Clause, that have nothing to do with important
types of actions, should not.
And indeed the Equal Protection Clause does not. "Discrimina
tory purpose" has, for some time now, been the touchstone of equal
protection analysis. A rule has a "discriminatory purpose," within
equal protection law,

if the rule-predicate refers explicitly to partic
if the legislators

ular races, genders, or other "suspect" classes, or

93. 505 U.S. at 380 (citing ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGis. CooE § 292.02 (1990)).
94.

See 505 U.S. at 380 n.1.

95. See 505 U.S. at 381; 505 U.S. at 402 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); 505 U.S.
at 432 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
96. The majority overturned the teenager's indictment, on the assumption that the ordi
nance had been narrowed to cover a content-based and viewpoint-based subset of "fighting
words." See 505 U.S. at 391-96. The concurring Justices agreed that the teenager's indict
ment should be overturned, but their rationale was that the ordinance was overbroad, by
including speech-acts that were not "fighting words." See 505 U.S. at 411-15 {White, J., con
curring in the judgment).
97. Cf. infra text accompanying notes 315-33 (discussing true nature of constitutional
"liberties").
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intended the rule to have a disparate impact along suspect lines.98
Having a "discriminatory purpose" is close to99 a necessary condi
tion for a successful equal protection challenge.100 A rule that
merely has a disparate impact, not a "discriminatory purpose,"

will

not violate the Equal Protection Clause. This doctrine stems from
the Court's well-known decision in Washington v. Davis, 101 where it
upheld a qualifying exam for D.C. police officers, even though
blacks were disqualified by the test in disproportionate numbers;
and from the extension of Davis to gender in the Feeney case,102
which upheld Massachusetts's civil service preference for veterans,
even though virtually all veterans in Massachusetts were men.
To construe the Equal Protection Clause as act-shielding would
eviscerate the doctrines here described. As an illustration, consider
Craig v. Boren, 103 perhaps the leading example of an equal protec
tion challenge to a conduct-regulating rule (the type of rule dis
cussed in this article). An Oklahoma statute prohibited the sale of
low-alcohol beer to minors, with a "minor" defined as a man under
the age of twenty-one, and a woman under the age of eighteen.104
98. See FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U. S. 307, 313 (1993) ("[A] statutory
classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitu
tional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification."); Person
nel Admr. v.Feeney, 442 U.S.256, 271-80 (1979) (holding that rule that employs a nonsus
pect predicate will still trigger heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, but
only if predicate was selected, by rule-formulator, because of rule's adverse effects on a sus
pect class).
Beach also adverts here to the possibility of an equal protection challenge enhanced by
the presence of fundamental rights. The Court has indeed recognized discrimination-type
challenges in the area of fundamental rights, but, most recently - at least with respect to
conduct-regulating rules - it has proceeded directly under the relevant fundamental right,
and has not relied upon the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.520 (1993) (free exercise); R.A.V. v. City of St.Paul,
505 U.S.377 (1992) (free speech).
99. I say "close to" because the Court has, on occasion, invalidated statutes under the
rational-basis prong of equal protection scrutiny. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996); Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commn., 488 U.S. 336 (1989); City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Hooper v. Bernalillo County
Assessor, 472 U.S.612 (1985); Zobel v.Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982); United States Dept. of
Agric. v.Moreno, 413 U.S.528 (1973). Such cases, or at least some of them, can be under
stood as involving "suspect" classes that the Court was unwilling to label as such - for
example, the class of new state residents in Hooper and Zobel, the class of homosexual per
sons in Romer, and the class of mentally retarded persons in Cleburne.
100. It will be sufficient if the interest behind the rule lacks enough importance to justify
purposeful discrimination. See, e.g., Craig v.Boren, 429 U. S.190, 197 (1976) ("classifications
by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives").
101.
102.
103.
104.

426 U.S.229 (1976).
Feeney, 442 U. S.256 (1979).
429 U.S.190 (1976).
See Craig, 429 U. S. at 191-92.
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vendor of low-alcohol beer brought an anticipatory challenge to
the statute. The Court sustained her challenge, finding an insuffi
cient connection between gender and the state's claimed objective
- traffic-safety - to justify the statute's explicit gender classifica
tion.105 The vendor was constitutionally free from the particular
legal duty to which the gender-discriminatory statute purported to
subject her. But this could hardly mean, given Davis and Feeney,
that the vendor was also free from the duties to which a host of
gender-neutral rules might subject her, and under which her (vari
ous) actions of selling low-alcohol beer to minors might fall: for
example, a rule requiring her to possess a valid license, to refrain
from selling alcohol to someone obviously intoxicated, or to sell al
cohol for take-away consumption only in closed containers.t06
Indeed, the Court in Craig v. Boren made clear that Oklahoma
could cure the defect in its statute by widening the statutory duty,
so as necessarily to include within its scope every single action cov
ered by the now-discriminatory duty. "[T]he Oklahoma Legislature
is free to redefine any cutoff age for the purchase and sale of [low
alcohol beer] that it may choose, provided that the redefinition op
erates in a gender-neutral fashion."107 Sanctioning the vendor for
breaching a rule that banned sales to women as well as men under
the age of twenty-one would not violate the vendor's constitutional
rights, or anyone else's. This is a tight, logical consequence of the
doctrinal focus on discriminatory purpose; but note that it would
hold true even if the doctrine were changed to make either dispa
rate impact or discriminatory purpose the basis for an equal protec
tion violation. The concept of disparate impact, like the concept of
discriminatory purpose, takes as its referent a particular rule.108 It
A

105.

See 429 U.S. at 199-204.

106. Here, as in the overbreadth context, the point that the vendor was not asserting "her
own" constitutional rights, but instead was asserting (under the rubric of jus tertii) the consti
tutional rights of others - male purchasers of low-alcohol beer, see 429 U.S. at 192-97 (hold
ing that vendor had jus tertii standing) - is misplaced. The vendor did have a constitutional
right in my minimal sense: a legal right to secure the invalidation, in some measure, of the
rule that purported to impose a duty upon her. See supra text accompanying notes 90-91
(discussing this issue in the overbreadth context).
In any event, my point would also hold for a rule that penalized the purchase of alcohol
by men between 18 and 21. Clearly, overturning a young man's sanction or duty pursuant to
this rule would not entail that he had a general constitutional immunity for othenvise-illegal
actions of purchasing alcohol.
107.

Craig, 429 U.S. at 210 n.24 (emphasis added).

108. See Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Pan.. & Pun. A.FF. 107,
147-69 (1976). Fiss provides a theoretical defense of disparate-impact-type scrutiny, by argu
ing in favor of what he calls the "group disadvantaging principle": "[A) state law or practice
[that) aggravates . . . the subordinate position of a specially disadvantaged group
is what
the Equal Protection Clause prohibits." Id. at 157.
• . .
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concerns whether that rule falls more heavily on blacks rather than
whites, men rather than women. So imagine that our vendor in
Craig successfully challenged some gender-neutral rule on the
grounds of its disparate- impacf (say, a rule prohibiting the sale of
certain beverages disproportionately consumed by men). She
would still be subject to existing gender-neutral rules lacking that
disparate impact, as well as to a widened version of the unconstitu
tional rule - widened so as to eliminate the disparate impact.
So much for the Free Speech and Equal Protection Clauses of
the Bill of Rights. The Free Exercise Clause can be handled
quickly. As a consequence of the Court's decision in the seminal
case of Employment Division v. Smith, 109 free exercise doctrine is
now closely isomorphic to equal protection doctrine and roughly
isomorphic to free speech doctrine.110 The Court in Smith held that
Native Americans who had used peyote as part of the ceremony of
a Native American church, and as a result were dismissed from
their jobs for illegal drug use, could be denied state unemployment
benefits.111 The right to religious freedom, the Court announced,
simply protected actors from being sanctioned or coerced pursuant
to non-neutral rules. Non-neutral rules, here, are those that explic
itly pick out religious properties of actions - for example, that the
It is, in theory, possible to construct an act-shielding doctrine under the Equal Protection
Clause. Certain otherwise-proscribable actions, if performed by blacks, would be constitu
tionally immune; blacks' freedom to perform such actions could be conceptualized as a re
source to which they have a special claim, by virtue of distributive or reparative justice, or by
virtue of an anti-caste principle, or whatever. But this is not what Flss argues for, or what the
concept of disparate impact involves. See Personnel Admr. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 259-61
(1979) (describing claimant's disparate-impact challenge to statutory provision establishing
preference for veterans); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 232-38 (1976) (describing claim
ants' disparate-impact challenge to various hiring practices, in particular a qualifying test,
employed by the District of Columbia).

109. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
110. I say "roughly" rather than perfectly isomorphic to free speech doctrine, because
rules picking out nonexpressive act properties are, at least officially, subject to heightened
scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause, see supra text accompanying note 73 - properly so,
see infra text accompanying notes 354-64 - while neutral laws are not subject to heightened
equal protection or free exercise scrutiny. I say "closely" rather than perfectly isomorphic to
equal protection doctrine because of a special proviso that the Court deployed in Smith, and
reaffirmed in City ofBoerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997), to explain its earlier unemploy
ment-compensation cases: '"[W]here the State has in place a system of individual exemp
tions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of religious hardship without
compelling reason."' Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2161 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 884). The exist
ence of this special proviso does not materially undermine the isomorphism between free
exercise and equal protection doctrine, for purposes of this article. Post-Smith, sanctioning
or coercing an action under a religiously discriminatory rule will violate the Constitution
even though sanctioning or coercing the very same action under a neutral rule that lacks the
requisite "system of individual exemptions" will not.
111. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
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action is performed for religious purposes, or by the members of a
particular religious group.

[Our] decisions have consistently held that the right of free exercise
does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a
"valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the
law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or
proscribes)."112
Post-Smith, the religious cast of a particular action will not, under
the Constitution, work to exempt that action from a rule the predi
cate of which describes actions in nonreligious terms113 - just as,
under the Equal Protection Clause, actors are not exempt from
race-neutral or gender-neutral laws and, under the

O'Brien portion

of First Amendment jurisprudence, speakers can generally be regu
lated by rules picking out nonexpressive properties of their actions.
Thus the rule-centered - rather than act-protecting - structure of
free speech and equal protection doctrine holds true,

tandis,

mutatis mu

for free exercise.

Finally, constitutional doctrine in the area of substantive due
process quite clearly fits the Basic Structure. Here, as elsewhere,
constitutional challenges - whether anticipatory challenges by
would-be actors, or retrospective challenges by actors who already
have been sanctioned - are structured as challenges to particular
rules. This is so natural to constitutional lawyers, scholars, and ju
rists, that the Court without pause or comment adopted a rule
centered approach in the seminal, post-New Deal substantive due
process cases:

Griswold v. Connecticut114 and Roe v. Wade. 115 Gris
wold was a retrospective, individual challenge by Dr. Griswold and
another doctor, who had been tried and convicted in state court for

prescribing contraceptives in violation of a Connecticut criminal
statute that prohibited " 'us[ing] any drug, medicinal article or in
strument for the purpose of preventing contraception,' " or assisting
others in doing so.116

Roe

was an anticipatory, class-action chal

lenge by the pseudonymous Jane Roe and others, who brought a
declaratory and injunctive suit in federal district court against the
Texas abortion statutes, which criminalized " 'procur[ing] an abor
tion' " except for those " 'procured . . . by medical advice for the
112. 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting United•States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens,
J., concurring in the judgment)); see Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2160-61 (reaffirming Smith).
113. With the special exception noted above, see supra note 110.
114. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
115. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
116.

Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480 (quoting CoNN.

GEN. STAT.

ANN. § 53-32

(West 1958)).
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purpose of saving the life of the mother.' "117 In each case, the
Court focused on the particular statute against which it took, re
spectively, Dr. Griswold's and Ms. Roe's claims to be . targeted.
Specifically, the Court in each of these cases asked whether the par
ticular statute at issue was narrowly tailored - a concept familiar
from free speech jurisprudence.118 To quote the analysis in
Griswold:
The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within the zone
of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees.
And it concerns a law which, in forbidding the use of contraceptives
rather than regulating their manufacture or sale, seeks to achieve its
goals by means having a maximum destructive impact upon that rela
tionship. Such a law cannot stand in light of the familiar principle, so
often applied by this Court, that a "governmental purpose to control
or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may
not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."119

The narrow-tailoring approach in Roe was identical:
Where certain "fundamental rights" are involved, the Court has
held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a
"compelling state interest," and that legislative enactments must be
narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake.
Measured against these standards, [the Texas statute], in restrict
ing legal abortions to those "procured or attempted by medical advice
for the purpose of saving the life of the mother," sweeps too broadly.
The statute makes no distinction between abortions performed early
in pregnancy and those performed later, and it limits to a single rea
son, "saving" the mother's life, the legal justification for the proce
dure. The statute, therefore, cannot survive the constitutional attack
made upon it here.120

Because the Connecticut statute at stake in Griswold failed the
Court's narrow-tailoring test, the Court overturned the sanctions of
Dr. Griswold and his fellow physician that had been meted out pur
suant to that statute.121 There was only a brief description of the
particular actions that these doctors had performed;122 and it was
surely not an entailment of the holding in Griswold that the doctors
117.

Roe, 410 U.S. at 117 n.l (quoting TEX. PENAL CoDE ANN. arts. 1192, 1196).

118. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (citing free speech case law for narrow-tailoring analy
sis); Roe, 410 U.S. at 155 (citing substantive due process, free speech, and other fundamental
rights case law for narrow-tailoring analysis).
119. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama
288, 307 (1964)).

Roe, 410 U.S. at 155, 164 (citations omitted).
See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
122. See 381 U.S. at 480-81.
120.

121.

ex reL Flowers, 377 U.S.
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were constitutionally immune from being sanctioned, under any
statute, for those particular actions. What if the notation Dr.
Griswold used on his prescription form was a secret message to the
pharmacist that constituted blackmail or extortion on an unrelated
matter? What if the forms Griswold used had been stolen from the
government? What if he prescribed more expensive contraceptive
C rather than cheaper contraceptive D, as part of a price-fixing
scheme with other doctors and the drug companies? The Court in
Griswold did not need to confront these possibilities - it did not
need to undertake a complete description of all the morally rele
vant properties of Dr. Griswold's actions123 - because Dr.
Griswold's substantive due process right was rule-centered, not act
shielding. It protected him from being sanctioned pursuant to the
no-contraception rule; it did not protect him from being sanctioned
pursuant to all the rules under which his actions of prescribing con
traceptives might fall.
As for the decision in Roe: when the Court upheld the entry of
anticipatory relief prohibiting any enforcement of the Texas no
abortion statute,124 this holding clearly did not entail that every ac
tion within the scope of that statute was immune from coverage by
every rule. The very point of the famous trimester analysis of Roe
was to make clear that a state could proscribe and sanction post
viability abortions absent a threat to the mother's life or health.125
A future actor who procured a post-viability abortion could not be
sanctioned by Texas pursuant to the particular overbroad rule
targeted and invalidated in Roe, 126 but that actor could be sanc
tioned for the very same action if Texas in the interim had re
sponded to Roe by enacting a more narrowly tailored no-abortion
statute limited to post-viability abortions not involving maternal life
or health.
The post-Roe and -Griswold substantive due process cases are
similarly structured as challenges to particular rules rather than to
the sanctioning or coercing of particular actions.127 I will not test
123. See DAVID LYONS, FoRMs AND LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM 30-61 (1965) (analyzing
concept of complete moral description of particular action).
124.
125.

See Roe, 410 U.S. at 166-67.
See 410 U.S. at 162-66.
See 410 U.S. at 166 ("(T]he Texas abortion statutes, as a unit, must fall. . . . We find it

126.
unnecessary to decide whether the District Court erred in withholding injunctive relief [and
merely entering declaratory relief], for we assume the Texas prosecutorial authorities will
give full credence to this decision that the present criminal abortion statutes of that State are
unconstitutional.").
127. Some exemplary and prominent cases, besides Casey, are Webster v. Reproductive
492 U.S. 490 (1989) (regulation of abortion); Bowers v. Hardwick, 418 U.S.
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the reader's patience by discussing the facts and reasoning of these
decisions here, beyond noting that the recent landmark decision in

Casey128

was, like

Roe,

an anticipatory class action in which the

Court facially invalidated a particular state law - a Pennsylvania
statute prohibiting doctors from performing an abortion on a mar
ried woman without receiving a signed statement of spousal consent
from her.129 To spin out the familiar story: the holding in

Casey

protects Pennsylvania physicians from being sanctioned pursuant to
this particular rule; but it does not entitle them to perform abor
tions that not only violate the rule but are also wrongful under an
other description, for example, because the physician's license
elapsed, or because the physician failed to secure the woman's con
sent, and so on.
* * *

This descriptive survey of constitutional doctrine under the rele
vant portions of the Bill of Rights should suffice, I hope, to show
that constitutional rights are not act-shielding, or even remotely like
that.130 But the observant reader might complain that, by demon
strating this negative claim, I have not yet demonstrated the posi

tive

claim that constitutional rights are rights against particular

rules. There is logical space between having rights shield particular
actions from all the rules under which the actions fall, and having
rights that are targeted against particular rules.

A

constitutional

right might be targeted, not against a particular rule but against
some class of rules different from the class targeted by an act
shielding right. For example, constitutional adjudication might be
structured such that a constitutional right empowers the claimant to
186 (1986) (regulation of sodomy); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)
(family unity); and the recent assisted suicide cases, Vacco v. Quit� 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997),
and Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct 2258 (1997).
128. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). The Court in Casey moved from
Roe's narrow-tailoring test for laws regulating abortion, to an "undue burden" test, princi
pally to permit pre-viability measures aimed to protect fetal life, see 505 U.S. at 868-79, but
this does not change the rule-centered cast of the Casey decision itself or of abortion doctrine
more generally.
129. See 505 U.S. at 887-98.
130. What about the possibility of a hybrid structure, such that constitutional rights1 are
targeted against rules, while constitutional rightsz protect innocent actions? It might be pro
tested that, by demonstrating that constitutional rights1 exist - by showing that it can violate
X's constitutional rights to sanction him by virtue of an action proscribable under another
description - I have not ruled out the existence of constitutional rightSz. While a hybrid
structure is indeed logically possible, it does not describe the case law. The closest cases we
have to cases that recognize rightsz are as-applied challenges to rules. But as I demonstrate
below, as-applied challenges to rules are best construed as rule-targeted; they do not involve
a complete moral inspection of X's action, and therefore X's successful as-applied challenge
does not confer a constitutional right2 on him. See infra text accompanying notes 140-44.
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sanctioned, for

performing a particular action, pursuant to any rule where the "pur
pose" behind the rule (whatever precisely that means) is not a com
pelling one.131
Although this intermediate sort of constitutional right - one
that neither protects a particular action from all rules, nor is
targeted against a particular rule - is indeed a logical possibility, it
seems morally esoteric. The act-shielding structure, at least, has
real moral resonance. Actions are the primary object of moral as
sessment, at least on certain plausible theories now widely held by
moral philosophers - namely, act-consequentialist or deontologi
cal theories.132 A particular action will, at bottom, be permissibly
performed or not, and

if

our constitutional reviewing courts were

epistemically and remedially perfect, they might well focus their ef
forts on protecting particular actions. But constitutional courts do
not do this, presumably because of the formal simplicity and practi
cal advantages of focusing on particular rules. Given that they do
not, why think that an intermediate position, with neither the moral
resonance of rights-as-shields-for-actions, nor the countervailing
benefits of the Basic Structure, is anything more than a logical
possibility?
Given that an intermediate position is both formally complex
and morally esoteric, my descriptive efforts here will be brief: the
intermediate position does

not

accurately describe our constitu

tional practices, any more than the act-shielding structure does.
Our very language belies it. Constitutional challenges are charac
terized as facial or as-applied challenges to particular rules,133 not
to classes of rules. Constitutional courts typically focus on the pred
icate or history of one particular rule, regardless of whether the
constitutional challenge is retrospective or prospective, or whether
it is facial or as-applied. Sometimes, constitutional courts will con
sider, in the same case, a challenge to two or more rules; but it is
not a

necessary

feature of constitutional adjudication that this oc

cur.134 The odd, intermediate position I am briefly considering says
that, necessarily, recognizing X's "constitutional right" entails inval131. I am indebted to Michael Dorf for pressing me to recognize and discuss this
possibility.
132. See supra note 46.
133. See Dorf, supra note 38, at 236.
134. I will not try to demonstrate this exhaustively. But it is true, for example, of the
various cases I have selected as doctrinal exemplars, see infra cases cited notes 156-61, 334·41,
348-51, that they typically if not exclusively involve challenges to one rather than multiple
rules, on any plausible text-based individuation criterion.
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idating a class of rules, rather than just one rule. But constitutional
courts typically invalidate (in some measure) merely one, particular
rule. This implies that the Basic Structure rather than the interme
diate position holds true.

I should note that the general view of constitutional adjudica
tion presented in this article (that courts repeal or amend rules, not
individual treatments), and the arguments generally supporting this
view, presuppose only the weaker claim that the act-shielding view
is false (that is, that either the Basic Structure or an intermediate
structure obtains), and not the more robust claim that the Basic
Structure is true. The Direct Account of constitutional rights is un
persuasive because it cannot persuasively account for the following
feature of constitutional law, which is a feature
Structure

and

both

of the Basic

of the intermediate structure just described: that it

can be unconstitutional to impose a sanction or duty pursuant to
one rule even though the very action by virtue of which the sanction
is imposed, or that the claimant is coerced not to perform·, can be
sanctioned or coerced pursuant to a different rule.13s
Nonetheless, because I think the more robust claim is indeed
correct, the view of constitutional adjudication presented here, and
the arguments advanced to support that view, are specifically
framed with the Basic Structure in mind. Constitutional rights are
targeted against particular rules, not against classes of rules.136
135.See infra Part II (criticizing Direct Account). A derivative account of the intermedi
ate structure would construe courts as repealing or amending classes of rules rather than
particular rules.
136. To be sure, a judicial invalidation of one rule may have collateral consequences for
other rules. For example, the invalidation may be stare decisis for a subsequent, judicial
invalidation of another rule with similar content. The invalidation may even trigger duties,
on the part of enforcement officials, to refrain from enforcing other rules. For example, the
invalidation of one rule might make it sufficiently "clear " that a second is unconstitutional,
such that an enforcement official would no longer possess qualified immunity from a dam
ages action if she were to enforce the second. See generally Kent Greenawalt, Constitutional
Decisions and the Supreme Law, 58 U. CoLO. L. REv. 145 (1987) (analyzing consequences of
Supreme Court constitutional decisions for legislative and executive officials). Nonetheless,
it is a mistake to conceive these collateral consequences as an invalidation of the collaterally
affected rules - or at least to conceive them as the kind of invalidation envisioned by an
intermediate structure. The difference between the intermediate structure and the Basic
Structure concerns whether a particular rule is targeted by a judicial holding - whether the
Court's analytic focus concerns the moral propriety of a particular rule; and, relatedly,
whether the change in the duties, powers, etc. of private persons and state officials, with
respect to a particular rule, secured by the judicial holding, can be different from the changes
that follow from the holding with respect to other rules. But surely the answer is yes, given
current practices. For instance, the court can enjoin officials not to enforce the particular
rule; it need not enjoin them not to enforce a class of rules. W here such an injunction is
entered, official enforcement of the targeted rule cru;i trigger contempt sanctions, under the
injunction, while official enforcement of other rule� (however similar) will not
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What do I mean by "one" particular rule? In saying this, I pre
suppose some kind of criterion for individuating rules.137 I will not
specify a particular criterion, beyond saying this: the (descriptively)
correct individuation criterion is some kind of text-based criterion.
Criminal or civil statutes as well as administrative regulations - the
kind of rules at stake in this article - have a canonical, written
formulation that is part of a canonical "code": the U.S. Code, or
the Code of Federal Regulations, or a state statutory or administra
tive code.138 The (descriptively) correct criterion, at least for such
rules; must individuate rules along textual lines: as a single deontic
sentence, or a single term in a deontic sentence, or a single provi
sion made up of several sentences, or something like that. Why?
Because the constitutional courts, in reviewing sanctions and duties,
focus on the predicate and history of these sort of textually defined
deontic entities. The courts will look at a code provision, or a sen
tence in that provision, or a bunch of "related" provisions, and so
on.139 "What, precisely, is the correct text-based individuation cri
terion?" is a tough question; perhaps there is a different criterion
for different constitutional clauses. I need not answer that ques
tion, for purposes of this Part or indeed this article. My claim is
that, whatever the precise, text-based criterion for individuating
rules that is descriptively most accurate (or normatively most at
tractive), the Basic Structure and not some other structure - act
shielding or intermediate - holds true.
Finally, I should make clear that the Basic Structure does not
require constitutional courts to focus exclusively on the predicate or
history of the rule pursuant to which an actor is sanctioned or co
erced, as opposed to also considering some of the features of his
particular action. This goes to the problem of facial versus as
applied challenges, to which I have already alluded. In X's facial
challenge to a rule R (whether an anticipatory challenge by which X
seeks to free himself of a duty, or a retrospective challenge by
which X seeks to overturn a sanction), the court's analysis does fo
cus solely on the predicate and history of R.14o In X's as-applied
137. See SCHAUER, supra note 58, at 62 (discussing individuation of rules); Joseph Raz,
Legal Principles and the Limits ofLaw, 81 YALE LJ. 823, 825-29 (1972) (same); JosEPH RAz,
CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM 70-92, 140-47 (1980) (same).
138. See supra note 58 (discussing issue of canonical formulation). For common-law rules
without a canonical formulation, the individuation criterion might not be text-based.
139. This is true, for example, of the doctrinal exemplars, see infra cases cited notes 15661, 334-41, 348-51.
140. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887-99 (1992) (prospective
facial challenge to duty); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (retrospective
facial challenge to indictment).
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challenge to R, the court's analysis focuses in part on the predicate
and history of R, but also in part on some of the features of X's own
past or future actions. The Basic Structure js consistent with as
applied challenges, insofar as (a) the court engages in a morally lim
ited, rather than morally complete description of X's own actions;
and relatedly (b) X's victory does not entail that those actions are
free from sanction under other rules.
As-applied challenges, as adjudicated by the Court, fit this de
scription. To give an example: In In re R.M.J.141 the claimant attor
ney had been sanctioned, pursuant to a Missouri rule generally
prohibiting attorneys from advertising their services, and the
Supreme Court then overturned his sanction on free speech
grounds. It held that the Missouri rule violated the Free Speech
Clause, as applied to the claimant.142 This meant that the Court
analyzed the particular advertisements for which the claimant had
been sanctioned: it determined that the advertisements were a
form of "commercial speech" and, further, that the advertisements
did not have certain properties (being false or misleading) relevant
to the purpose behind the Missouri rule.143 Had the claimant pub
lished a false advertisement, his sanction would have been upheld.
What the Court did not do was perform a complete moral inspec
tion of the claimant's advertisements; the inspection was limited to
the properties that related, either to the liberty of speech, or to the
particular rule that Missouri had deployed against the claimant.
Presumably, then, he could still be sanctioned for the advertise
ments if they were sufficiently wrong under another description for example, if the action of publishing the advertisements consti
tuted an antitrust violation, theft of services,;or the breach of a stat
ute regulating the level of wages and prices. The claimant
attorney's challenge was as-applied but not act-shielding, and I will
further claim that this is generally true of as-applied challenges (at
least to sanctions and duties) throughout constitutional law.144
141. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
142. See 455 U.S. at 206-07.
143. See 455 U.S. at 204-07.
144. The overwhelming majority of the cases in which the Court sustains as-applied chal
lenges arise under the Free Speech Clause, at least for substantive challenges to the kinds of
rules discussed in this article. Clear, recent examples of successful as-applied free speech
challenges include: Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Commission v. FEC, 518 U.S.
604 {1996); Ibanez v. Florida Department ofBusiness & Professional Regulation, 512 U.S. 136
{1994); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 {1990);
Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission, 496 U.S. 91 {1990); Shapero v.
Kentucky Bar Association, 486 U.S. 466 (1988); and United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171
{1983). See also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 n.3 (1989) (styled as as-applied chal
lenge, given possibility of nonexpressive flag "desecration"). These are generally consistent
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When and why reviewing courts should engage in as-applied
analysis, as opposed to facial analysis, remains a very interesting
constitutional question - one that the Direct and Derivative Ac

will answer quite differently. We will consider this question
1
below. 45 My point here is that, whatever the correct answer, the

counts

existence of as-applied challenges is quite consistent with the Basic
Structure.
* * *

The Basic Structure is

our structure.

It holds true of as-applied

challenges as well as facial challenges, in anticipatory suits as well as
retrospective suits, and across the wide terrain of the Bill of Rights
- from free speech to equal protection to free exercise to substan
tive due process.

Perhaps morality requires this structure to

change; but I will not pursue that issue in this article.146 For there is

a morally tenable account of the moral content of constitutional
rights, structured the way those rights are. That is the Derivative
Account. Rule-targeted rights are best construed, and plausibly
construed, as morally derivative rights. The Direct Account is a
poor view of rule-targeted rights; the Derivative Account is a much
with my descriptive claim that as-applied adjudication is not act-shielding, and does not in
volve a complete moral inspection of the claimant's actions. This is also true of the few clear
as-applied challenges that the Court has sustained in the area of substantive due process. See
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 {1965) (as-applied challenge, insofar as Court relies
upon married status of doctors' patients); Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678
{1977) (striking down law restricting distribution and advertisement of contraceptives, as ap
plied to nonprescription contraceptives).
As-applied challenges virtually never arise under the Equal Protection Clause. For the
exception that proves the rule, see City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S.
432, 447-51 (1985); 473 U.S. at 476 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) ("[T]o my knowledge, the Court has never before treated an equal protec
tion challenge to a statute on an as-applied basis.").
As for the Free Exercise Clause: although as-applied challenges were standard prior to
the Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), see Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Commn., 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707
(1981); WISconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), the
isomorphism between free exercise and equal protection created by Smith implies that as
applied challenges should become unusual here as well. In any event, there is a reading of
the pre-Smith case law that makes it consistent with the Basic Structure - and, given the
absence of a complete moral inspection of the religiously motivated actions at stake in Hob
bie, Thomas, Yoder, and Sherbert, such is probably the better reading. Pre-Smith type free
exercise rights are consistent with the Basic Structure if the successful constitutional claim of
a religiously motivated actor against being sanctioned (or, as in Hobbie, Thomas, and Sher
bert, being denied benefits) pursuant to neutral Rulei. leaves open the possibility that he
might be sanctioned (or denied benefits) for the very same action pursuant to another neu
tral rule (say, a neutral rule justified by a more compelling purpose than the purpose justify
ing Rule1). This is not to say that an act-shielding right to religious liberty is impossible,
simply that the pre-Smith cases probably did not create such a right.
145. See infra text accompanying notes 414-21.
146. The question is whether the legal institution or practice of act-shielding rights is mor
ally preferable to the Basic Structure. See infra text accompanying note 427 (discussing this
issue).
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better view. These are normative, not descriptive claims, and the
time has come to defend them.
II.

THE DIRECT ACCOUNT

Embedded in the traditional rules governing constitutional adjudi
cation is the principle that a person to whom a statute may constitu
tionally be applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on the
ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to
others, in other situations not before the Court. A closely related
principle is that constitutional rights are personal and may not be as
serted vicariously. These principles rest on more than the fussiness of
judges. They reflect the conviction that under our constitutional sys
tem courts are not roving commissions assigned to pass judgment on
the validity of the Nation's laws. Constitutional judgments, as Mr.
Chief Justice Marshall recognized, are justified only out of the neces
sity of adjudicating rights in particular cases between the litigants
brought before the Court . . . .147

This is the official view of constitutional rights - the view that
the Court officially espouses.148 This view sees constitutional rights
as essentially "personal," in the following sense: X's constitutional
right secures judicial protection, for
particular rule

R to him. If

X,

against the application of a

applying rule

R

to X is morally un

problematic, then X has no constitutional claim; the Constitution
does not empower X to secure a judicial invalidation (a repeal or
amendment) of the rights-targeted rule, merely because the rule
does wrong to other persons within the rule's scope. In the Court's
words:

" A
[ ] person to whom a statute may constitutionally be ap

plied will not be heard to challenge that statute on the ground that
it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others."149 To

construe the Constitution as empowering X to trigger a judicial in

validation of rules that merely do wrong to some persons, but not to

X himself, would make reviewing courts into mini-legislatures "roving commissions assigned to pass judgments on the validity of
147. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610-11 (1973) (citations omitted).
148. The Court has numerous times made statements similar to the above-quoted state
ment from Broadrick, particularly in the context of explicating the overbreadth doctrine.
See, e.g., Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 112 n.8 (1990); Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576,
581 (1989) (plurality opinion); Board of Airport Commrs. v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S.
569, 573 (1987); Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 501 (1985); Secretary of
State v. Joseph H. Munson, Co., 467 U.S. 947, 955 (1984); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,
767 (1982); see also United States v. Salemo, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) ("A facial challenge to
a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the
challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be
valid."). Salerno's rule, clearly, trades upon the "personal" view of constitutional rights ar
ticulated by the Court in Broadrick and the other cases here cited.
149. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 610.
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the Nation's laws"150 - rather than adjudicatory bodies essentially
concerned with the treatment of particular litigants.
The Direct Account encapsulates and formalizes this official
view of constitutional rights.

Direct Account
To say that some treatment of X (sanctioning X pursuant to a
rule, or subjecting X to the duty that the rule announces) "vio
lates X's constitutional rights" entails the following: the treat
ment is directly wrong, and X has the legal right to secure
judicial invalidation of the treatment. "Directly wrong" means
that there is sufficient moral reason for the court to invalidate
the treatment (overturn X's sanction, or free X from the duty),
quite independent of any further invalidation of the rule under
which the treatment falls.
Is this account morally tenable? I think not. This Part considers,
and criticizes, the possible defenses of the Direct Account. I ana
lyze, and reject, a variety of purported explanations why moral rea
son might obtain for a court to overturn X's own treatment,
independent of further invalidating the rule under which that treat
ment falls.151 For purposes of clarity and rigor, I discuss separately
the two kinds of legal treatments that are at issue in this article:
sanctions and duties. My strategy will be to rebut, first, the possible
explanations why the Direct Account holds true of sanctions.152
Then, at the end of this Part, I discuss whether moving from sanc
tions to duties helps the Direct Account.153
To assess the Direct Account I use the following simple and styl
ized examples of constitutional rights. The examples are meant to
reflect the range of substantive constitutional rights that sanctions,
and the duties that sanctions back up, can violate.154 I draw the
150. 413 U.S. at 611.
151. In advancing this criticism, I do not mean to deny the plausibility of deontological or
agent-relative moral constraints: for example, the plausible constraint upon killing one per
son even to save five. See, e.g., SCHEFFLER, supra note 17, at 80-114 (critically discussing
agent-relative constraints). What the Direct Account tries to advance is an agent-relative, or
quasi-agent-relative, view of the moral content of constitutional rights: a purported moral
reason to save the claimant, independent of what happens to anyone else. My claim is not
the generic claim that moral views of this sort are implausible; rather, it is the specific claim
that, given the proscribability of rights-holders' actions under other descriptions, the Direct
Account won't fly for the constitutional rights I discuss.
152. See infra sections II.A, B, C.
153. See infra section II.D.
154. With one exception: a right against vagueness. Vagueness may provide a viable
challenge to a conduct-regulating law that is otherwise constitutional. See Kolender v. Law
son, 461 U.S. 352, 352 (1983) (striking down, on vagueness grounds, a statute that required
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rule in each example, more or less directly, from a major Supreme
Court case or cases under the Bill of Rights. And the stylized facts
are designed to highlight the Basic Structure of constitutional
rights: that constitutional rights function as shields against particu
lar rules, not shields around particular actions.155
THE FLAG DESECRATION CASE: A rule provides that "no per
son shall desecrate a flag of the United States."156 It violates

the actor's free speech rights to be sanctioned pursuant to this
rule. It turns out that actor was, by his very action, a batterer,
polluter, and arsonist.
THE RESIDENTIAL PICKETING CASE: A rule provides that "no
person shall picket a residence or dwelling, except for persons
loiterers to provide, upon request by a peace officer, a "credible and reliable" identification).
But the moral import of vagueness is sufficiently distinct from, say, the moral import of a
clear law regulating speech, or abortion, see LoN FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAw 39 {1969)
(listing a total "failure to make rules understandable," along with a failure to publicize rules,
retroactivity, and several others, as a failure to maintain a legal system at all), that I leave for
another day the question whether a Direct Account of vagueness succeeds.
155. To avoid misunderstanding, let me emphasize that the stylized facts in these exam
ples are not drawn from particular cases. I am aware of free-speech cases where the success
ful claimant was, in fact, a wrongdoer under another description. See cases cited supra note
66, 85-87. I am not aware of equal protection, free exercise, or substantive due process cases
where that was true, in part, no doubt, because of the facial character of constitutional adju
dication in these latter areas. See supra note 144; infra notes 554-57 and accompanying text.
Nonetheless, as I have argued at some length, the successful equal protection, free exercise,
and substantive due process claimant, as well as the successful free speech claimant, could be
a wrongdoer under another description. Nothing in his having a successful constitutional
claim entails otherwise, and these stylized facts are designed to illustrate that. If you deny
that a claimant with these particular facts would have a successful claim (on the Derivative
Account, because the Court would amend the rule but leave the claimant's action covered by
the amended rule, see infra text accompanying notes 414-21), simply substitute a different
kind of wrongdoing plaintiff. Some wrongdoing plaintiff must have a successful claim, if con
stitutional rights are not act-shielding.
It might be objected that the Basic Structure (X's valid constitutional claim does not
protect him from being sanctioned under a different description) is, strictly, consistent with
the following: X's valid constitutional claim does entail that X is not {the Court predicts)
sanctionable under a different description. This is strictly consistent with the Basic Structure
if, when the court's prediction is proven wrong, the claimant is not protected, by judicial
order, from the latter sanction. However, I see nothing in existing free speech, free exercise,
equal protection, and substantive due process doctrines, as described in Part I, that would
rule out the Basic Structure but support the latter proposition. I will not belabor matters by
re-discussing the doctrines here. It might further be objected that, although X can have a
valid constitutional claim and still be constitutionally sanctionable under a different descrip
tion, this does not strictly entail that X can be a moral wrongdoer under another description.
For example, one can imagine a regime in which X's constitutional right entails that his ac
tion was not malum in se, but permits his action to be malum prohibitum. Again, I see abso
lutely nothing in free speech, free exercise, equal protection, or substantive due process
doctrines that draws this distinction, and so the stylized actors here perform actions that are
malum in se. This assumption will be significant at certain points below. See infra text ac
companying notes 193-97.
156. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 {1989) {holding flag-desecration statute unconsti
tutional under Free Speech Clause).
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engaged in labor picketing. "157 It violates the actor's free
speech rights to be sanctioned pursuant to this rule. It turns
out that the actor trespassed upon the resident's property and
used threatening language while picketing.
THE CmLo PoRNOGRAPHY CAsE: A rule provides that "no
person shall display a photograph of a naked child. "158 It vio
lates the actor's free speech rights to be sanctioned pursuant to
this rule. It turns out that the actor was a child pornographer.

THE ALcoHoL CAsEs: A rule provides that "no male [or no
female, or no black person] between the ages of eighteen and
twenty-one shall purchase alcohol. "159 (The rule supplements
a background prohibition on the purchase of alcohol by any
person under eighteen.) It violates the actor's equal protection
rights to be sanctioned pursuant to this rule. It turns out that
the actor used a stolen credit card to purchase alcohol.
THE ANIMAL SACRIFICE CAsE: A rule provides that "no per
son shall kill animals for religious purposes."160 It violates the
actor's free exercise rights to be sanctioned pursuant to this
rule. It turns out that the actor killed an endangered animal
protected by an endangered species statute (for example, a
panda, cougar, or eagle) that the actor had stolen from a zoo.
THE ABORTION CASE: A rule provides that "no person shall
procure an abortion. "161 It violates a woman's substantive due
process rights to be sanctioned pursuant to this rule. It turns
out that she procured an abortion by threatening to kill the
157. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980) {holding unconstitutional, under Free
Speech and Equal Protection Clauses, statute that prohibited residential picketing but ex
empted labor picketing). REsIDENTIAL P1cKETING is meant to exemplify the special portion
of free speech case law, evident in Carey and most recently in the majority opinion in R.A. V.
v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), where the Court finds an underinclusive rule to
violate free speech rights.
158. See supra note 88 (citing child pornography cases). The Court, in these cases, has
upheld rules targeted at child pornography, by virtue of their being narrower than the hypo
thetical rule in CHILD PORNOGRAPHY. If the reader doubts that the Court would, indeed,
find the hypothetical rule to be overbroad, then the reader can replace it with a yet broader
rule - for example, a rule prohibiting any pictures of "unclothed" children, with unclothed
defined prophylactically to include, e.g., the lack of clothing over torsos or thighs.
159. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (holding gender-discriminatory ban on beer
sales unconstitutional under Equal Protection Clause).
160. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)
(holding unconstitutional, under Free Exercise Clause, ordinance that prohibited animal kill
ing and was targeted at Santeria religion).
161. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding unconstitutional, under substantive
component of Due Process Clause, statute generally prohibiting the procuring of abortions).
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physician who performed the procedure,
so.

if he

declined to do

Any moral theory of constitutional rights, whether the Direct
Account or some other account, will need to explain the Basic
Structure of constitutional rights that these stylized cases are meant
to exemplify. Sanctioning X pursuant to rule R, by virtue of some
action that X has performed, can violate X's constitutional rights

even if X's

very action bears proscribable properties (other than

those picked out by

R)

such that sanctioning X for that very action

pursuant to a different rule is not unconstitutional. To say that X's
sanction pursuant to R is "unconstitutional," or that it "violates X's
constitutional rights," does not entail (1) that X's action is not con
stitutionally proscribable under any description. But according to
the Direct Account, to say that X's sanction is "unconstitutional,"
or that it "violates X's constitutional rights,"

does

entail

(2)

that

there exists moral reason for a court to overturn X's sanction, in
dependent of further invalidating the rule

R

pursuant to which X

has been sanctioned. The key puzzle, for the defender of the Direct
Account, is to explain why the latter proposition holds true even
when the first proposition does not.
Let me clarify what it means to say that the fl.ag-desecrator's
action in THE FLAG DESECRATION CASE turns out to have been an
action of battery or polluting the environment, that the photo
displayer's action in THE CmLD PORNOGRAPHY CASE turns out to
have been pornographic, that the residential-picketer's action in
THE RESIDENTIAL PICKETING CASE was also trespassory, and so
on. I do

not

mean that the reviewing court reliably knows about

these further, proscribable properties of the rights-holder's action.
To assume that would be ungenerous to the Direct Account, for as
we shall see in a moment, one possible defense of the Account is
epistemic - a defense that trades upon the limited epistemic capac
ities of reviewing courts.162 Rather, I simply mean that the relevant
action truly had those additional properties.
Relatedly, the stylized examples of constitutional rights assume
that the actor is sanctioned under the wrong rule - the rule prohib
iting "flag desecration," "residential picketing," "photo display,"
etc. -

instead

of being sanctioned pursuant to a rule prohibiting

"battery," "trespass," "obscenity," etc. Let us place to one side the
double jeopardy issues that might arise where the fl.ag-desecrator,
etc., is sanctioned for the very same action pursuant to multiple
162. See infra section II.A.2 {discussing epistemic defense of Direct Account).
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rules, either seriatim or simultaneously.163 A so-called theory of
constitutional rights which is, in truth, merely an addendum to
double-jeopardy doctrine is too weak to be a satisfactory theory.
Constitutional rights to free speech, equal protection, free exercise,
and substantive due process function, in practice, as protection for
rights-holders quite independent of the Double Jeopardy Clause that is, as protection against being sanctioned pursuant to the
wrong rule R even if R is the sole rule that the state deploys against
the rights-holder.164
Can the Direct Account explain why it is unconstitutional to
sanction, solely for "flag desecration," the fiag-desecrator who also
was a batterer; why it is unconstitutional to sanction, solely for "res
idential picketing," the picketer who also was a trespasser; and so
on? Let us see.
A.

A Theory of Justified Sanctions

One might try to defend the Direct Account by invoking a gen
eral theory of justified sanctions - a general theory, such as an
expressive theory, a deterrent theory, or a rehabilitative theory,
that purports to set forth the necessary and sufficient conditions for
a legal sanction to be morally justified, at least prim.a facie.165 This
163. See generally MooRE, supra note 64, at 325-55 (discussing problem of deciding
whether two different rules, pursuant to which a person is sanctioned for the very same act
token, pick out the same or different act-types for double-jeopardy purposes).
164. A recent case that clearly illustrates this point is Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections Com
mission, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (striking down fine pursuant to law prohibiting distribution of
anonymous campaign literature, as violating free speech). Other exemplary cases are: Texas
v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (free speech); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982) (free speech);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (equal protection); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965) (substantive due process). See also WISconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (free
exercise under pre-Smith regime). I should also note the following, reciprocal point. Where
X's sanction pursuant to one rule violates the Free Speech, etc., Clause, and is overturned on
constitutional grounds, sanctioning him for the very same action pursuant to a different rule
will not constitute double jeopardy - regardless of the similarity between the invalid and
valid rule under ordinary double jeopardy doctrine. See Montana v. Hall, 481 U.S. 400, 402
(1987) (double jeopardy does not bar reprosecution where conviction overturned, on
grounds other than sufficiency of the evidence, on appeal).

165. See R.A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PuNisHMENrS 151-266 (1986) (surveying theories of
punishment); IGoR PRIM:ORATZ, JUSTIFYING LEGAL PUNISHMENT (1990) (same); NIGEL
WALKER, WHY PUNISH? (1991) (same). Certain justified-sanction defenses of the Direct Ac
count, such as Hampton's expressive theory, see infra text accompanying notes 171-75, are
clearly most persuasive in explaining why the Direct Account might hold true of criminal
sanctions. And my rebuttal to these defenses trades upon a theory of sanctioning - retribu
tivism - which again is most germane to criminal sanctions. See infra text accompanying
notes 179-201. Given the frequency with which the Court strikes down criminal sanctions or
criminal-law duties, under the Free Speech, etc., Clauses, and given the absence of any dis
tinction between civil and criminal rules in this jurisprudence, see supra note 54, I suggest and
henceforth assume that a would-be defense of the Direct Account which fails for criminal
rules should be rejected.
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is an attractive route for the defender of the Direct Account, be
cause certain theories of justified sanctions are rule-dependent.
Under certain theories, X's sanction is morally justified only if the
predicate or history of the rule pursuant to which X is sanctioned
meets certain conditions. For example, an expressive theory stipu
lates that a sanction, to be morally justified, must express what it
was about the actor's conduct that made it wrong.166 X must have
been a (1) culpable (2) wrongdoer, and (3) the rule under which she
is sanctioned must express that. An expressive theory of justified
sanctions, or some other rule-dependent theory, seems a natural
way for the constitutional theorist to explain why sanctioning X
pursuant to rule R is morally problematic even though X's very ac
tion is properly sanctioned under a different rule. The problem
with R, the explanation goes, is just that its predicate or history fails
to meet the moral conditions set out by the rule-dependent theory
of justified sanctions.
In considering whether a theory of justified sanctions, such as an
expressive theory, can underwrite the Direct Account, we must
keep separate two, crucially different ideas. The first idea is
nonepistemic. The idea, here, is that the predicate or history of the
rule pursuant to which a person is sanctioned truly matters, quite
independent of the epistemic capacities of a constitutional review
ing court. It truly is not a matter of nonepistemic moral indiffer
ence whether the battering fiag-desecrator is punished for "flag
desecration" rather than "battery." It is simply a bedrock moral
fact that she should be sanctioned under the right kind of rule.167
166. See generally Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. Cm. L.
591 (1996) (analyzing expressive theories of punishment); Igor Primoratz, Punishment
as Language, 64 PHil.. 187 (1989) (same); A.J. Skillen, How to Say Things with Walls, 55 PmL.
509 (1980) (same). Expressive theories of law, not just sanctions, have recently become sali
ent in legal scholarship. See Larry Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. Cm. L.
REv. 943 (1995); Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expres
sive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725 (1998); Cass Sunstein, On the
Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2021 (1996).
167. Tue nonepistemic defense of the Direct Account, and indeed virtually every other
REv.

defense I consider in this Part, as well as the Derivative Account I defend below, presumes
that "moral facts" exist in the following sense: moral utterances, e.g., "X's sanction is de
served" or "X's sanction is not deserved" or "X's duty is unjust," constitute claims about the
world that are generally true or false, as opposed to merely expressing some attitude on the
speaker's part, such as a preference. Tue technical term for this view of morality as truth
stating is cognitivism. Cognitivism is to be distinguished from a stronger claim, realism, which
states that the truth-content of moral claims is independent of society's conventions. See
DAVID BRINK, MORAL REALISM AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF Ennes 1-36 (1989) (discussing,
and distinguishing between, cognitivism and realism). Whatever the appeal of realism, none
of the moral arguments mooted here - neither the ones I criticize, nor the ones I advance presuppose it. All are consistent with some form of moral conventionalism. See Adler, supra
note 4, at 803-04 (discussing varieties of conventionalism).
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Even if the reviewing court is epistemically reliable168 - even if the
court reliably knows that the flag-desecrator also was a batterer it should still overturn the flag-desecrator's sanction under the fiag
desecration rule.
The second, contrasting idea is

epistemic.169

One of the central

functions of legal institutions, specifically the institutions that enact
and then apply conduct rules, is to identify those actions whose per
formance is morally wrong. You, or I, or a fallible federal judge
somewhere, cannot impose an imprisonment on X, or take away
some of his money, merely because we believe that X performed
wrong. Society needs to do more epistemic work - more work to
assess the wrongfulness of his action - than

that.

Society does the

epistemic work, principally, by enacting rules and then enforcing
them. So even

if it truly is a matter of nonepistemic moral indiffer

ence whether the battering flag-desecrator is sanctioned under one
rule or the other - even

if the predicate

or history of the rule do

not figure in the morally necessary nonepistemic conditions for a
justified sanction - the reviewing court should overturn X's sanc
tion for "flag desecration." The epistemically reliable way to deter
mine whether his action was wrongful, by virtue of some property
other than flag-desecration, is just for state officials to draft and try
an indictment against

him for

some other offense.

I will consider these two, importantly distinct ideas,
temic and epistemic, in turn.

1.

nonepis

The Nonepistemic Idea

The nonepistemic idea is that the predicate or history of the rule
pursuant to which a person is sanctioned has true moral significance
for the justifiability of his sanction, independent of the epistemic
capacities of reviewing courts. It is morally improper to sanction

him pursuant to the wrong kind of rule - there is moral reason

to

168. See Adler, supra note 4, at 771-80 {distinguishing between arguments that point to
epistemic or other deficits of constitutional reviewing courts, and arguments that point to
content of moral criteria that reviewing courts enforce).
169. By "epistemic," I mean pertaining to moral knowledge: knowledge of whether X's
sanction is morally justified. Given cognitivism about morality, this idea is coherent. See
supra note 167 {discussing cognitivism). I draw this epistemic idea from the epistemic strain
in the scholarly literature on authority. Whether authoritative rules create reasons for belief
or action, see Heidi Hurd, Challenging Authority, 100 YALE L.J. 1611, 1615-20 {1991) (ex·
plaining this distinction); infra text accompanying notes 282-88 (same), it is plausible to think
that the rule's authority is at least partly grounded upon the moral expertise of the rule·
formulator: her knowledge of what morality requires. See id. at 1667-77 {defending reason·
for-belief account of legal authority, grounded upon epistemic capacities of legal institu·
tions); JosEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 38-69 {1988) {defending reason-for-action
account of legal authority, grounded in part upon epistemic capacities of legal institutions).
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overturn that sanction - in the same way that it is (or may be)
morally improper to sanction him if his action was not wrongful, or
if his state of mind was not culpable.110
How might this nonepistemic idea be fleshed out? One way, as
I have already suggested, may be to defend an expressive theory of
sanctions - the kind of theory that, most famously, Jean Hampton
has defended.171 On Hampton's view, the essence of punishment is
to cancel the demeaning and injurious message that crime
communicates.
[Punishment] is a response to a wrong that is intended to vindicate the
value of the victim denied by the wrongdoer's action through the con
struction of an event that not only repudiates the action's message of
superiority over the victim but does so in a way that confirms them as
equal by virtue of their humanity. What do I mean by "vindicating
the value of the victim?" . . . To vindicate the victim, a [punitive] re
sponse must strive first to re-establish the acknowledgement of the
victim's worth damaged by the wrongdoing, and second, to repair the
damage done to the victim's ability to realize her value. 112

Part of what makes a proper punishment morally appropriate is
what the punishment says: it says that the wrongdoer is not supe
rior to the victim.173
170. On the moral importance of wrongdoing and/or culpability in justifying sanctions,
see generally Symposium, Harm v. Culpability: Which Should be the Organizing Principle of
the Criminal Law, 5 J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL lssUES 1 (1994).
171. See Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal ofRetribu
tion, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1659 (1992) [hereinafter Hampton, Correcting Harms]; Jean Hamp
ton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRmcs 1 (Wesley
Cragg ed., 1992); JEAN HAMPTON & JEFFRIE MURPHY, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 111-61
(1988). Hampton terms her theory an '"expressive' theory of retribution," Hampton, Cor
recting Harms, supra, at 1659, but I use the terms "retributivism" and "retribution" in this
article to refer to the nonexpressive variant of that view, namely, that the morally culpable
deserve punishment independent of what punishment expresses, with "punishment" itself
construed not to entail some kind of expression. See Michael Moore, The Moral Worth of
Retribution, in REsPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER AND THE EMOTIONS 179, 181 (Ferdinand
Schoeman ed., 1987) (distinguishing between retributivist and "denunciatory," i.e., expres
sive, theories of punishment).

172. Hampton, Correcting Harms, supra note 171, at 1686. Hampton actually uses the
term "retribution" in this quotation rather than "punishment" - thus the alterations - both
because she is developing an expressive variant of retributivism, see supra note 171, and
because she wants her theory to cover nonpunitive as well as punitive responses to wrongdo
ing, see Correcting Harms, supra note 172, at 1685; but for the sake of a clear distinction
between her theory and nonexpressive retributivism, I have altered the quotation and more
generally describe Hampton as offering an expressive theory of punishment. This termino
logical point does not affect the substantive question here, namely, whether a theory such as
hers can underwrite the Direct Account.
173. To be sure, a mere statement does not constitute the kind of "expression" that
Hampton's theory warrants and demands. Rather, it warrants and demands hard treatment
for the wrongdoer that is also expressive treatment. See id. at 1686-87 ("Re-establishment of
the acknowledgement of the victim's worth is normally not accomplished by the mere verbal
or written assertion of the equality of worth of wrongdoer and victim. . . . [Rather] we are
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In developing her expressive theory, Hampton does not, of
course, mean to defend the Direct Account. Her theory is a theory
of punishment, not a theory of constitutional law. But the defender
of the Direct Account might try to employ Hampton's theory, or
more broadly the kind of expressive theory that Hampton's epito
mizes, for his own purposes. He might say that the rule pursuant to
which X is sanctioned must, inter alia, pick out the wrong-making
property of X's action. The rule must do that, because the very
point of punishing X is to point out - to X, the victim, and the
broader community - that X was not free to inflict that type of
action upon a moral equal.174 This is a possible route for the de
fender of the Direct Account, because a common failure among
some of the rules in our stylized examples - particularly FLAG
DESECRATION, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY, and ABORTION - is that
these rules fail to describe (or fully describe) wrong-making proper
ties of actions.175 Burning a flag is not wrong because it desecrates
the flag; it is wrong because the burning batters a bystander, pol
lutes the air, etc. Displaying a sexually explicit picture of a child is
not wrong just because the child is unclothed; it is wrong because
the picture is sexually explicit and exploitative. Procuring an abor
tion, by means of a coercive threat, is not wrong because the actor
procures an abortion; it is wrong because she procures something by
means of a coercive threat.
Another kind of theory of justified sanctions that the defender
of the Direct Account might try to turn to her advantage is the kind
of deterrent theory developed by Larry Alexander, Daniel Farrell,
and Warren Quinn.176 Although Alexander's, Farrell's, and
Quinn's specific theories differ in their details, the general idea be
hind these theories is to ground the justifiability of (ex post) sanc
tions upon the justifiability of (ex ante) deterrent threats. We are
morally required to respond by trying to remake the world in a way that denies what the
wrongdoer's events have attempted to establish . . . .").
174. See id. at 1677 (arguing that "a wrongful action that produces moral injury and
which merits retributive punishment is an action that has a certain kind of meaning," viz.,
that the wrongdoer is morally superior to the victim).
175. See infra text accompanying notes 203-04 (further explicating how rules in FLAa
DESECRATION, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY, and ABORTION underdescribe wrong-making features
of actions). The remaining stylized rules are not morally underdescriptive in the same way,
see infra text accompanying notes 216-17, and so the expressive defense of the Direct Ac
count, as well as the deterrent theory discussed immediately below, is most persuasive with
respect to FLAG DESECRATION, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY, and ABORTION.
176. See WARREN QuINN, The Right to Threaten and the Right to Punish, in MORALITY
ACTION 52 (1993); Lawrence Alexander, The Doomsday Machine: Proportionality,
Punishment and Prevention, 63 MONIST 199 (1980); Daniel M. Farrell, The Justification of
Deterrent Violence, 100
301 (1990).
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justified in inflicting a setback on a wrongdoer if and only if we
justifiably threatened him with that setback, prior to the wrongdo
ing. Farrell, for example, argues in favor of the following principle:
When my situation is such that either (i) I enforce a conditional threat
of retaliation that I have previously and justifiably made, thereby pro
tecting myself from a decrease in my credibility and hence from an
increase in my vulnerability or (ii) I do not enforce the relevant
threat, thereby jeopardizing my credibility and hence increasing my
vulnerability to aggression I might otherwise have deterred, I am enti
tled to choose (i) over (ii), provided that the penalties thus threatened
and imposed are within certain limits and are directed only at offend
ers for offenses.177

How might the defender of the Direct Account develop this kind of
deterrent theory, for her own purposes? She might say something
like this: Sanctioning X pursuant to a particular rule is justified
only if enacting the rule - issuing that particular coercive threat to
X and others, not to perform the type of action identified in the rule
- was justified. For if enacting the rule was justified, then sanc
tioning X is justified as a way to maintain the credibility of the par
ticular deterrent threat embodied in the rule. But enacting the
rules in cases such as FLAG DESECRATION, CmLD PORNOGRAPHY,
and ABORTION was not justified, because these rules encompass
plenty of harmless actions.178 We have moral reason to maintain
the credibility of our deterrent threats against "batterers," etc., but
we do not have moral reason to maintain the credibility of our de
terrent threats against "flag desecrators," etc. Thus we have true,
nonepistemic moral reason to sanction the battering flag-desecrator
pursuant to a rule that prohibits battery rather than pursuant to a
rule that prohibits flag-desecration, and the same is true for the
other stylized cases.
But the difficulty with this kind of defense of the Direct Ac
count - a nonepistemic defense based upon a rule-dependent the
ory of sanctioning, such as Hampton's expressive theory or the
Alexander/Farrell/Quinn deterrent theory - is that the would-be
defender must overcome the following, retributivist objection. As
Michael Moore explains:
Retributivism is the view that punishment is justified by the moral cul

pability of those who receive it. A retributivist punishes because, and
only because, the offender deserves it. Retributivism thus stands in
stark contrast to utilitarian views that justify punishment of past of
fenses by the greater good of preventing future offenses. It also con177. Farrell, supra note 176, at 316.

178. See infra text accompanying notes 315-53 (discussing how rules in these cases go
morally awry in including innocent actions within their scope).
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trasts sharply with rehabilitative views, according to which
punishment is justified by the reforming good it does the criminaI.179
For the retributivist, "moral culpability" is not only a necessary con
dition for a punitive sanction - something that an expressive the
ory or the kind of deterrent theory discussed here does not mean to
deny180 - but it is a sufficient condition as well.181 The actor's
"moral culpability" is sufficient to justify punishing him, independ
ent of any further good that punishment may secure: specifically,
independent of the role of punishment in preventing future wrong
doing, r ehabilitating the criminal, or expressing social
condemnation.182
Thus, the retributivist might object as follows to the Direct Ac
count: There is simply no nonepistemic reason to overturn the ac
tor's own sanction, independent of further invalidating the rule
under which it falls, in cases such as

FLAG DESECRATION, CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY, and ABORTION as well as RESIDENTIAL PICKETING
and ANIMAL SACRIFICE. The battering flag-desecrator, etc., was a
culpable wrongdoer, and that suffices to justify his sanction,

whatever the predicate or history of the underlying rule. To be
sure, there is reason to repeal or amend the flag-desecration

rule,

etc. - because some flag-desecrators, etc., are not wrongdoers
under another description - but it remains a matter of (nonepis
temic) moral indifference whether in

FLAG DESECRATION the state

chooses to sanction the battering flag-desecrator for "battery" or
"flag desecration," and similarly in

TION, RESIDENTIAL PICKETING,
although the Direct Account may

CHILD PORNOGRAPHY, ABOR
ANIMAL SACRIFICE. And
hold true for ALCOHOL, that is

and

not because of a general theory of sanctions, such as an expressive
or deterrent theory. Rather, the Direct Account may hold true
here because of quite separate considerations of equality. Sanction
ing a black person who uses a credit card to purchase alcohol, pur
suant to a racially discriminatory rule, is concededly wrong - but
179. Moore, supra note 171, at 179; see also Michael S. Moore, Justifying Retributivism, 27
ISRAEL L. REv. 15 {1993). An updated version of Moore's well-known article on The Moral
Worth of Retribution, supra note 171, is MICHAEL MooRE,
BLAME ch. 3 (1997).

PLACING

180. See, e.g., Hampton, Correcting Harms, supra note 171, at 1686 (stating that "retribu
tion is a response to a wrong"); Farrell, supra note 176, at 316 n.9 (stating that the principle
justifying the carrying out of deterrent threats "is meant to apply only to . . . threats to harm
those who do an innocent person wrong").
181. See Moore, supra note 171, at 181-82 ("Retributivism is a very straightforward the
ory of punishment: We are justified in punishing because and only because offenders deserve
it. Moral culpability {'desert') is in such a view both a sufficient as well as a necessary condi
tion of liability to punitive sanctions." {footnote omitted)).
182. See id. at 180-81 (distinguishing retributivism from utilitarian, "denunciatory" (i.e.,
expressive), and other theories of punishment).
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not because retributivism is wrong. It is wrong because, whatever
the correct theory of sanctions, imposing a legal burden upon some
one or depriving him of a legal benefit under the description
"black" is a serious insult and stigma.183
How might the would-be defender of the Direct Account reply
to the retributivist objection? First, she might try to show that re
tributivism is wrong on the merits . This is a tall order. The debate
between retributivist and non-retributivist theories of punishment
has raged on for centuries, and in recent years there has been a real
revival of interest in retributivism, among moral philosophers,184 as
part of a general revival of non-utilitarian theorizing most famously
exemplified by John Rawls's A Theory of Justice.185 To defeat re
tributivism, the defender of the Direct Account would either need
to demonstrate the truth of utilitarianism (the view that overall
well-being is the sole criterion of moral rightness) ;186 or she would
need to show that, despite the existence of principles of justice con
straining or coexisting with the principle of maximizing overall well
being, the retributivist principle (that a morally culpable actor de
serves punishment) is not among the true principles of justice.
Proving the truth of utilitarianism is obviously a daunting task.187
And the non-utilitarian approach to defeating retributivism is little
less daunting, given that the retributivist principle coheres with our
concrete judgments188 at least as well as the ·principle that a
tortfeasor has a duty to repair the losses that his tortious conduct
183.

See infra

section 11.B.2 (discussing stigma theory of Equal Protection Clause).

184. See David Dolinko, Some Thoughts about Retributivism, 101 Ennes 537, 537 (1991)
(noting "a dramatic change in the regard in which courts and legislators hold the doctrine of
retributivism" and the fact that "[t]his shift on the part of official legal sentiment parallels a
shift in the views of philosophers and legal scholars"); Heidi M. Hurd, What in the World is
Wrong?, 5 J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL IssUES 157, 157 n.1 (1994) (citing scholars who defend
retributivism).
185. JoHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusTICE (1971). As Moore notes: "Retributivism . . .
joins corrective justice theories of torts, natural right theories of property, and promissory
theories of contract as deontological alternatives to utilitarian justifications . . . ." Moore,
supra note 171, at 182.
186. See SCARRE, supra note 46, at 4 (noting that utilitarian moral theories have generally
been "welfarist, consequentialist, aggregative and maximising").

umm

187. See SCARRE, supra note 46, at 152-204 (s
arizing criticisms of utilitarianism).
Probably the most famous critiques of utilitarianism, in the modem literature, are those ad
vanced by Bernard Williams, see Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in J.J.C.
SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR
AGAINST 77 (1973), and, of
course, by Rawls, see RAWLS, supra note 185, at 150-92.

AND

188. See Moore, supra note 171, at 183-85. For a recent explication and defense of coher
entism in moral reasoning, specifically the Rawlsian idea of "reflective equilibrium" that
gives place to judgments about concrete cases as well as to general principles, see NoRMAN
DANIELS, JUSTICE
JUSTIFICATION: REFLECTIVE EQUILIB
IN THEORY
PRAC
TICE 1-17 (1996).

AND

RIUM
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occasioned,189 or that promisors are morally obliged to keep their
promises,190 or that social and economic inequalities should work to
the benefit of the least well-off.191 Indeed, in its jurisprudence di
rectly addressing the content and justification of punishment, such
as its Eighth Amendment and double jeopardy jurisprudence, the
Supreme Court has for some time said quite consistently that re
tributivism is a constitutionally acceptable and standard theory of
punishment.192
Note that the defender of the Derivative Account does not need
to prove retributivism to be true. All she needs to say is that,
whatever the truth of retributivism, she has a morally impeccable
and straightforward explanation for the content of constitutional
rights under the Free Speech, Free Exercise, Equal Protection, and
Due Process Clauses. The moral content of a constitutional right is
that some rule should be repealed, whether or not retributivism is
true - for example, because the rule coerces persons not to per
form certain types of innocent actions, such as mere fiag
desecration. By contrast, the defender of the Direct Account needs
to provide not only an explanation why these rules go wrong why they are not deterrent threats worth maintaining, or proper
expressive mechanisms - but in addition must show that retributi
vism is wrong on the merits. So the serious arguments for retributi
vism undermine the moral plausibility of the Direct Account; but
189. See JULES CoLEMAN, R:isKS AND WRONGS 303-28, 324 (1992) (describing and de
fending "mixed conception" of corrective justice institutionalized by tort law, such that "the
duty of wrongdoers in corrective justice is to repair the wrongful losses for which they are
responsible").
190. See CHARLES FRIED, CoNTRAcr AS PROMISE 1 (1981) (arguing that "[t]he promise
principle . . . is the moral basis of contract law"); id. at 17 (arguing that breaching promises is
morally wrong "[b]y virtue of the basic Kantian principles of trust and respect").
191. See RAWLS, supra note 185, at 83.
192. This goes back, at least, to Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). See 428 U.S. at
183 (" 'Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law,' but neither is it a
forbidden objective nor one inconsistent with our respect for the dignity of men.") (opinion
of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (citation omitted). For recent statements, see, e.g., Aus
tin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 621 {1993) (deciding whether civil forfeiture constitutes
"punishment" for purposes of Excessive Fines Clause) (" 'lb;A] civil sanction that cannot
fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also
serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come to under
stand the term.' " (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448
(1989))); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (striking down civil-commitment statute
on due process grounds) ("A State, pursuant to its police power, may of course imprison
convicted criminals for the purposes of deterrence and retribution."); Kansas v. Hendricks,
117 S. Ct. 2072, 2082 {1997) (upholding civil-commitment statute for "sexually violent
predators") (describing "retribution" and "deterrence" as twin purposes of criminal punish
ment); and Hudson v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 488, 493 (1997) (describing factors that are
useful in determining whether a penalty is "criminal" for double-jeopardy purposes) ("[T]he
factors includ[e] whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retri
bution and deterrence.' " (citation omitted)).
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the serious arguments against retributivism· do not undermine the
moral plausibility of the Derivative Account.
Another tack the defender of the Direct Account might take is
to bracket the truth of retributivism, but then argue that the re
tributivist principle of punishing the morally culpable does not jus
tify the sanctions meted out in the stylized cases above. Yet why
not? The retributivist principle, again, is that moral culpability is
not only necessary but sufficient to justify punishment.193 I suggest
that the actors, in all the stylized cases above, satisfy this principle.
They are "morally culpable" because they have culpably194 commit
ted serious wrongs:195 battery, pollution, and arson; assault and
trespass; child pornography; fraud; the killing of a stolen and en
dangered animal; assault with a deadly weapon.

The

epistemic

point - that X's having been tried and convicted for flag-desecra
tion, etc., fails to evidence his moral culpability, qua batterer, etc. should not obscure the moral fact that X committed wrong. He
performed an action that breached some other rule and that, quite
apart from that, ought not have been performed. (Even if, by some
mistake, the rules against battery, etc., had temporarily been re
pealed in the relevant jurisdictions, it was wrong of X to do what he
did.196)
are,

I

In

addition, the sanctions that the actors actually received

suggest, "punishment," although this is admittedly open to

some debate.197
Finally, the temptation to amend the retributive principle and
insist that morally culpable actors must receive punishment for

right reasons

the

should be resisted. For how would a "right reasons"

addendum be defended, within a retributivist theory? The retribu
tivist principle expresses (part of) what is morally fitting: it is fit193. See Moore, supra note 171, at 181-82.
194. I mean to assume this in the stylized facts.
195. It is open to debate whether the "moral culpability" sufficient to warrant punish
ment, within a retributivist theory, entails wrongdoing, culpability, or both. See Symposium,
Harm v. Culpability, supra note 170. Further, it is open to debate whether the retributivist's

"wrongdoing" entails only harmful action, or whether it includes harmless wrongs as well, or
even mere illegality. See FEINBERG, supra note 57, at 10-14 (su=arizing considerations,
besides harmfulness, that support a criminal prohibition on certain actions); Moore, supra
note 171, at 181 n.1 (defining moral culpability as including morally innocent actions that are
legally prohibited). Whatever the boundaries of moral culpability, for retributivist purposes,
our stylized actors lie within that concept's core.
196. Only a super-shallow conventionalist would claim that X's action cannot be morally
wrong unless prohibited by a formal legal rule. See Adler, supra note 4, at 803-04 (discussing,
and criticizing, super-shallow conventionalism).
197. See DUFF, supra note 165, at 151 ("Punishment . . . must logically be imposed on an
offender, for an offence, by a duly constituted authority, and must inflict suffering on him."
(emphasis added)). Notably, however, Duff offers this definition of punishment in the ser
vice of an expressive account, see id. at 267.
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ting, the retributivist claims, that wrongdoers receive the
punishment they deserve. A legal practice that tends to realize the
morally fitting events or states-of-the-world identified by the re
tributivist principle is, for the retributivist, a justified practice; a
legal practice that tends not to realize those events or states is, for
her, less well justified. So the practice of enforcing a rule against
"batterers" is better justified than the practice of enforcing a rule
against "flag desecration."198 But this is not because the retribu
tivist wants to punish batterers "for the right reasons;" it is because
batterers are usually wrongdoers, while flag-desecrators often are
not. We might, perhaps, have a

general

theory why legislators

should act for the "right reasons" (a theory of authority, or of legis
lative motivation, of the kind considered below)199; but a specific
"riglift reasons" addendum to the retributivist principle is simply ad
hoc, just as a specific "right reasons" addendum to, say, the Rawl
sian principle of redirecting resources to the less-well-off would be.
Is there anything left for the defender of the Direct Account to
say, in response to the retributivist? I suppose she might say this:
although the sanctions meted out in our stylized cases do, indeed,
satisfy the conditions for punishment specified by the retributive
principle - in this important sense, no wrong has been done to the
actors - it would still be a good idea to sanction them pursuant to
different rules. Doing so would not only dispense the punishment
they deserve, but additionally would express what made their ac
tions wrong, or maintain the credibility of justified threats against
future wrongdoers. Yet I find it hard to see how this final defense
of the Direct Account coheres, in any way, with the moral concepts
underlying our stylized cases, particularly FLAG DESECRATION,

CHILD PORNOGRAPHY, and ABORTION. Surely the constitutional
rights to free speech and abortion do not rest upon the moral claims
of the once and future

victims

of wrongdoing speakers and of

wrongdoing women who procure abortions!

It is much more

straightforward and plausible to say what, as we shall see, the De
rivative Account says: that the constitutional rights to free speech
and abortion typically rest upon the moral claims of otherwise
innocent speakers and women, who fall within the scope of overly
198. On the general distinction between the moral justifications for a practice and the
moral justifications for a particular application of that practice, see John Rawls, 11vo Con
cepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REv. 3, 3 (1955); SCHAUER, supra note 58, at 128-34.
199. See infra section 11.C; infra note 278. Cf. MooRE, supra note 179, at 751 (arguing
that "every citizen [has the right] not to have his or her behaviour regulated for the wrong
reasons by the government," but that such right "is not basic but is the correlative of a more
basic duty on the part of legislators to enact legislation for certain reasons but not others").
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broad rules such as the rules in FLAG DESECRATION,
NOGRAPHY, and ABoRTION.200

CHILD

POR

Note, finally, that a nonepistemic defense of the Direct Account
based upon a rule-dependent theory of sanctions must overcome,
not just retributivism, but every other rule-independent theory of
sanctions. Retributivism is one such theory; it may not be the only
one.201 Because I think the retributivist's objection is sufficiently
powerful to defeat the nonepistemic defense of the Direct Account,
I will not pursue the point here. My burden is merely to adduce

one

constitutionally satisfactory, rule-independent theory of justi

fied sanctions - retributivism - that justifies the sanctions im
posed in FLAG DESECRATION, ABORTION, and the rest of our
stylized cases. By contrast, a nonepistemic defense of the Direct
Account must demonstrate that there exists

no

constitutionall! sat

isfactory, rule-independent theory sufficient to justify the sanctions
in the stylized cases.

If the defender of the Direct Account refutes

retributivism, then she must proceed to defeat whatever other rule
independent theories might plausibly obtain.

2.

The Epistemic Idea

The nonepistemic defense of the Direct Account, sketched
above, tries to show why the predicate or history of the rule pursu
ant to which an actor is sanctioned has true moral significance for
the justifiability of her sanction, independent of the epistemic ca
pacities of reviewing courts. The defense tries to demonstrate why
sufficient nonepistemic reason obtains to invalidate X's own sanc
tion, without a further invalidation of the rule, and despite the fact
that X has culpably committed a wrong by the very action for which
she has been sanctioned. The epistemic defense is less ambitious.
The idea here is that, whatever wrong X happens to have per
formed, she has not been tried and convicted for

that.

Rather, she

has been tried and convicted for breaching a rule that (in some
way)202 does not serve as an epistemically reliable mechanism for

identifying wrongful actions. And the right way for society to deter
mine whether X, indeed, performed a wrong is simply to indict and
200.

See infra section IIl.A.1.

201. For example, consider an incapacitative theory: imprisoning X, who has performed
wrongdoing in the past, serves to incapacitate him and thereby prevent his future wrongdoing
quite independent of the predicate or history of the particular rule pursuant to which X is
sanctioned. See WALKER, supra note 165, at 34-41 (discussing incapacitative theory).
202. "In some way" is meant to anticipate the different, specific ways that sanctioning X
pursuant to a rule may fail to constitute adequate epistemic work. See infra text accompany
ing notes 203-19 (discussing epistemiei rights and epistemiei_ rights).
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try her for violating a rule that is not epistemically flawed in this
way.203
The following formulation takes an initial stab at the epistemic
idea:

Epistemic1 Rights: Underdescriptive Rules
To say that X's sanction pursuant to rule R is "unconstitu
tional," or that it violates her "constitutional rights," is to say
that X has a legal right to have more epistemic work per
formed (specifically, by trying her under a different rule), prior
to imposing a sanction upon her. More epistemic work is
needed because the rule is underdescriptive. Some (or many)
actions falling within the description set forth by the rule's
predicate are morally innocent; relative to that description, X's
action was not necessarily (or probably) wrongful.
FLAG DESECRATION, CmLD PORNOGRAPHY, and ABORTION moti
vate this idea of "underdescriptive" rules - rules whose scope in
cludes some or many morally innocent actions. A given action of
"flag desecration," or "procuring an abortion," or "displaying
photos of naked children" is not necessarily or likely wrongful.
Thus, even if retributivism is true - even if an actor's wrongdoing
truly suffices to justify a sanction, regardless of the predicate or his
tory of the rule pursuant to which X is sanctioned - society has not
yet done enough to identify the properties of X's action that make
it wrong. To say that X has a "constitutional right" not to be sanc
tioned pursuant to a rule prohibiting "flag desecration," "abortion,"
or "photo display" could simply entail that her sanction is possibly
or likely unjustified, relative to the act-description set forth by the
predicate of the targeted rule. Even the retributivist can accept this
construal of X's constitutional right, for even the retributivist does
not want to sanction innocent actors. Whatever our underlying the
ory of sanctions, we can all agree that, in cases such as FLAG DESE
CRATION, CmLD PORNOGRAPHY, and ABORTION, we need to
203. Indeed, nothing I say in this section is meant to deny the general proposition that
rules have an epistemic function. See supra note 169 (discussing epistemic idea, within litera
ture on authority). Whatever else rules do - whether that is solving coordination problems,
or prisoners' dile=as, or coercing morally apathetic actors to do what morality requires - I
find it compelling to think of agencies and legislatures as institutions that, among other
things, perform the epistemic work needed to determine what morality (particularly the con
sequentialist component of morality) requires of actors in certain domains. See RAz, supra
note 169, at 38-69 (presenting theory of authority, grounded both on moral expertise of au
thorities and on role of authoritative utterances in solving coordination problems and prison
ers' dile=as). I simply do not think that the epistemic idea is an adequate account of
constitutional rights to free speech, free exercise, equal protection, and substantive due
process.
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undertake more epistemic work to determine whether X's action
was wrongful.
We must carefully distinguish this plausible idea of epistemic1
rights from a different idea, with which it might be confused, and
which is not plausible at all. That is the following:

The Implausible Epistemic Idea: Substantive Rights Based on
Limited Evidence
To say that X's sanction pursuant to rule R is "unconstitu
tional," or that it violates her "constitutional rights," is to say
that X has a legal right not to be sanctioned by virtue of the
action she performed. The moral content of the legal right is as
follows: there is true, moral reason not to sanction X by virtue
of the action she performed, or so the reviewing court has de
termined on the evidence before it. The reviewing court has
determined that such moral reason obtains, because it has con
cluded that X's action was not wrongful. The court has con
cluded that X's action was not wrongful because, relative to the
description embodied in the targeted rule, it was not wrongful.
This latter explanation is implausible, of course, because it squarely
contradicts the Basic Structure. If X's constitutional right were a
legal right not to be sanctioned, under any rule, for the action she
performed, then the flag-desecrator, etc., whose sanction was invali
dated on First Amendment, etc., grounds could not subsequently be
sanctioned under

any rule:

a rule prohibiting battery, obscenity, or

assault with a deadly weapon. Relatedly,

if constitutional rights had

this act-shielding structure, we would want reviewing courts to en
gage in considerably more investigation of the potentially wrong
making features of actions, beyond the features picked out by a par
ticular rule.204
So let us return to the more plausible notion - that constitu
tional rights are epistemic1 rights. An epistemic1 right is a right of
some sanctioned X to have more epistemic work done, given that
the rule

R

pursuant to which he has been sanctioned is un

derdescriptive - given that an action is not necessarily or likely
wrongful, merely by virtue of falling under the description set forth
by

R.

The idea of epistemic1 rights is plausible because it

is

consis-

204. Perhaps it might be objected that the state's failure to prosecute X pursuant to a
second rule is itself strong grounds for an inference that X's action has no further wrong
making properties. But such an inference is unwarranted, given the structure of double
jeopardy doctrine. See MooRE, supra note 64, at 325-55 (double jeopardy permits the se
quential prosecution of an actor, for the very same action, pursuant to statutes picking out
different act-types).
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tent with the Basic Structure. Sanctioning you for "procuring an
abortion" violates your epistemic1 rights because society has not,
yet, reliably determined whether you did something wrong; sanc
tioning you for "assault with a deadly weapon," by virtue of the
very same action, does not violate your epistemic1 rights, because
now society has reliably determined your wrongdoing. Further, as

I

have said, the explanation is quite consistent with retributivism. Its
defender can concede that

if X's

action of procuring an abortion

also was an action of assault with a deadly weapon - indeed,

if in

the past X performed a wrongful action, and no fitting punishment
has yet been produced to match that - then her sanction might be
(nonepistemically) justified.

The very point of a constitutional

right, the defender can say, is to require that our legal institutions
do the epistemic work needed to determine the true properties of
X's action or prior actions. Finally, and relatedly, the idea of an
epistemic1 right fits nicely with the notion that legal institutions
have different and limited roles. The limited role of the legislature
or agency is to enact rules that,

inter alia,

purport to describe

wrong-making features of actions; the limited role of a prosecutor
and trial court, or an enforcement official and agency judge, is to
apply these rules; and the limited role of a constitutional reviewing
court is to determine whether these legal institutions have, yet,
done enough epistemic work to impose a sanction upon X 2os The
reviewing court's role is

not

to engage in a boundless search for

something, sometime, that X did wrong, and so the truth of retribu
tivism is no obstacle at all to a rule-targeted, epistemic right.
Despite its plausibility, the idea of epistemic1 rights must be re
jected. The problem is that, in general, there is no justiciable con
stitutional norm against proscribing actions that are morally
innocent, or against sanctioning persons who merely breach rules
that proscribe morally innocent actions.206 The Constitution, as en
forced by the courts, does not generally prohibit the imposition of a
civil or criminal sanction upon a morally innocent actor: some Y
whose action, which a legal rule prohibited, was morally permissible
205. Cf. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610-11 {1973) (articulating view of consti·
tutional courts as institutions with a limited role). Some view of this sort is surely right. See,
e.g., Owen M. Flss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term - Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93
HAR.v. L. REv. 1, 5-17 {1979) {denying that federal courts are limited to resolving disputes,
but arguing that their role is limited to the protection of "constitutional values").
206. See Larry Alexander, The Supreme Court, Dr. Jekyll, and the Due Process of Proof,
1996 SUP. CT. REv. 191, 216 & n.76 {discussing absence of federal constitutional restrictions
on states' definitions of crimes); Louis
Bilionis, Process, the Constitution, and Substantive
Criminal Law, 96 MICH. L. REv. 1269 {1998) (same).

D.
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or required.207 State officials do not violate Y's constitutional rights
under the Eighth Amendment, the Due Process Clause, or any part
of the Constitution by sanctioning him for breaching a rule that
prohibits "the sale of filled milk," even if filled milk is a perfectly
healthy product that was banned by mistake or because the legisla
ture was controlled by the manufacturers of substitute products.2os
They do not violate W's constitutional rights by sanctioning her for
breaching a rule that prohibits opticians from "dispensing eye
glasses without an opthamologist's prescription," even if most opti
cians, including W herself, are perfectly competent to write eyeglass
prescriptions.209 Relatedly, then, the Constitution does not gener
ally provide epistemic1 rights to sanctioned persons. Z can be sanc
tioned, without further epistemic work, pursuant to a rule
prohibiting "the sale of filled milk" or "dispensing eyeglasses with
out an opthamologist's prescription" - regardless of whether some

207. Nor does it do to say that actors have a general moral obligation to obey the law,
such that Y's action may have been morally innocent prior to its legal proscription, but
breaching that proscription was itself morally wrong. See SCHAUER, supra note 58, at 125
(noting possibility of moral obligation to obey the law). This argument, cogent or not, is
hardly one that the defender of epistemiei rights can advance; rather, she must claim that
some of the actions that legal rules proscribe are morally innocent, and that actors retain
epistemic rights with respect to those actions even after breaching the legal rules. If so, she
must explain why the actors in FLAG DESECRATION and the other stylized cases, but not
other actors, have such rights.
208. See United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (upholding, over substan
tive due process challenge, indictment of filled milk manufacturer pursuant to statute prohib
iting interstate shipment of filled milk); Geoffrey P. Miller, The True Story of Carolene
Products, 1987 SUP. CT. R:Ev. 397 (detailing absence of moral reason to ban filled milk, and
special-interest politics behind passage of statute). Although the Carolene Products opinion
itself leaves open the possibility of some judicial scrutiny for those "garden variety" statutes
that do not trigger heightened scrutiny, see 304 U.S. at 152-54, it is now notoriously true that
the effective level of judicial scrutiny for such statutes is zero. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa,
372 U.S. 726 (1963) (upholding, over substantive due process and equal protection challenge,
statute prohibiting nonlawyers from engaging in business of debt adjusting, and detailing
judicial deference absent more specific constitutional challenge). The upshot, as Professor
LaFave notes, is that "the United States Supreme Court has all but abandoned the practice of
invalidating criminal statutes on the basis that they bear no substantial relation to injury to
the public." 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AuSTIN W. Scorr, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAw
§ 2.12(b), at 211-12 (1986).
Although the Court in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), did strike down a
statute criminalizing mere "status" (viz., drug addiction), as violating the Eighth Amend
ment, it has since been careful to cabin Robinson narrowly. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S.
514, 533 (1967) (plurality opinion) ("Robinson
brings this Court but a very small way into
the substantive criminal law. And unless Robinson is so viewed it is difficult to see any
limiting principle that would serve to prevent this Court from becoming . . . the ultimate
arbiter of the standards of criminal responsibility . . . .").
209. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (upholding, over substantive due
process challenge, statute prohibiting opticians from dispensing eyeglasses without prescrip
tion from licensed optometrist or ophthalmologist).
• . .
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or many actions within the scope of these rules are morally
innocent.210
The defender of the Direct Account might be tempted to distin
guish FLAG DESECRATION, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY, and ABORTION
from the case in which Z is sanctioned for "the sale of filled milk,"
or "dispensing eyeglasses without an opthamologist's prescription,"
by appealing to the concept of liberty: "The particular action X
performed, in our stylized cases, was an action falling within some
class of constitutional liberties. X's particular action was an action
of speech in FLAG DESECRATION and CHILD PORNOGRAPHY, and
an action lying within the zone of privacy in ABORTION. This is not
true of Z: Z's particular action was not a liberty-type action.
Therefore X, but not Z, is entitled to more epistemic work suffi
cient to determine whether his action was wrong." But this attempt
to salvage the idea of epistemic1 rights is misconceived, because it
distorts the concept of liberty.
The concept of liberty, or freedom, is forward-looking, not
backward-looking. To say that actors should be at liberty to per
form actions of type A - expressive actions, or actions falling
within the zone of personal privacy - is to say that performing an
A-type action, or not, should be at the actor's choice (absent over
riding reason). Actors should not be coerced (absent overriding
reason) into refraining from A-type actions, or otherwise prevented
from choosing, themselves, whether or not to perform actions of
that type.211 But it is only physically possible for actors to choose
210. Creating a general epistemic1 right - a general right not to be sanctioned pursuant
to a rule where, relative to the act-description set forth in the rule plus whatever further facts
about the claimant's action have properly come to the court's attention, the claimant is possi
bly or likely morally innocent - would involve a return to the broad-ranging practice of
judicial review characteristic of the Lochner period, see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905). What if the defender of the Direct Account wants to do just that? Then he can
plausibly argue that the claimants in CHILD PORNOGRAPHY, FLAG DESECRATION, and ABOR
TION have had their epistemiei rights violated; but I would then reply, as to the notion of
epistemic;z rights, that this is dilutive. See infra text accompanying notes 220-25.
211. Consider Joel Feinberg's definition of "liberty," at the beginning of his famous trea
tise on the criminal law, where he quite naturally ties the idea of "liberty" to choice and
coercion:
We can . . . formulate the basic question of these volumes as one about the moral limits
of individual liberty, understanding "liberty" simply as the absence of legal coercion.
When the state creates a legal statute prohibiting its citizens from doing X on pain of
punishment, then the citizens are no longer "at liberty" to do X The credible threat of
punishment working directly on the citizens' motives makes X substantially less eligible
than before for their deliberate doing. . . . [W]hen we are prohibited from doing [X] we
are required, under threat of penalty, to omit doing [X].
FEINBERG, supra note 57, at 7. One might dispute Feinberg's definitional link of liberty and
coercion. "There are many other barriers to our actions than prohibitory rules backed by
threats of punishment. . . . But it would be false and misleading to say that I am not free or
not at liberty to do [such] things." Id. at 8. Whether or not Feinberg is right, here, it is at
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the actions that they will perform in the future; it is physically im
possible for actors to change the actions they already did or did not
perform, in the past.212 Therefore, any moral imperative to leave
actors free to perform A-type actions must be a forward-looking
imperative. For example, the freedom of speech at Time T0 means
that actors who might speak at future times Ti. T2

•

•

•

ought not be

coerced by the duty-imposing legal rules that are or will be in force,
into remaining silent at those future times. It does not mean that an
actor who already has spoken, at some prior times T_i. or T_2,

•

•

•

is

entitled to extra, epistemic work - beyond what is ordinarily re
quired under the Eighth Amendment or the rest of the Constitution
- to determine whether her past speech-act was wrongful under
another description.213
Now, it is certainly open to the defender of the Direct Account
to submit a creative reinterpretation of the Free Speech Clause and
the substantive component of the Due Process Clause. He might
argue, creatively, that these clauses do not protect "liberties" in my
forward-looking sense; rather, they protect "liberties*" in the spe
cial, backward-looking sense appropriate to the idea of epistemiei
rights. A liberty* is an epistemic trigger. A liberty* marks out some
class of actions such that, if X performed an action within that class,
and is sanctioned pursuant to an underdescriptive rule,

X is

spe

cially entitled to the performance of additional epistemic work suf
ficient to determine whether his sanction is justified.

But the

standard, and better, moral readings of the Free Speech Clause and
the substantive component of the Due Process Clause see these
provisions as protecting liberties, not liberties*. It is vitally impor
tant to actors, and to their listeners, that they be free to perform
certain expressive actions; it is vitally important to them that they
have the free choice whether or not to perform actions lying within
least clear that legal coercion exemplifies a restriction on liberty because legal coercion (and
brute state force) is the exemplary way to restrict actors' future choices.
As for the Feinbergian link between liberty and choice: I believe that this is the correct
analysis of the concept of liberty, but ultimately this conceptual claim is less important than
the point that the choice-based concept Feinberg delineates - and not its backward-looking
analogue - better captures the constitutional criteria of free speech and substantive due
process.

212. I assert this to be true as a matter of common sense. How to cash out this truism, in
a theory of free will and the nature of the physical world, is well beyond my ken. See, e.g.,
STORRS McCALL, A MooEL OF TiiE UNIVERSE: SPACE-TIME, PROBABILITY, AND DECISION
1-19, 250-79 (1994) (defending branching model of universe, with open future and closed
past, and explicating free will within this model).
213. This raises the question why, on any account of the Free Speech Clause and the
substantive component of the Due Process Clause, retrospective challenges to sanctions
rather than prospective challenges to duties should be allowed. I deal with that question
below. See infra text accompanying notes 409-13.
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the zone of privacy.214 This is a forward-looking, not a backward
looking, reading of the moral criteria lying behind FLAG DESECRA
TION, CmLD PORNOGRAPHY, and .ABORTION. As between the
standard view that the Free Speech Clause and the substantive
component of the Due Process Clause of the Constitution protect
liberties, and the creative view that they protect liberties*, the stan
dard view is much better.21s
An additional problem with the notion of epistemic1 rights, and
the associated concept of liberties* (epistemic triggers), is that these
ideas do little to explain the remaining stylized cases: RESIDENTIAL
PICKETING, ANIMAL SACRIFICE, and ALcoHoL. If there is an epi
stemic failure that occurs in these remaining cases, it does not seem
to be the failure of underdescription. A rule prohibiting the "pick
eting of residences, except by labor groups" is not significantly un
derdescriptive: most actions of residence-picketing are
unnecessarily disruptive and upsetting to the residents, and ought
not be performed.216 Similarly, a rule prohibiting "the sacrifice of
animals for religious purposes" may not be significantly un
derdescriptive, depending on how one balances the religious needs
of the actors against the animals' welfare. Thus, even if the First
Amendment does underwrite liberties* rather than liberties, it is
hard to see how the idea of epistemic1 rights explains REsIDENTIAL
PICKETING and ANIMAL SACRIFICE. As for ALCOHOL: X's
purchase of alcohol was not an exercise of a liberty or a liberty*,
because the Equal Protection Clause does not protect "liberties" in
either sense.217 So an appeal to liberties* will not explain why epi
stemic rights are violated in that case, as opposed to the case of a Z
214. See infra notes 317, 327-28, 343 and accompanying text (discussing standard, liberty
protecting view of free speech and substantive due process, and citing sources).
215. The standard view might be wrong. See infra text accompanying notes 354-57 (dis
cussing discrimination, rather than liberty, account of free speech and substantive due pro
cess). But the plausible alternative to the standard view is that these clauses protect liberties
in no sense - not that they protect liberties*.
216. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (upholding general ban on residential pick
eting, over free speech challenge). Another, more conventional way of putting the distinc
tion between REsIDENTIAL PICKETING and FLAG DESECRATION is to say that the first is
underinclusive and the second overinclusive. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, The Changing Faces of
First Amendment Neutrality: R.A.V. v. St. Paul, Rust v. Sullivan, and the Problem of
Content-Based Underinclusion, 1992
CT. REv. 29, 29-32 (articulating puzzle of underin
clusion, within free speech jurisprudence). Underinclusion precludes underdescription, in
the sense demanded by epistemiei rights. Whatever the correct account of REsIDENTIAL
PICKETING, or of the majority decision in R.A. V., it cannot be that the sanctions in these
cases were meted out pursuant to rules that were underdescriptive.

SUP.

217. No plausible theory of the Equal Protection Clause sees it as delineating liberties in
either sense. See infra section II.B (discussing leading theories of equal protection).
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sanctioned for "the sale of filled milk" or "dispensing eyeglasses
without an opthamologist's prescription."
Given these difficulties with the notion of epistemic1 rights, the
defender of the Direct Account might be tempted to rework the
epistemic idea along the following lines:

Epistemic2 Rights: Rules That Are Enacted Through an Unreli
able Process
To say that X's sanction pursuant to rule R is "unconstitu
tional," or that it violates her "constitutional rights," is to say
that X has a legal right to have more epistemic work per
formed (specifically, by trying her under a different rule), prior
to imposing a sanction upon her. More epistemic work is
needed because the process by which R was formulated was
defective in certain, constitutional ways. The legislators or ad
ministrators who formulated R were not sufficiently informed,
impartial, and deliberative to determine, in a reliable way,
which actions should be legally proscribed and subject to sanc
tions. Specifically, certain errors (false beliefs) about the
moral relevance of speech, religion, race, or gender infected
the process by which R was formulated.
Note a few attractive features of this new formulation of the episte
mic idea. First, the idea of epistemiei rights potentially explains
REsIDENTIAL PICKETING, ANIMAL SACRIFICE, and ALCOHOL as
well as (perhaps) FLAG DESECRATION, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY, and
ABORTION. The rule in each case can, arguably, be taken as evi
dence of some process defect. For example, the rules in REsmEN
TIAL PICKETING and ANIMAL SACRIFICE are not underdescriptive
in the sense required by epistemic1 rights, but we can plausibly say
that they evidence a rule-formulation process infected with false be
liefs about the moral relevance of speech and religion. An action of
residential picketing is not made less harmful by the labor-related
viewpoint of the picketers; an action of killing animals is not made
more harmful by the religious cast of the actors. So we can infer
that the legislators or administrators who formulated these rules
made certain moral errors (within a class of errors delineated by the
First Amendment); and we can therefore conclude that X's episte
miei rights have been violated. The Constitution demands, we
might say, that persons not be sanctioned pursuant to rules whose
formulation was infected by certain error-types: at least that much
epistemic work is morally and constitutionally required, prior to im
posing a sanction.
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Relatedly, the idea of epistemiez rights does not require an ap
peal to the notion of liberties* (epistemic triggers) in order to ex
plain why epistemic rights are violated in our stylized cases but not
in the case of a rule prohibiting "the sale of filled

milk" or "dispens

ing eyeglasses without an opthamologist's prescription." The pro
cess for formulating a rule can be constitutionally defective,
independent of whether the rule includes liberties* within its scope,
and independent of whether X's particular action was an instance of
a liberty*. All we need is some constitutional basis for delineating a
class of

error-types

-

types of false beliefs, such that,

if these

be

liefs infected the rule-formulation process, more epistemic work is
morally and constitutionally required. The First Amendment,

alia,

inter

proscribes legislative error about the moral relevance of

speech218 and religion; the Equal Protection Clause proscribes leg
islative error about the moral relevance of race and gender.21 9
Thus, the idea of epistemiez rights can be used to explain ALCOHOL
(which does not involve liberties or liberties*) as well as the re
maining stylized cases. The promulgation of a rule prohibiting men
between eighteen and twenty-one (or women or black persons)
from purchasing alcohol evidences false beliefs, among legislators,
about the moral relevance of gender (or race), and it therefore vio
lates X's epistemiez rights to be sanctioned pursuant to this rule
quite independent of the presence of liberties or liberties*.
But does this epistemic tack really work? Does the idea of epi
stemiez rights successfully underwrite the Direct Account? I think
not. The difficulty with the idea of epistemiez rights is that it dilutes
the moral justification for judicial review. The moral fact about
FLAG DESECRATION, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY, .ABORTION, and the
remainder of our stylized cases is not merely the

epistemic fact that

society needs to undertake further moral deliberation and research.
It is not merely that more epistemic work needs to be done to de
termine whether sanctioning a given individual under the stylized
rule is morally justified. Rather, and more strongly, the moral fact
about each and every one of the stylized rules is the nonepistemic
fact that the rule-predicate should be repealed or amended. As I
will argue at much greater length in Part III, for each stylized rule
there is sufficient moral reason that the rule-predicate be changed,
218. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 189, 227-33 (1983) (arguing that free speech doctrine operates, in part, to
identify laws where legislators were improperly motivated with respect to speech).
219. See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, A.Nno1sCRIMINATION LAW AND SoCIAL EouALITY 13-56
(1996) (analyzing process theories of equal protection).
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in some measure. The rule in FLAG DESECRATION wrongly coerces
otherwise-innocent speakers to refrain from expressing their views
about the flag; the rule in ABORTION wrongly coerces some women
not to procure abortions; the rule in CHILD PORNOGRAPHY wrongly
coerces parents not to display pictures of their naked infants; the
rules in ALCOHOL, ANIMAL SACRIFICE, and RESIDENTIAL PICKET
ING wrongly discriminate on the basis of race, gender, ·religion, or
viewpoint. A world with these rules is a world that, in some mea
sure, is morally awry - not merely a world whose moral status de
mands more inquiry on our p art.220
The difference between epistemic and nonepistemic grounds for
judicial intervention is a large one; it parallels the large differences
that moral philosophers and jurisprudes have elaborated in other
contexts, for example, between reason for belief and reason for ac
tion,221 between attempted and completed crime,222 and between
risking and wronging.223 By advancing merely an epistemic claim,
the idea of epistemiei rights makes a weaker case for constitutional
review, under the Bill of Rights, than can and should be made.
Although this critique is not catastrophic for the epistemic idea it does not prove the idea to be internally incoherent, or deeply
confused - it does weigh against epistemiei rights and in favor of
the Derivative Account.
The defender of the Direct Account might respond to this point
by saying that constitutional reviewing courts are not competent to
determine whether morality requires a change in the predicates of
rules. Their role is merely epistemic, not nonepistemic - to pro
tect epistemiei rights, and nothing more. But if that were true, con
stitutional law would look radically different. Constitutional courts
pervasively scrutinize rule-predicates and not merely the direct his
torical evidence (in the legislative or administrative history, or in a
rulemaking record, or in the testimony of legislators or administra
tor) of the beliefs that motivated rule-formulators.224 Judicial re220.
221.
222.
223.

See infra sections ID.A.1-2.
See Hurd, supra note 169, at 1615-20.
See Hurd, supra note 184, at 187-93 (criticizing attempted-act deontology).
See Stephen R. Perry, Risk, Harm, and Responsibility, in PHn.osoPmCAL FOUNDA
TIONS OF ToRT LAw 321 (David G. Owen ed., 1995).
224. This is not to say that direct historical evidence is irrelevant to reviewing courts. See

Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 228-29 (1985) (relying on direct historical evidence of
racist motivation behind facially neutral provision of state constitution to invalidate provi
sion). Nor is it to say that a system exclusively focused on the rulemaking record, cf. United
States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 250-53 (2d Cir. 1977) (invalidating
rule under Administrative Procedure Act, given agency's failure to respond adequately to
public comments), or even on testimony by officials about their mental states, cf. Citizens to
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view, under the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause,
and the substantive component of the Due Process Clause, is
largely structured around moral "tests" governing the predicates of
rules: the state must justify its rule-predicate as "narrowly tailored
to a compelling governmental interest," or as "significantly related
to an important governmental interest," or as non-discriminatory,
or whatevei.225 To interpret these as tests for false beliefs that may
have figured in a rule's enactment, which courts apply so as to pro
tect epistemiez rights, is to get matters quite backwards. A rule
predicate evidences the role of false beliefs in the rule's enactment

only if moral

reason obtains to change, in some measure, the rule

predicate. For
dence?

In

if the predicate is morally perfect, where is the evi
if courts are competent to perform this "eviden
of rule-predicates, then mutatis mutandis they are

short,

tiary" testing

competent to perform the task required by the Derivative Account,
and the epistemiez idea is unduly dilutive.
B.

Equality

I have extensively discussed, and criticized, two possible de
fenses of the Direct Account: a nonepistemic theory of justified
sanctions, such as an expressive or deterrent theory, that counts a
rule's predicate or history as part of the morally necessary condi
tions for a justified sanction, independent of the epistemic capaci
ties of reviewing courts; and an epistemic theory of justified
sanctions, that counts a rule's predicate or history as indicating the
need for additional moral inquiry prior to imposing a sanction.
But these are not the only defenses available to the Direct Ac
count.

Equality is

a partly separate, and morally rich, idea within

constitutional theory. The defender of the Direct Account might
hope to explain some, or even most types of constitutional rights,
by employing a theory of equality. At a minimum, she should hope
thus to explain the constitutional rights that arise in classic equal
protection cases, here exemplified by the stylized case I call ALCO
HOL. And, by extension, she might think that equality can under
write the Direct Account for cases of "discrimination" that arise,
not under the Equal Protection Clause, but under the Free Speech
Clause (as in REsmEm1AL PICKETING, or perhaps FLAG DESECRAPreserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971) (remanding, under Adminis
trative Procedure Act, for possible testimony by administrator), is a conceptual impossibility.
But clearly constitutional review, as now and long practiced, is not exclusively focused on
direct historical evidence of the beliefs behind rules.
225. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
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TION and CHILD PoRNOGRAPHY),226 or the Free Exercise Clause
(as in ANIMAL SACRIFICE),227 or even the Substantive Due Process
Clause.
Let us focus on ALcoHoL, for I will argue that a theory of
equality does not underwrite the Direct Account in this classic
equal protection scenario - and thus, a fortiori, that it does not
explain free speech, free exercise, or other such cases that may have
something to do with equality. My discussion cannot be compre
hensive, for there are in fact many different theories of equality.
Equality is an especially tricky and multifaceted moral concept.228
Rather, I will focus on those theories of equality that have figured
most prominently in constitutional law and constitutional scholar
ship: (1) equality as the equal treatment of "similarly situated" per
sons; (2) equality as the freedom from moral stigma or insult; (3)
equality as the guarantee of a political process that is free of preju
dice against certain groups; and (4) equality as a guarantee against
laws that aggravate the subordinate position of a specially disadvan
taged group.

1. Similarly Situated Individuals
Joseph Thssman and Jacobus tenBroek are justly famous for
their 1949 article on the "Equal Protection of the Laws," which
clarified and made influential the idea that equal protection re
quires the equal treatment of "similarly situated" persons.
The essence of [the Equal Protection Clause] can be stated with
deceptive simplicity. The Constitution does not require that things
different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. But
it does require, in its concern for equality, that those who are similarly
situated be similarly treated. The measure of the reasonableness of a
classification is the degree of its success in treating similarly those
similarly situated.229
226. See Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (invalidating rule prohibiting picket
ing near school, except peaceful labor picketing, under Equal Protection and Free Speech
Clauses); Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L.
REv. 615, 622-24 (1991) (noting increasingly important idea of "content discrimination"
within free speech doctrine).
227. See supra text accompanying notes 109-13 (discussing isomorphism between current
free exercise doctrine and equal protection doctrine).
228. For recent philosophical treatments, see LARRY S. TEMKJN, INEQUALITY (1993);
Dennis McKerlie, Equality, 106 ETHICS 274 (1996). For an overview of the theories that have
figured most importantly within the literature on the Equal Protection Clause, particularly
with respect to race and gender, see KOPPELMAN, supra note 219, at 13-114.
229. Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 3 CAL. L.
REv. 341, 344 (1949) (footnote omitted); see Flss, supra note 108, at 110 & n.2 (describing
Tussman and tenBroek's "now classic article").
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The Supreme Court regularly articulates this theory of equality in
its equal protection jurisprudence,230 and Kenneth Simons has car
ried forward and refined the idea within constitutional
scholarship.231
Let us bracket the point that the Court does not, in fact, enforce
a general guarantee of equal treatment for "similarly situated" indi
viduals. It is notoriously true that the Court will uphold wildly arbi
trary and unfair laws - laws that fail to accord equal treatment to
similarly situated firms, or workers, or consumers - as long as the
laws do not employ "suspect" predicates such as race and gender,
and other special factors are not present.232 Even leaving this point
aside, the "similarly situated" theory of equality does not help show
why the Direct Account holds true.
Consider the following variant of ALcoHoL: A rule prohibits
the purchase of alcohol by women (but not men) between the ages
of eighteen and twenty-one. For purposes of this discussion, I will
assume that the rule is irrational: its purpose is to prevent drunk
driving, and while all persons between eighteen and twenty-one are
more prone to drive drunk than all persons twenty-one or over,
women and men between eighteen and twenty-one are equally
prone to drive drunk. A woman W is sanctioned for breaching the
rule, and challenges her sanction on equal protection grounds. It
turns out that W's action of purchasing alcohol also was an action of
criminal fraud; she used a stolen credit card to execute the
purchase. Is there sufficient moral reason for the court to overturn
W's sanction, without further invalidating the no-alcohol rule?
The defender of the Direct Account wants to say that W has
been treated unequally, relative to a class of similarly situated men.
The puzzle lies in defining the class of men to whose treatment W's
230. See, e.g., Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2297 (1997) ("[The Equal Protection Clause]
embodies a general rule that States must treat like cases alike but may treat unlike cases
accordingly."); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) ("The
Equal Protection Clause . . . is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should
be treated alike.").
231. See Kenneth W. Simons, Overinclusion and Underinclusion: A New Model, 36
UCLA L. REv. 448, 456-60 (1989) [hereinafter Simons, Overinclusion and Underinclusion]
(discussing Tussman and tenBroek's model of classificatory fit); id. at 463-518 (proposing new
variant); see also Kenneth W. Simons, Equality as a Comparative Right, 65 B.U. L. REv. 387,
389 (1985) (stating that equality rights are not empty, understood as comparative rights: "A
right to equal treatment is a comparative claim to receive a particular treatment just because
another person or class receives it").
232. See FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-17 (1993) (discussing
deference to social and economic regulation under Equal Protection Clause, and citing
cases). "Special factors" is meant to cover the unusual cases in which the Supreme Court
invalidates statutes under the rational-basis prong of equal protection scrutiny. See supra
note 99.

should be compared.233 Is it

moral respects,
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(1)

men who · are similar to

W in all

that is, men between eighteen and twenty-one who

have purchased alcohol using stolen credit cards; or rather

(2) men

who are similar to W with respect to the purpose of the rule, that is,
men between eighteen and twenty-one who have purchased alco
hol? Relative to comparison class
qual treatment:

(2), W has indeed received une

she has been sanctioned, while men between

eighteen and twenty-one who purchase alcohol will not generally be
sanctioned for doing so. But, relative to comparison class
has

not received unequal

(1), W

treatment: she has been sanctioned pur

suant to the no-alcohol rule, while men between eighteen and
twenty-one who purchase alcohol using stolen credit cards will pre
sumably be sanctioned pursuant to the laws against fraud.234

In

short, the problem of multiple description, which bedeviled

the Direct Account earlier on - within a theory of justified sanc
tions - reappears within a theory of equality. For the retributivist,
as we have seen, it is a matter of (nonepistemic) moral indifference
whether the battering flag-desecrator is sanctioned pursuant to a
law that prohibits "battery" or pursuant to a law that prohibits "flag
desecration." It is a matter of moral indifference for the retribu
tivist whether the fraudulent alcohol-purchaser is sanctioned pursu
ant to a law that prohibits "fraud" or a law that prohibits "alcohol
purchases by women between eighteen and twenty-one." The de
fender of the Direct Account might hope that, by shifting ground
from the pros and cons of retributivism to the terrain of equality, he
can avoid the problem of multiple description. But he cannot. For
the problem simply recurs, here, in a slightly different form. Now,
the problem is whether the description under which some person is
sanctioned shapes the comparison class of "similarly situated" per
sons, for purposes of deciding whether the sanctioned person has
received equal treatment compared to that class.
233. Cf. Simons, Overinclusion and Underin'clusion, supra note 231, at 465 (noting that
"an equal protection claim necessarily compares the treatment of an identifiable plaintiff's
class with the more favorable treatment of some other identifiable class"). I would modify
this, to say that the plaintiff compares her treatment with the treatment of some identifiable
class. If the plaintiff is bringing a facial, anticipatory challenge to a statute, then her (known)
relevant features are the features picked out by the statutory classification; if, however, she is
bringing a different kind of challenge, more features of her may be known, which may place
her within a different moral class, and we should not assume that her claim of comparative
equality stands or falls depending upon the way others within her statutory class fare.
234. Of course, if W were sanctioned seriatim for purchasing alcohol and then for fraud,
her multiple punishment would be unequal treatment whatever the comparison class; but I
have assumed that our stylized actors are sanctioned only pursuant to the invalid rule. See
supra text accompanying notes 163-64.
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Only a description-dependent method for defining comparison
classes can underwrite the Direct Account. Therefore, the defender
of the Direct Account will want to adopt the view that the class of
men similarly situated to W is (2) the class of men between eighteen
and twenty-one who purchased alcohol. The purpose of the no
alcohol rule is to prevent the risk of drunk driving, a risk to which
both male and female drinkers between eighteen and twenty-one
are particularly prone. The purpose of the no-alcohol rule is not to
prevent fraud, and so non-fraudulent as well as fraudulent male
purchasers are relevantly similar to W. Or so the defender of the
Direct Account will argue.235 But the difficulty with this view is
that - if we were to sanction W, for the very same action of hers,
under a different rule - the compatjson class would change. Imag
ine that nothing in the world changes, except for the state's choice
of rule. W has performed her action of fraudulent alcohol
purchase, as before; men between eighteen and twenty-one who
perform otherwise-innocent actions of alcohol-purchase are not
sanctioned, as before; and men between eighteen and twenty-one
who perform fraudulent actions of alcohol-purchase are sanctioned,
as before, pursuant to the laws against fraud. Now, however, the
state prosecutes W for fraud rather than for breaching the no
alcohol rule. On the description-dependent view, W no longer has
an equality complaint, for the correct comparison class is now (3)
men who have committed fraud, that is, those similarly situated
with respect to the anti-fraud purpose of the law pursuant to which
W is sanctioned. But why should the state's choice of law have this
kind of bedrock moral significance, in changing whether W herself
has received what equality demands? Nothing in W's own re
sources, opportunities, and welfare has changed - unless we are
willing to make further claims about the "expressive" or "stigmatic"
import of rule-descriptions - and nothing has changed in the re
sources, opportunities, or welfare available to men.
The exponent of the Derivative Account has a simple and ele
gant answer to this puzzle. Whatever the right method for defining
comparison classes, the no-alcohol rule should be generally invali
dated in some way - either repealed, or extended to include men
235. Cf Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 229, at 346 ("[W]here are we to look for the
test of similarity of situation which determines the reasonableness of a classification? The
inescapable answer is that we must look beyond the classification to the purpose of the
law."). But Tussman and tenBroek are concerned here with whether the enactment of a
classification into law satisfies equal protection, and not whether a particular application of
that law does. See id. at 344-45 (explicitly stating that their concern is enactment, not
application).
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between eighteen and twenty-one as well as women. For, whatever
the right method, enforcing the no-alcohol rule as is will lead to

violations of equal treatment. If the right method is description
dependent, then the rule should be repealed or amended: all
women sanctioned pursuant to the rule - both otherwise-innocent

women who do nothing more than purchase alcohol, and women
who commit fraud, etc. - are treated unequally, relative to all or at
least some men between eighteen and twenty-one who purchase al
cohol. Conversely,

if the

right method is description-independent,

then the rule should still be repealed or ainended: otherwise-inno
cent women sanctioned pursuant to the rule are treated unequally,

relative to those otherwise-innocent men between eighteen and
twenty-one who purchase alcohol and

WJl not be sanctioned under

any laws. To put the point succinctly and generally:

if a legislative

classification, such as the classification � the no-alcohol rule, is in
deed irrational relative to valid legislative purposes, then - regard

less of the significance of the rule's purpose in defining comparison

classes - the proponent of a Tussman/tenBroek type theory of

equality will want to repeal or amend the rule.

I tend to believe that the proper method for defining compari
son classes is description-independent. To think otherwise is to con

flate a nonexpressive theory of equality, specifically a theory that

demands the similar treatment of morally similar persons, with an
expressive theory of equality that focuses on the problem of stigma

and insult. But, in any event, the defender of the Derivative Ac

count can remain agnostic on this issue. The defender of the Direct

Account cannot; she must either establish a puzzling and controver
sial theory of description-dependent comparison classes, or else

move on to a different theory of equality altogether.

2.

Stigma

A second theory of equality, prominent within constitutional
scholarship236 as well as the case law,237 focuses upon unfair stigma
236. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 219, at 57-76 (surveying stigma theory within scholar
ship on discrimination).
237. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) ("To separate [schoolchil
dren] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a
feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and
minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."). The Court, since Brown, has repeatedly in
voked the notion of stigma in its race-discrimination case law - most recently, in seeking to
justify strict scrutiny for affirmative action. See, e.g., Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 229
(1995); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) ("Classifications based
on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm. Unless they are strictly reserved for. remedial
settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial
hostility."). For earlier invocations, in the context of straight race discrimination, see, e.g.,
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- paradigmatically, racial stigma - as a serious form of wrong and
unequal treatment. Paul Brest produced the classic scholarly expo
sition of this theory in his

1977
Antidiscrimination Principle.238

article entitled

In Defense of the

[One] rationale for the antidiscrimination principle is the prevention
of the harms which may result from race-dependent decisions. . . .
Decisions based on assumptions of intrinsic worth and selective indif
ference [inter alia] inflict psychological injury by stigmatizing their
victims as inferior.239
The theory goes back to the Court's decision in

Brown v. Board of
Education,240 and before that to Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v.
Ferguson, in which Harlan indicted segregation as placing a "badge
of servitude" upon blacks.241
The theory helps explain why rules that employ "suspect" predi
cates, such as racial predicates, are uniquely subject to judicial in
validation under the Equal Protection Clause.
plausible to think that where

(1)

It is intuitively

the predicate of rule

actors by virtue of their race (black) and

(2)

R

picks out

is morally suboptimal

in scope (morality requires either an extension of the rule to in
clude whites, or a repeal), which strongly evidences (3) the causal
role of legislators' or constituents' false beliefs about the moral in
feriority of black persons, in producing the rule, the upshot is that

(4) a serious kind of wrong (a "stigma") is done to black persons
who are sanctioned pursuant to the rule.242
Note, too, how a stigma theory of equality helps the defender of
the Direct Account. Consider a variant of ALCOHOL with a racially
discriminatory rule that prohibits the sale of alcohol to black per
sons between eighteen and twenty-one. A black person

B

is sanc

tioned for breaching the rule, and challenges his sanction on equal
protection grounds. It turns out that

B used a stolen credit card to

purchase the alcohol. The defender of the Direct Account has here
a straightforward and morally compelling explanation why it is not,
all things considered, a matter of moral indifference whether B is
Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 485 (1992); Crawford v. Board of Education, 458 U.S. 527, 544
(1982); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 26 (1971).
238. Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term - Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1976).
239. Id. at 8.
240. 347 U.S. at 493-94.
241. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 562 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
242. It is possible that stigma ensues even where the rule's predicate is morally optimal in
scope. But we then have an evidentiary question about the existence of prejudice in produc
ing the rule - although that, too, may not be a necessary condition for stigma. In any event,
the strongest case for stigma is where all of the first three conditions obtain.
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sanctioned pursuant to a racially neutral anti-fraud rule, as opposed
to the no-alcohol rule. B deserves, or may deserve, that sanction,
under our general theory of sanctions; retributivism is, or may be,
true. Thus, it is, or may be, a matter of indifference, for purposes of
our theory of sanctions, whether B is sanctioned pursuant to the no
alcohol rule or an anti-fraud rule. But the choice of rule is not, all
things considered, a matter of moral indifference, because to sanc
tion B as a "black" (regardless of her fraud) is to do her serious
wrong. When we add our theory of equality to our theory of sanc
tions, even the retributivist can agree that there is sufficient and
compelling moral reason for a court to invalidate B's sanction and quite independent of further invalidating the no-alcohol rule.
Thus, the Direct Account has finally gained a secure foothold
within constitutional law. By using a stigma theory of equality, the
defender of the Direct Account can finally explain, in a plausible
and persuasive way, a central part of our constitutional jurispru
dence - the jurisprudence of race discrimination. But how widely
can she extend the stigma theory, beyond that central part? Let us
continue cycling through the variants of ALCOHOL. The defender
of the Direct Account might plausibly extend Brest's theory to the
case where a rule prohibits women between eighteen and twenty
one from purchasing alcohol, and a woman

W who

has breached

the rule is sanctioned for doing so.243 But what about the case in
which a man

M is sanctioned pursuant to a rule prohibiting alcohol
to men? I take this variant directly from the Court's decision
in Craig v. Boren244 - remember that the Oklahoma statute invali
dated in Craig prohibited the sale of low-alcohol beer to men be
tween eighteen and twenty-one245 - and that feature of Craig is
sales

hardly unusual for the Supreme Court case law on gender discrimi
nation. As one scholar has noted: "It has become notorious that in
almost all the major sex discrimination cases decided by the
Supreme Court, the prevailing plaintiff was a man."246
So explaining the M variant of ALcoHoL is a serious problem
for the defender of Direct Account - and it cannot be resolved, I
suggest, using the stigma theory. The enactment of a rule prohibit
ing the sale of alcohol to men is

not plausibly taken

as evidence of

the causal role that false beliefs about the moral inferiority of men
243. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 219, at 118-27 (arguing that women are stigmatized by
gender-discriminatory laws).
244. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
245. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 191-92.
246. KOPPELMAN, supra note 219, at 133.

·

74

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 97:1

played in the enactment of that rule. Just the opposite: at most it is
plausibly taken (if morally suboptimal), just like the enactment of
the W variant, as evidence of the causal role that false beliefs about
the moral inferiority of women played in the enactment of the rule.
Andrew Koppelman, a leading advocate of the extension of the
stigma theory from race to gender, argues thus in his discussion of
Michael M. v. Superior Court247 - a case where the law, as in
Craig, provided more stringent treatment for men than women.

[This case] involved a constitutional challenge to California's statu
tory rape law, which criminalized sexual intercourse with a female
(but not with a male) under the age of eighteen. . . . The law's likely
effect was "legitimating stereotypes of male aggressiveness and fe
male vulnerability, as well as double standards of morality that tradi
tionally have served to repress women's sexual expression."248
Perhaps the stigma theory furnishes reason to invalidate the no
alcohol-for-men rule - but what this theory warrants is the invali
dation of the rule, not merely M's own treatment.249 Sanctioning M
pursuant to the no-alcohol-for-men rule does not stigmatize him, in
the way that sanctioning W pursuant to the no-alcohol-for-women
rule stigmatizes her, and sanctioning B pursuant to the no-alcohol
for-blacks rule stigmatizes B.
So I take the stigma theory to have gained the Direct Account a
secure, but only a small foothold within constitutional law. A
stigma-based Direct Account explains only a portion of current
equal protection law: the B and W variants of ALCOHOL. It does
not explain the M variant of ALCOHOL, and it explains none of our
remaining stylized cases, with the possible exception of ABORTION.
"Moral inferiority" is an essential part of the stigma theory; it is
what makes the theory powerful and persuasive.250 What consti
tutes a moral insult to X, sufficient to justify overturning her sanc
tion even if the rule R is not further invalidated, and even if X
herself has performed wrong, is the belief of the legislators who
enacted R (or their ascription of such a belief to their constituents)
that X is a moral inferior. No rule in our remaining stylized cases,
with the possible exception of ABORTION, evidences such a belief
about the sanctioned Xs.
247. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
248. KOPPELMAN, supra note 219, at 144-45 (quoting DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND
GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 102 (1989)). Even if a rule can be stigmatic
independent of prejudice in tbe rule's history, see supra note 242, it is implausible tbat a rule
discriminating against men (in our society, today) signals tbeir inferiority.
249. See infra text accompanying note 276 (discussing problem of marginal contribution).
250. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (condemning race dis
crimination because it stigmatizes blacks as inferior); Brest, supra note 238, at 8-12 (same).
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3. Process Theories
Our alcohol-drinking M may still have hope. A theory of equal

ity that demands the equal treatment of "similarly situated" persons
fails to explain why the Direct Account holds true for M, W, or B in

ALcoHoL; a theory of equality that demands freedom from unfair
stigma works for W and B, but not M; yet there remains the possi

bility that a "process" theory of equality can help M.251 That kind

of theory has its origin in the oft-quoted footnote four of Carolene
Products,252 and has been given its most salient scholarly exposition
by John Hart Ely in his book Democracy and Distrust.253 As Ely
explains:

In a representative democracy value determinations are to be made
by our elected representatives, and if in fact most of us disapprove we
can vote them out of office. Malfunction occurs when the process is
undeserving of truth, when . . . though no one is actually denied a
voice or a vote, representatives beholden to an effective majority are
systematically disadvantaging some minority out of simple hostility or
a prejudiced refusal to recognize commonalities of interest, and
thereby denying that minority the protection afforded other groups by
a representative system.254
As the passage suggests, a process theory trades essentially on the

political role of prejudice (which I would construe as false beliefs
about the moral inferiority of the targeted group, and perhaps re

lated types of false beliefs, for example, certain stereotypes). One
can develop the theory in two different ways:

(1)

by arguing that it

is intrinsically or instrumentally important for citizens to participate

in the political process, and that prejudice prevents the targeted
group from participating, or (2) by arguing that a rule that the legis

lator enacts by virtue of some prejudice of hers tends to be morally
amiss, because prejudice is by definition a false belief and decisions

predicated upon false beliefs tend to be wrong.

251. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 219, at 13-56 (surveying process theories within scholar
ship on discrimination).
252. See United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) ("Nor need we
enquire [here] . . . whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operations of those political processes ordina
rily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry.").
253. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1980).
254. Id. at 103.
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Although Ely intends to argue for version one of the process
theory,255 I believe that version two is the better one256 - and in
any event it is version two that helps M in ALCOHOL. M can hardly
say that, because women failed to participate in the process of en
acting the no-alcohol-for-men rule, his own treatment is unfair.257
What M can say is that, because certain prejudices about women
figured in the enactment of the rule, the rule's formulation does not
meet minimum moral standards of epistemic reliability. Legislators
who believe that men are superior to, or otherwise morally distinct
from women, are likely to miscalculate the empirical effects, and
normative significance, of the various actions that men and women
perform. They may wrongly believe, for example, that young men
are typically brash, or daring, or brave, and likely to run the risk of
driving drunk.258 A false belief about M's station, superior or not,
may be tied up with false beliefs about his high willingness to take
risks or do harm. M cannot complain of being stigmatized by a rule
that discriminates against men, nor can he say necessarily that he
has been treated unequally relative to similar actors, but M can say
that he has been denied the minimum epistemic work to which he is
entitled - the epistemic work of a legislature that knows, at least,
the basic truth of the equal worth and station of men and women.
This is, of course, just the idea of epistemi� rights that I earlier
considered and rejected.259 The problem with the idea, as I have
suggested, is that it dilutes the case for judicial review, relative to
the Derivative Account. The idea of epistemi� rights is feasible
and nondilutive only in contexts where courts have direct, historical
evidence about the prejudices that figured in a rule's formulation;
and further where courts are not well-placed to determine whether
morality requires a change in the rule's predicate. That may be
true, for example, of nonconstitutional judicial review in the admin
istrative law context; but it is not true in the equal protection con255. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 219, at 39 (noting that "Ely purports to offer a constitu
tional theory . . . in which judicial review is concerned solely with 'what might capaciously be
designated process writ large - with ensuring broad participation in the processes and distri
butions of government' " (footnote omitted) (quoting ELY, supra note 253, at 87)).
256. See infra text accompanying note 400 (describing counterintuitive consequences of
first variant).
257. M could say, I suppose, that the existence of prejudice against women, by preventing
women from participating in a rule's formulation, has the instrumental effect of making the
rule less reliable. This construal of version one of process theory is subject to the same kind
of objection that I advance, here, against version two. It merely provides M a kind of episte
miez right.
258. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 202 n.14 (1976) (noting stereotype that " 'reckless'
young men [will] drink and drive").
259. See supra text accompanying notes 218-25.
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text, and Ely does not mean to claim otherwise. 260 Rather, Ely
suggests, courts should scrutinize rule-predicates as evidence of the
prejudices that may have motivated rule-formulators.
[T]he "special scrutiny" that is afforded suspect classifications . . . in
sists that the classification in issue fit the goal invoked in its defense
more closely than any alternative classification would. There is only
one goal the classification is likely to fit that closely, however, and that
is the goal the legislators actually had in mind. If that goal cannot be
invoked because it is unconstitutional, the classification will fall.

Thus, fu,nctionally, special scrutiny, in particular its demand for an es
sentially perfect fit, turns out to be a way of ''flushing out" unconstitu
261
tional motivation .
.

.

.

But Ely's claim gets matters quite backwards. It is like saying that,
because a tortfeasor caused harm to a victim, we have evidence that
the tortfeasor imposed a risk on the victim.262 What matters mor
ally about the tortfeasor - or at least what matters
harming, not risking. Similarly, what matters more

HOL

-

more - is
about ALco

more than the fact that prejudices against women figured in

the enactment of the no-alcohol rule, such that more epistemic
work about

M is

needed - is that nonepistemic moral reason ob

tains to invalidate

the rule and to replace it with some kind of
If the predicate of the no-alcohol rule is mor
which is what the Court concluded in Craig v. Bo

gender-neutral rule.
ally imperfect,

ren, 263 then the predicate may evidence the role of prejudices in the
rule's enactment; but, more importantly, it shows that the rule
should be repealed or amended.
rule is morally perfect

If the predicate of the no-alcohol
(pace Craig), then we have not yet "flushed

out" the prejudices that Ely would have us look for. A non-dilu
tive, predicate-based defense of the Direct Account does not exist.

4.

The Group-Disadvantaging Principle

Finally, I consider the theory of equality Owen Fiss advanced in
his well-known article

Groups and the Equal Protection Clause.264

260. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 253, at 146 (noting the "proof problems of a . . . direct
inquiry [into legislative motivation"). For a real-world example, see Craig, 429 U.S. at 199200 n.7 (noting that "[Oklahoma's] purpose is not apparent from the face of the statute and
the Oklahoma Legislature does not preserve statutory history materials capable of clarifying
the objectives served by its legislative enactments").
261. Ely, supra note 253, at 146 (second emphasis added).
262. See Perry, supra note 223, at 330-39 (arguing that risk is not harm, and ought not be
compensable as harm in tort law).
263. See Craig, 429 U.S at 204 {holding that "the relationship between gender and traffic
safety [is] far too tenuous to satisfy [the constitutional] requirement that the gender-based
difference be substantially related to achievement of the statutory objective").
264. Fiss, supra note 108; see also KOPPELMAN, supra note 219, at 76-92, 76 (surveying
group-disadvantage theory within scholarship on discrimination: "[T]he group-disadvantage
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Fiss argues that the Constitution prohibits practices that aggravate
the subordinate position of a "specially disadvantaged group,"
paradigmatically blacks.265 Blacks are a "social group"266 - a so
cial entity with a "distinct existence apart from its members"267 that "has been in a position of perpetual subordination," and whose
"political power . . . is severely circumscribed. "268 As a conse
quence, this social group falls within the protection of the Equal
Protection Clause.
Some state laws or practices may just be a mistake - they make all
groups and all persons worse off, and equally so. These do not seem
to be the concern of a constitutional provision cast in terms of equal
ity. Equality is a relativistic idea. The concern should be with those
laws or practices that particularly hurt a disadvantaged group. Such
laws might enhance the welfare of society (or the better-off classes),
or leave it the same; what is critical, however, is that the state law or
practice aggravates (or perpetuates?) the subordinate position ofa spe
cially disadvantaged group. This is what the Equal Protection Clause
prohibits.269

Fiss intends this theory to be quite distinct from the other theories
of equality that are current within constitutional law, and that I
have here considered: a theory of equal treatment for similarly sit
uated individuals, a stigma theory, and a process theory. Unlike the
equal treatment theory, which focuses upon how individuals fare
relative to others, Fiss's theory is explicitly a non-individualistic the
ory. His concern is with the effect of laws and practices on "spe
cially disadvantaged" groups, not on particular individuals: "[T]he
Equal Protection Clause should be viewed as a prohibition against
group-disadvantaging practices, not unfair treatment. . . . [A] claim
of individual unfairness [should be] put to one side . . . . "270 And,
by contrast with the stigma and process theories, for which it is cru
cial that laws discriminate on the basis of race or be motivated by
theory looks beyond process and signification to the substantive social position of blacks and
other disadvantaged groups").

265. See generally Flss, supra note
disadvantaging principle").

108, at 147-70 (explicating and defending "group

266. Id. at 154.
267. Id. at 148. This, along with what F!Ss calls "interdependence" ("[t]he identity and
well-being of the members of the group and the identity and well-being of the group are
linked," id.), are in F!Ss's view the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a
social group.

268. Id. at 154-55.
269. Id. at 157 (emphasis added).
270. Id. at 160; see id. at
and tenBroek's theory).

123, 148 (noting, and criticizing, individualistic cast of Tussman
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racial prejudices,2 7 1discrimination is not central to Fiss. Part of the
point of Fiss's article is to show that a racially neutral law that,
nonetheless,aggravates the subordinate position of blacks,should
be unconstitutional. 21 2
As I have already explained,equal protection doctrine does not
currently reflect this kind of view. A reviewing court will not invali
date the kind of law Fiss hopes to strike down - a racially neutral
law that has a disparate impact upon blacks,and thereby aggravates
their subordinate position. That has been the doctrine,for better or
worse,since Washington v. Davis.273 So the defender of the Direct
Account cannot hope to explain the current pattern of equal pro
tection rights using a Fissian theory. But even if doctrine were to
change, and disparate impact were to become the touchstone for
equal protection law,the Direct Account would not hold true.
Let us consider, once more, the B variant of ALcoHoL, now
using a Fissian lens. A rule prohibits "black persons between eight
een and twenty-one "from purchasing alcohol. A black person B
purchases alcohol using a stolen credit card,and is sanctioned pur
suant to the rule. Are there sufficient grounds for the reviewing
court to invalidate B 's sanction,independent of further invalidating
the no-alcohol rule? A Fissian defense of the Direct Account runs
into two serious difficulties,here: the first concerns the individua
tion of legal practices,and the second concerns the problem of mar
ginal contribution.
Fiss would invalidate legal practices that aggravate the
subordinate position of blacks;if sanctioning B contributes to such
a practice, then there is Fissian reason to overturn B 's sanction.
But is the relevant legal practice: (1) enforcing the no-alcohol rule
against those blacks whose actions are not sanctionable under other
descriptions, or rather (2) enforcing the no-alcohol rule, period?
This is very like the problem of defining comparison classes that I
discussed above,in the context of the Thssman/tenBroek theory of
equality. Sanctioning B is part of the second practice,but not the
first.
Fiss stresses that his criterion for individuating "social groups "is
natural,not artificial.
271. See ELY, supra note 253, at 145-70 (arguing for judicial focus on "suspect classifica
tions" as evidence of unconstitutional motivation); Brest, supra note 238, at 26, 44-53 (argu
ing that discrimination, not disparate impact, is touchstone of Equal Protection Clause).
272. See Flss, supra note 108, at 141-46, 157-60, 170.
273. 426 U.S. 229 (1976); see supra text accompanying notes 98-102 (discussing Court's
rejection of disparate impact as sufficient condition for invalidating laws under Equal Protec
tion Clause).
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[It] strikes me as odd to build a general interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause . . . on the rejection of the idea that there are natu
ral classes, that is, groups that have an identity and existence wholly
apart from the challenged state statute or practice. There are natural
classes, or social groups, in American society and blacks are such a
group.274

Fiss continues: "[The] Equal Protection Clause [does not extend to]
what might be considered artificial classes, those created by a classi
fication or criterion embodied in a state practice or statute . . . "21s
If this nonartificiality principle carries over to the individuation of
group-disadvantaging practices themselves, the Direct Account will
likely fail. A criterion that confines the relevant "practice" to (1)
enforcing that portion of the no-alcohol rule that covers only blacks
whose actions are not sanctionable under other rules, is nonar
tificial in the following sense: B's sanction will not contribute to the
relevant Fissian "practice," whether she is sanctioned pursuant to
the no-alcohol rule or instead for fraud. By contrast, a criterion
that individuates the Fissian practice as (2) enforcing the entire no
alcohol rule, is artificial in the following, interesting sense: B's
sanction will contribute to the Fissian practice if she is sanctioned
pursuant to the no-alcohol rule, but will not contribute if she is
sanctioned for the very same action of hers pursuant to a rule
prohibiting fraud.
But even if one individuates the Fissian practice along the lines
of (2) rather than (1), the Direct Account likely fails. The problem
here is the problem of marginal contribution.276 The relevant prac
tice, let us assume, is (2) enforcing the no-alcohol rule. Relative to
a world in which the no-alcohol rule is repealed, fully enforcing the
no-alcohol rule aggravates the subordinate position of the black
group. Only blacks are sanctioned pursuant to the rule, and only
blacks are coerced not to purchase alcohol. But relative to a world
in which the no-alcohol rule is fully in force, \vith the exception of
B's sanction, fully enforcing the no-alcohol rule only marginally ag.

274. Fiss, supra note 108, at 148.
275. Id. at 156.
276. The idea that a particular action (here, sanctioning B) might be innocent by virtue of
its marginal contribution to some disfavored state-of-the-world, even though a general prac
tice of performing actions "like this" (however precisely that is defined) has bad conse
quences, is hardly a new one. That idea is precisely what helped animate rule-utilitarianism.
See LYONS, supra note 123, at 2-17; ScARRE, supra note 46, at 122-32. Lyons claims, fa
mously, that act- and rule-utilitarianism are extensionally equivalent; but that does not entail
that the enforcement of a textually entrenched rule cannot have overall consequences that
are different from the consequences of an application. See SCHAUER, supra note 58, at 79-85
(arguing that Lyons's proof does not apply to "rules" understood as entrenched
generalizations).
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gravates the subordinate position of the black group. B's sanction,
taken alone, has only a vanishingly small effect on the social posi
tion of the black group. (The sanction is hard on B, but as we have
seen, Fiss's concern is for blacks as a group, not for particular black
individuals.) Therefore the Direct Account is false: the court does
not have sufficient reason to overturn B's sanction, independent of
further invalidating the no-alcohol rule. After all, B is a wrongdoer
under another description; if she is not sanctioned pursuant to the
no-alcohol rule, she may not be sanctioned at all. The vanishing
contribution that freeing her makes to the social position of blacks
is not weighty enough to outweigh the demands of retributive
justice.
The Fissian theory may provide a reviewing court reason to re
peal or amend the no-alcohol rule, given the cumulative contribu
tion that sanctioning and coercing lots of black individuals has on
the subordinate position of the black group. But it does not pro
vide the reviewing court a reason to invalidate B's sanction, without
more, regardless of how we individuate practices for Fissian
purposes.

C. Authority
I have considered, under the rubric of a theory of justified sanc
tions, and the rubric of a theory of equality, a wide range of possi
ble defenses of the Direct Account. A justified-sanction defense
might be nonepistemic or epistemic. As for the first, I considered
several plausible rule-dependent theories of sanctioning (specifi
cally, expressive and deterrent theories); as for the second, I consid
ered several plausible theories of epistemic rights (what I called
epistemic1 rights and epistemiez rights). And under the rubric of
equality, I analyzed seriatim the four specific theories most visible
within constitutional scholarship and doctrine: (1) a Tussman/
tenBroek theory of equal treatment, (2) a stigma theory, (3) a pro
cess theory, and (4) a group-disadvantaging theory. I have argued
that none of these defenses underwrites the Direct Account for any
of our stylized cases, with the following exception: the stigma the
ory explains the B and W variants (but not the M variant) of ALco
HOL. This is a modest harvest, indeed, for the Direct Account.
Are there further moral arguments that the defender of the Di
rect Account might advance? If it is true in our stylized cases (leav
ing aside the B and W variants of ALcoHoL) that X's sanction is
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(prima facie)277 justified under a nonepistemic theory of sanctions;
that constitutionally sufficient epistemic work has been done to de
termine that; and that X has no equality claim sufficient to warrant
overturning her sanction independent of further invalidating the
rule R under which it falls, then it is hard to see what further argu
ments (more or less connected to the moral criteria at stake in our
stylized cases) remain for our defender. I see only one real possibil
ity, and I will briefly consider that here.21s
That possibility is a theory of authority. By "authority" I mean
what the term means within contemporary jurisprudence: a rule
has "authority" if the enactment of that rule, in some way, provides
the actors and/or state officials subject to the rule additional reason
(in particular, additional moral reason) to do what the rule autho
rizes or requires.279 "Reason" here is meant to encompass both
277. I say "prima facie" to leave open the possibility that the sanction might be, all things
considered, unjustified, say because it violates an equality norm.
278. What about a defense of the Direct Account based on legislative motivation? The
idea of illegitimate legislative motivation, or purpose, has long been popular within constitu
tional scholarship. See Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of
Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REv. 95; John Hart Ely, Legislative and
Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 19 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970); Symposium, Leg
islative Motivation, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 925 (1978). For a recent, important addition to
this scholarship, see Pildes, supra note 166, at 761 (arguing that constitutional rights "are
ways to channel the kind of reasons and justifications government can act on in different
domains"). Note however that the idea of illegitimate legislative motivation is ambiguous
and, without further elaboration, unhelpful. To say that the legislator's motivation is "illegiti
mate" is to say that it is, somehow, morally problematic - but how?
I see four cogent ways to cash out the illegitimate-motivation idea within the Direct Ac
count. One might say that the rule-formulator's mental state (motivation, etc.) in formulat
ing rule R has: (1) direct moral import, in rendering X's otherwise-innocent treatment
pursuant to R wrongful; or (2) epistemic import, in requiring that society do more work to
determine the propriety of that treatment; or (3) import for authority, in depriving R of au
thority; or (4) import for culpability, in making the rule-formulator culpable for the wrong
done to X. But I have considered, or will consider, each of the first three possibilities: the
first maps onto the stigma theory, the second onto the idea of epistemiei rights, and the third
onto the notion of authority. As for the fourth: absent some independent explanation why
X's treatment is wrong, the rule-formulator's culpability does not explain why we should
overturn it. At best it explains why we should punish the rule-formulator.
279. See Hurd, supra note 169, at 1615-20 (discussing "theoretical authority," "influential
authority," and "practical authority"). Each of these represents a different way that an utter
ance might, arguably, change the moral reasons bearing upon the actor who receives the
utterance. The utterance of a "theoretical" authority provides the actor with a first-order
reason for belief; the utterance of an "influential" authority provides the actor with a first
order reason for action; the utterance of a "practical" authority provides the actor with a
second-order reason for action. We should note a fourth possibility: that an utterance might
provide the actor a second-order reason for belief.
Each of these fotlr possibilities is indeed represented in the literature on authority. See id.
at 1667-77 (arguing that authority consists of first-order reasons for belief); Michael S.
Moore, Authority, Law, and Razian Reasons, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 827, 871 (1989) (first-order
reasons for action); RAz, supra note 169, at 23-69 (second-order reasons for action); Donald
H. Regan, Authority and Value: Reflections on Raz's Morality of Freedom, 62 S. CAL. L.
REv. 995, 1001-18 (1989) (second-order reasons for belief). For other recent work on author
ity, see Larry Alexander, Law and Exclusionary Reasons, PHIL. TOPICS, Spring 1990, at 5;
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reasons for belief and reasons for action - a distinction whose im
port will soon become apparent.
Authority, in this sense, is fundamental to law and legal systems.
It is, obviously, a fundamental moral question whether and how the
enactment of legal rules changes moral requirements. Is there a
moral obligation to obey the law? We will need a theory of author
ity to answer that. Further, the concept of authority may have con
ceptual significance in delineating the very concept of law. One can
plausibly say that a given deontic proposition - such as "No vehi
cles may be driven in the park," or "All adult males must deliver a
sacrifice for the Sun God" - only exists as a

legal rule if, at a mini

mum, a sufficient number of actors, or at least state officials, take
the proposition to be authoritative, claim to do so, or are instructed
to do so by other rules.280 Relatedly, what it means to be sanc
tioned "pursuant to" a particular legal rule R is plausibly something
like this: it means that state officials impose a sanction upon you,
by virtue of the moral reasons that these officials take or claim R's
enactment to create.
The following idea might therefore seem tempting to the defender of the Direct Account:

Constitutional Rights as Authority-Rights
If X has been sanctioned pursuant to a rule R that truly lacks
authority, for her281
if the enactment of the rule R does not
-

create fresh moral reason for X to do what the rule requires,
and does not create fresh moral reason for state officials to
sanction X when she breaches the rule - then there is suffi
cient moral reason to overturn X's sanction, independent of
further invalidating R. For to say that state officials have sanc
tioned X "pursuant to" R means that these officials have taken
or claimed R to be authoritative, with respect to X; and by hy
pothesis R is

not

authoritative in this way.

LESLIE GREEN, THE AUTIIORITY OF THE STATE (1988); Stephen R. Perry, Second-Order
Reasons, Uncertainty and Legal Theory, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 913 (1989); and SCHAUER, supra
note 58, at 128-34.
280. See SCHAUER, supra note 58, at 126 ("[T]o say that a rule exists within some deci
sional environment is . . . to say that the decision-makers in that environment . . . treat the
rule as relevant to the decisions they are called upon to make."). Arguably, a legal rule can
exist where state officials do not take or claim it as authoritative, but are simply instructed to
do so, e.g., a conduct rule that is legally valid and enforceable under applicable rules gov
erning the enactment and enforcement of conduct-rules, but that state officials and actors are
now ignoring.
281. I say "for her" because authority may be piecemeal. See Moore, supra note 279, at
833-37 (discussing piecemeal cast of authority, within Razian account, for citizens if not state
officials).
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But this idea, tempting as it might seem, is flat wrong. I will as
sume, for the sake of argument, that the rules in our stylized cases
lack true authority, for some or even all of the actors or state offi
cials subject to these rules. Even so, the Direct Account does not
obtain. Why not? Because the premise that rule R lacks authority,
with respect to X and the officials who sanction X pursuant to R the officials who, let us assume, incorrectly talce or claim the rule to
provide fresh reason for sanctioning X - does not in fact warrant
the conclusion that there is sufficient moral reason to overturn X's
own sanction, independent of further invalidating the rule under
which the sanction falls.
Let us back up a moment. Why might a legal rule R possess true
authority? How might R's enactment change the moral reasons
bearing upon the actors and/or state officials subject to R? This is a
question of much currency and controversy among legal theorists.
One view of authority - the revisionist view - sees legal authority
as merely epistemic.282 On this view, the enactment of a legally au
thoritative rule merely changes the reasons for belief that actors and
state officials subject to the rule possess. Because the rule
formulator is epistemically reliable, her enactment of R constitutes
a fresh reason for those actors to believe that the actions identified
by R are wrongful, and for state officials to believe that those ac
tions are sanctionable. As Heidi Hurd explains:
One in a position to give good advice concerning how another
ought to act in certain circumstances possesses theoretical authority,
at least over some range of deontic propositions. The utterances of a
theoretical authority provide reasons for belief, not reasons for ac
tions. They function, that is, evidentially. When a theoretical author
ity makes a claim concerning right action, its utterance provides a
reason to think that there are other reasons (besides the sheer fact
that the authority has spoken) to act as recommended. The prescrip
tions of such a theoretieal authority are thus heuristic guides to de
tecting the existence and determining the probable truth of
antecedently existing reasons for action.283

Hurd argues that legal authority does this, and no more: an author
itative legal rule, issued by a sufficiently reliable legislator, simply
evidences preexisting moral requirements.284
282. This is a little tricky. Someone who believes that authority entails reasons for action,
as does Raz, might nonetheless believe that an authoritative utterance changes the subject's
reasons for action by virtue of the authority's epistemic capacities - as does Raz. See supra
note 169 (discussing epistemic strain in Raz). But Raz does not believe that authority is
merely epistemic, in the sense of merely changing the subject's reasons for belief. Hurd does.
283. Hurd, supra note 169, at 1615.
284. See id. at 1667-77.

October 1998]

85

Rights Against Rules

Assume Hurd is correct. Then to say that the flag-desecration
rule, etc., lacks "authority" for X is simply to say that, for the par
ticular action of flag-desecration X performed, the fact that this ac
tion fell under the flag-desecration rule created no reason for X to
believe the action wrong, and now creates no reason for state offi

cials to believe the action sanctionable. In short, all the Hurdian
can say, in defense of the Direct Account, is that we ought to per

form more epistemic work to determine whether X should be sanc
.
tioned. On the Hurdian view, authoritative legal rules function
only to facilitate our moral inquiry; thus the claim that the flag

desecration rule, etc., lacks authority with respect to X's sanction

can only entail that we must inquire further into the wrongfulness

of X's action.

So a Hurdian authority-right must be some kind of epistemic

right. But which X's have this epistemic right

as a constitutional
matter? Surely not every X for whom a rule lacks authority. Again,
if Y is sanctioned pursuant to a rule R that prohibits "the sale of
filled milk (enacted by legislators who have been "captured" by
"

competing manufacturers), and Y is a nutritionist who appreciates
the true benefits of filled

milk

,

then this rule likely lacks Hurdian

authority for Y.285 But sanctioning Y doesn't violate his constitu

tional rights.286 Thus the Hurdian defender of the Direct Account

must identify either some constitutionally special propertx of X's

action that works as an epistemic trigger, or some constitutionally

special error-type that infects the process of formulating rules, and

deprives them of authority.

In

short, a Hurdian authority-right

will

be very much like what I earlier called an · epistemic1 right or an
epistemiez right. I have already discussed why these types of episte

mic rights do

not underwrite the Direct Account, and I will not be

labor the discussion here.
What

if Hurd is wrong?

Hurd's epistemic view of legal author

ity is, as I have said, revisionist. By contrast, on the traditional

view, legal authority is more than epistemic. It involves

action,

reasons for

and not just reasons for belief. For the traditionalist, the

enactment of a truly authoritative rule actually changes - indeed,

displaces287 - what morality requires of the actors and/or state offi285. Cf. RAz, supra note 169, at 100 (noting that "[t]he authority of the state may be
greater over some individuals than over others . . . . [One person] may prefer to decide for
himself, and be willing to invest the time and effort it takes to enable himself to decide
wisely"). It is hard to see how a Hurdian could disagree with this claim.
286. See supra text accompanying notes 206-10.
287. "Displaces" entails second-order reasons for action, while "changes" merely entails
first-order ones. See supra note 279.
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cials subject to the rule, rather than merely evidencing preexisting
moral requirements. As Hurd explains, summarizing the traditional
view:
One who utters a command certainly purports to give another a new
reason for action. The mother who instructs her son to take his um
brella intends her son to take the very fact that she has issued such a
command as itself a reason for using an umbrella. If the mother is
asked by her son why he must carry the despised object, the mother
can well be expected to invoke the time-honored reason, "Because I
told you to," and to anticipate that this very fact will be a reason
above and beyond the ones that the child antecedently had to take his
umbrella. [Indeed] the "Because I told you to" purports to give more
than just a new reason for action. . . . Rather [it] purports to give the
son, by itself, a normatively sufficient reason to take his umbrella: it
implicitly claims . . . to bar action on his part in accordance with the
reasons that he previously possessed not to take his umbrella.288

This traditional view of authority might seem to give comfort to the
defender of the Direct Account, for then the claim that the fiag
desecration rule, etc., lacks "authority" for X does not reduce to the
epistemic claim that we need to do more epistemic work about X
Rather, and more robustly, the traditionalist can say that the fiag
desecration rule, etc., has failed to perform the morally transforma
tive function - for X and the state officials sanctioning her - that
truly authoritative rules perform.
But so what? If the rule was not traditionally authoritative, then
it did not provide X moral reason to refrain from performing her
action. But this does not mean that X lacked any moral reason
whatsoever to refrain from performing that action. If the action was
also an action of battery, etc., then X had moral reason not to per
form it because (1) the action was morally wrong, quite independ
ent of falling under any legal rule; and further (2) the action
presumably violated another authoritative rule, viz., the rule against
battery, etc. The traditional theory of authority is not a theory of
the necessary conditions for moral wrongdoing; no one believes
that, unless an action is illegal, it is not immoral.289 Rather, the
traditional theory identifies a sufficient condition for moral wrong
doing: violating an authoritative legal rule. So, whether or not the
rules in our stylized examples possessed traditional authority, X's
actions were morally wrong - and that is doubly true if they vio
lated authoritative rules picking out "battery," etc.
·

288. Hurd, supra note 169, at 1618.
289. See Adler, supra note 4, at 803-04 (criticizing super-shallow moral conventionalism).

As Joel Feinberg puts it: "One can wrongfully kill whether or not there is a criminal law of
homicide." FEINBERG, supra note 57, at 20.
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As for the decision by state officials to sanction X:

if retributiv

ism is true, then these officials had sufficient moral reason to sane.,.
tion X, quite independent of whether the rule they took as
authoritative possessed traditional authority, or satisfied other "ex
pressive" or deterrent conditions. (If retributivism is true then
these officials (1) had sufficient reason to sanction X, independent
of her action falling under any rule, and further (2) sufficient reason
to sanction X, by virtue of her breaching a rule that

was

authorita

tive, albeit a rule different from the one actually applied by the offi
cials.) The traditional theory of authority does not displace theories
of sanctioning, just as it does not displace theories of moral wrong
doing. It is, again, not a theory of the

necessary

conditions for state

officials to impose a sanction, but a theory of the
tions. The traditional theory says that,

sufficient

condi

if the state enacts an author

itative decision rule, state officials have sufficient reason to sanction
actions violating the rule. It does not say that, absent such a rule,
state officials have no such reason.
D.

Duties Rather than Sanctions?

This Part has considered, at some length, whether the Direct
Account holds true for sanctions: whether moral reason might ob
tain for a court to overturn X's sanction pursuant to a rule

R,

in

dependent of further invalidating the rule, and despite the fact that
the action by virtue of which X has received that sanction is (or
might be) proscribable under a different description. I have fo
cused specifically upon sanctions, rather than discussing sanctions
and duties together, because of the analytic clarity that a focused
discussion brings; and, as between sanctions and duties, I have fo
cused on sanctions, rather than duties, because (under Supreme
Court doctrine) it is paradigmatically the imposition of a sanction
upon X that gives her a justiciable, constitutional complaint. No
one doubts that, where X has performed an action in breach of a
rule R, and has been prosecuted, convicted, and sanctioned for that
breach, the prerequisites for constitutional adjudication

will be sat

isfied: X will have "standing" to challenge the sanction, her claim

will be "ripe" and not "moot," and the judicial decision will not be
merely advisory.29° By contrast, at least in the past, the jus
ticiability of a constitutional challenge by some X to a legal

duty

290. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JurusDICTION Ch. 2 {2d ed. 1994) (surveying
justiciability requirements); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 86-94, 92 (1947)
{dismissing as nonjusticiable a pre-enforcement free speech challenge to the Hatch Act, but
permitting a challenge where the claimant had already been charged with a violation of the
Act and a proposed sanction had been entered; "[t]his [post-enforcement] proceeding so lim-
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that she has not yet breached has been open to question.291 Does
the duty imposed by R truly constitute a setback for X? Does it
truly coerce her? Does she truly intend to perform actions that
breach R and, if so, is there a realistic chance that she will be prose
cuted and sanctioned for doing so? These kinds of questions, at
least in the past, gave the Supreme Court some pause in permitting
prospective constitutional challenges to duties; and although such
justiciability concerns have over the last half century largely faded
from view, there are signs that they may, yet again, become impor
tant.292 These concerns make good sense within the Direct Ac
count, because on that account the purpose of constitutional
adjudication is to relieve X of an improper legal setback to her. If
X's duty is, in truth, no real setback at all, then on the Direct Ac
count judicial intervention is unwarranted.
Thus my focus, in this Part, upon sanctions rather than duties.
But, as we have seen, the sanction-focused Direct Account fails to
measure up. It fails to explain why the paradigmatic setback to X
- a sanction - should be invalidated in most of our stylized cases.
This failure might prompt the advocate of the Direct Account to
reconfigure her defense of that view. She might claim that duties,
even more than sanctions, should be seen as the central treatment
types that constitutional claimants are entitled to challenge. For ex
ample, where a would-be :flag-desecrator X brings a prospective
challenge to a rule that stipulates "no person shall desecrate a flag
of the United States," perhaps the Direct Account successfully ex
plains why moral reason obtains for a court to free X from that
duty, independent of further invalidating the :flag-desecration rule?
Or perhaps not. A duty-focused reconfiguration of the Direct
Account poses a number of serious difficulties. The first concerns
the overall simplicity and coherence of such an account. The Deriv
ative Account provides a simple and unified theory of judicial re
view: a constitutional challenge by X to R, whether a prospective
or a retrospective challenge, is simply an occasion for judicial repeal
or amendment of R. By contrast, even if the Direct Account suc
ceeds in showing that X's prospective challenge to R concerns the
moral propriety of X's own duty, the problem remains that (as I
ited meets the requirements of defined rights and a defined threat to interfere with a posses·
sor of the menaced rights by a penalty for an act done in violation of the claimed restraint").
291. See Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 86-91.
292. See infra text accompanying notes 588-97 (discussing justiciability of duties, particu·
larly the ripeness of preenforcement constitutional challenges to conduct-regulating and
other rules).
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have argued at length) X's retrospective challenge to her sanction
under R cannot be equally "personal." What, then, is the function,
within a duty-focused Direct Account, of a retrospective constitu
tional challenge? X's retrospective challenge to his sanction must
be an occasion for judicial repeal or amendment of rule R or, at
best, for judicial invalidation of X's duty (not merely his sanction).
So we are left with a complex, hybrid account where challenges to
certain legal setbacks (duties) concern the moral propriety of those
particular setbacks, but challenges to other setbacks (sanctions) do
not.
A second and even more serious problem is this: refocusing the
Direct Account on duties rather than sanctions does not eliminate
the problem of multiple description that our stylized cases are
meant to exemplify, and that bedeviled the sanction-focused ac
count. The problem was that the particular action, which X per
formed in breach of R and by virtue of which he was sanctioned,
might be wrongful under another description. X's action of flag
desecration might also be an action of pollution, arson, or battery,
and yet his sanction pursuant to the flag-desecration rule would
nonetheless violate the First Amendment. None of the defenses of
the Direct Account that I explored could make sense of this crucial
feature of constitutional rights. Now, it is tempting to think that the
problem of multiple description disappears when we tum from
sanctions to duties - the flag.:.desecration rule prohibits X, pro
spectively, from performing a class of actions, some of which may
prove harmless - but this temptation should be avoided. Imagine
two actors, X1 and X2• X1 is a violent anarchist, who seeks to fo
ment disorder by burning stolen flags, or by burning them in prox
imity to bystanders; X1 's actions of flag-desecration are, virtually
always, wrongful under other descriptions. X21 by contrast, is a pac
ifi.st war-protester, who eschews physical violence and takes great
care to ensure that his actions of flag-desecration are innocent of
nonexpressive wrong. Morality might well require that X21 but not
Xz, be freed from the duty that the flag-desecration rule imposes
upon these actors. The mix of actions that X2 would perform, but
for the existence of a legal rule prohibiting flag-desecration, is dif
ferent from the mix that X1 would perform; and the morality of
subjecting each actor to the no-flag-desecration duty should, it
seems, depend in part upon this personal mix.
Th.is poses a dilemma for the defender of the Direct Account.
Either she insists (1) that the constitutionality of X's duty under
rule R does not depend at all upon the personal mix of actions that
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X would perform, but for R; or she says (2) that the constitutional
ity of X's duty under R does depend in part upon X's personal mix.
The first alternative is unattractive, because the defender must then
confront the problem of explaining why, as a moral matter, both X1
and X2 have a moral right to be freed from their respective duties
pursuant to R, independent of their respective personal mixes. This
is the precise analogue of the problem that, in the case of sanctions,
the Direct Account was unable to resolve. The second alternative
is unattractive because it forces a dramatic revision of existing con
stitutional practice: in practice, adjudication of prospective consti
tutional challenges does not involve a judicial inspection of the
claimant's personal act-mix.293
Finally, a duty-focused Direct Account runs into serious difficul
ties with cases such as RESIDENTIAL PICKETING, ANIMAL SACRI
FICE, and the M variant of .ALcoHOL,294 where - quite apart from
this issue of multiple description - there is no apparent moral rea
son to overturn the claimant's own duty.295 Consider RESIDENTIAL
PICKETING: a rule provides that "no person shall picket a residence
or dwelling, except for persons engaged in labor picketing." X, a
nonlabor picketer, challenges his own duty pursuant to this rule.
Assume that the actions X would perform, but for the rule, are not
wrongful under other descriptions; freed from the rule, X would
simply engage in otherwise-innocent actions of residential picket
ing. Even so, it is hard to see why it would violate X's moral rights
to subject him to the no-picketing rule, given that - as the Court
has held - the constitutional problem in RESIDENTIAL PICKETING
could be cured by a broader rule without the exemption for labor
picketing.296
Can X say that he has been treated unequally, relative to labor
picketers, and that this is why his own moral rights are violated by
the narrower but not broader no-picketing rule? This equal treat
ment rationale might explain the M variant of .ALCOHOL, which in
volves the Equal Protection Clause, but it is less responsive to the
moral concerns underlying the First Amendment, and therefore less
293. See supra Part I (discussing morally limited, rather than morally complete, nature of
judicial inquiry in constitutional cases).
294. In the B and W variants of ALcoHoL, a stigma argument works for duties, as it does
for sanctions. See supra section 11.B.2.
295. Specifically, there is no apparent nonepistemic moral reason. An epistemic account
is available, for duties as for sanctions, but - as I have already discussed - the epistemic
account is dilutive. See supra text accompanying notes 220-25; supra section 11.B.3.
296. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (upholding law generally barring residen
tial picketing); infra text accompanying notes 370-83 (discussing rules that violate Discrimi
nation Schema, such that these rules can be cured by broadening their scope).
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persuasive for a case such as RESIDENTIAL PICKETING or ANIMAL
SACRIFICE.297 Further, an equal treatment rationale for why the
duties imposed in RESIDENTIAL PICKETING, ANIMAL SACRIFICE
and ALCOHOL are morally problematic leads us back. to the prob
lem of personal mix Take, for example, a nineteen-year-old male
M who is obliged not to purchase alcohol pursuant to a gender
.

discriminatory rule. Whether he is in fact treated unequally com
pared to others will depend on how the comparison class of
"others" is defined - as we have already seen.298 If the relevant
"others" are defined as M's moral equivalents in all respects (not
just relative to the purposes of the rule), then the contours of that
comparison class will, in turn, depend upon M's personal mix And
we are then back to the dilemma sketched out above: either judi
.

cial review prescinds from the prospective challenger's personal mix
(leaving the Direct Account on shaky ground) or it does not (forc
ing a dramatic revision of existing constitutional practice).

In short: for reasons of overall coherence and simplicity, and
because of problems internal to a duty-focused Direct Account,
reconfiguring the Direct Account around duties rather than sanc
tions does not look to be a promising strategy for salvaging it.
III.

THE DERIVATIVE ACCOUNT

The Direct Account makes robust moral demands on the con
tent of constitutional rights. It claims that having a constitutional
right entails the existence of sufficient moral reason for a court to
overturn the rights-holder's duty or sanction, independent of fur
ther invalidating the legal rule that imposes this duty upon the
rights-holder, as well as others, and authorizes state officials to
sanction her, as well as others.

But cashing out this claim has

proved morally tricky. It has proved tricky to show how moral rea
son of this robust sort could obtain, at least for the substantive
rights against conduct-regulating rules that now have currency
within constitutional law: rights to free speech, free exercise, equal
protection, and substantive due process. In Part II, I considered a
variety of moral theories that might support the Direct Account:
nonepistemic and epistemic theories of sanctioning; theories of
equality; and theories of authority. These theories failed, singly and
collectively, to do the requisite moral work.

297. I take the antidiscrimination component of the First Amendment to be concerned
with morally irrelevant properties, such as viewpoint or religious status, and not with equal
treatment. See infra section III.A.2 (defending Discrimination Schema).
298. See supra text accompanying notes 233-35.
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It is time to defend a different view of constitutional rights: the
Derivative Account.

On that account, constitutional rights are

morally derivative. To say that sanctioning X pursuant to rule R, or
subjecting her to the duty that R imposes, is "unconstitutional" or
"violates X's constitutional rights" is simply to say this: there is suf
ficient moral reason to invalidate that

rule.

The Derivative Ac

count conceptualizes judicial review as a legal institution whose
function is the invalidation of rules, not merely the invalidation of
the particular sanctions or duties of the rights-holders who happen
to initiate the judicial process. By "invalidation," I mean a judicial
utterance roughly equivalent in legal import to a legislative

peal. 299

re

A repeal is an utterance, by the rule-formulator (agency or

legislature), that generally rescinds the legal force of the rule. It
frees all actors from the legal duty that the enactment of the rule
created, and deprives all state officials of the legal power to sanc
tion actors pursuant to the rule. The Direct Account trades on a
traditional, purist view of the powers of reviewing courts, that sees
a court as empowered merely to rescind the duty of X and the
power of state officials to sanction her. By contrast, the Derivative
Account insists that - in order to make moral sense of constitu
tional rights - reviewing courts must be understood to have rule
repealing powers roughly equivalent to the repealing powers of
agencies and legislatures, and to be exercising those broad powers
whenever courts credit claims of "constitutional right" or hold the
treatment of rights-holders to be "unconstitutional."
Let me articulate the Derivative Account as clearly as possible:

The Derivative Account
To say that some rule R "violates X's constitutional rights" en
tails the following: there is sufficient moral reason to change
R 's predicate in some measure, and X has the legal power to
secure some kind of judicial invalidation of R. To say, more
specifically, that a treatment of X (being sanctioned pursuant
to a rule R, or subjecting X to the duty that R announces) "vio
lates X's constitutional rights" entails the following: there is
299. "Roughly" is meant to signal certain technical differences between judicial invalida
tion and legislative repeals, such as these: a judicial invalidation might be a partial invalida
tion or an extension rather than a facial invalidation, see infra text accompanying notes 41421; a judicial invalidation might leave open the possibility that a rule's authoritative inter
preter can revive it through a narrowing construction, see infra text accompanying notes 41617; and a subsequent judicial overruling of the invalidation decision might "revive" the invali
dated statute, see William Michael Treanor & Gene B. Sperling, Prospective Overruling and
the Revival of "Unconstitutional" Statutes, 93 CoLUM. L. REv. 1902 (1993). But judicial inval
idation is, crucially, like a legislative repeal in having general scope, rather than being con
fined to a particular claimant.
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sufficient moral reason to change R's predicate in some mea
sure, and X has the legal power to secure some kind of judicial

invalidation of R,

including the invalidation of X's own

treatment.
By a "rule," again, I mean a conduct-regulating, sanction-backed
rule that has a canonical, written formulation and that becomes au

thoritative through enactment by a legislature or agency. I assume

that rules are

individuated in some kind of text-based way.3oo

That

is, an "individual" rule is some textually-defined portion of the en

tire corpus of canonically formulated rules - a single deontic sen

tence, a single term in a deontic sentence, or a single provision

made up of several sentences. How precisely to individuate rules is

a technical problem that may depend in part on your precise con

ception of free speech, equal protection, free exercise, and the

other moral criteria referenced by the Bill of Rights. My defense of

the Derivative Account is agnostic within the family of text-based

individuation criteria, and is meant to be consistent with all of

them.

The Derivative Account says the following of a (textually indi
'\<iduated) rule: there is sufficient moral reason301 to change in some
measure the predicate of the rule. By this I mean the following:
There is sufficient moral reason either

(1)

to narrow the scope of

the rule R, that is, to exclude from the rule's coverage some class of
actions now included within the rule, thereby freeing

all actors from

the duty not to perform that class of actions (except where covered
by another rule) and disentitling

all state

officials from sanctioning

actions within that class (except where covered by another rule); or

(2)

to broaden the scope of the rule, that is, to include within the

rule's coverage some class of actions not now covered; or

(3)

to

partly narrow and partly broaden the scope of the rule; or even
perhaps (4) to replace the rule's predicate with a different but coex300. See supra text accompanying notes 137-39

(discussing individuation).

301. I emphasize again that "moral reason" is meant to encompass both consequentialist
and deontological accounts. To say that "moral reason" obtains to change R's predicate
means either that this change is required by a deontological norm, or that it improves the
world under applicable consequentialist criteria and is deontologically permissible. Whether
the criteria set forth in the Bill of Rights are wholly consequentialist, partly consequentialist,
or wholly deontological, cf. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of
Balancing, 96 YALE
943 (1987) (chronicling rise of "balancing" methodology in constitu
tional adjudication), the Derivative Account is morally straightforward. The deontologist
will say that moral reason obtains to overturn a duty-imposing rule backed by sanctions,
because that kind of threat violates a deontological constraint; the consequentialist will say
that the threat causes or constitutes a worsening of the world.

L.J.
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tensive description of actions.302 The Derivative Account does not,
necessarily, envision that reviewing courts will secure the particular
change in the predicate of the rule R that morality supports. Con
sider, for example, our stylized case ABORTION, where a rule pro
hibits any person from "procuring an abortion." One variant of the
Derivative Account might stipulate that the reviewing court should
"facially" invalidate the no-abortion rule: it should issue a legal ut
terance whose import is to preclude the enforcement of the rule
against anyone. Another variant of the Derivative Account might
stipulate that the reviewing court should "partially" invalidate the
no-abortion rule: it should specify some proper subset of the ac
tions covered by the rule - for example, abortions of non-viable
fetuses - against which the rule may not be enforced. What vari
ant of the Derivative Account is correct is a matter for further dis
cussion and debate, which I will pursue as needed below.303
My defense of the Derivative Account will proceed in two
stages. The main attraction of the Derivative Account is that it is
morally straightforward; it is straightforward that moral reason can
obtain to change, in some measure, the predicate of a rule. Section
A defends this claim, and in particular demonstrates how the moral
criteria set forth in the Bill of Rights - criteria such as free speech,
free exercise, equal protection, and substantive due process - can
straightforwardly be understood as criteria by which to measure the
predicates of rules. The Court's current free speech, free exercise,
equal protection, and substantive due process case law can be ex
plained, in a simple and straightforward way, by the Derivative Ac
count. We will have no difficulty accounting for the various stylized
cases that are meant to exemplify this case law - ABORTION,
CmLD PORNOGRAPHY, FLAG DESECRATION, and so on - and that
proved so difficult for the Direct Account to explain.
Section B addresses the various issues left open by the moral
arguments provided in section A. To say that rules can go morally
awry is one thing; to say that a particular body should invalidate
rules, by virtue of their being awry, is quite another. Do courts
truly have the power to invalidate rules? How is this notion of their
302. This is the kind of replacement that a stigma theorist might, perhaps, demand.
Again, I take the most powerful account of "stigma" to be where a rule's predicate that is
suboptimal in scope evidences the role of false beliefs in its production; but I leave open the
possibility of a predicate being stigmatic even though its scope is morally optimal {and thus
this predicate is properly replaced with a nonsynonymous, but coextensive predicate). See
RICHARD L. KnuraAM, THEORIES OF TRUTii:
lNTRoDUCTION 3-14 {1995) {dis·
tinguishing between the extensional equivalence of two terms, their necessary extensional
equivalence, and their synonymity).

A CRITICAL

303. See infra section III.A.3.
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role consistent with the concept of a "constitutional right" or the
concept of adjudication?

In what way

do the legal utterances that

issue from reviewing courts, and that often appear to be directed
merely at particular litigants, function to repeal or amend rules?
The critic of my view of constitutional rights might concede my

moral point (that the moral criteria referenced in the Bill

of Rights
can be understood as criteria by which to measure the predicates of

rules), but nonetheless raise further,

institutional

objections to the

Derivative Account. I rebut these further objections in section B.
A.

Rules that Go Awry: The Moral Foundations of Judicial
Review

Rules can go morally awry in multiple ways. A rule might exac
erbate distributive injustice, by having a disproportionate impact
upon persons who already receive far less than distributive justice
requires.304 It might produce certain unwanted states of affairs: for
example, the state of affairs where citizens who have a particular,
contestable viewpoint on a matter of public import are heard in dis
proportionate numbers, and "drown out" the opposition;30s or the
state of affairs where members of different religious groups are en
gaged in civil strife, which distracts and even destabilizes the pol
ity.306 A rule might violate the requirements of equality - not by
exacerbating distributive injustice as above, but rather by producing
differential

treatment

for

actors

whose

actions

are

morally

identical.3°7
All of these are possible - even constitutionally plausible explanations of how rules go morally awry. But, in fact, constitu
tional law needs none of them. There are two basic moral schemas
304. Cf. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CoNSTITUTION 338-46 (1993) (arguing that
Equal Protection Clause embodies an anti-caste principle); Fiss, supra note 108, at 157 (argu
ing that Equal Protection Clause prohibits laws that aggravate the subordinate position of a
disadvantaged group).
305. See Stone, supra note 218, at 217 (noting that a "possible explanation for the
content-based/content-neutral distinction [within free speech doctrine] derives from the fact
that content-based restrictions, by their very nature, restrict the communication of only some
messages and thus affect public debate in a content-differential manner"). I do not deny that
content-based laws which go morally awry in biasing debate are properly invalidated; but I
do deny that content-based laws are properly invalidated solely by virtue of their predictably
biasing debate.
306. See Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL IssUES
313, 317 (1996) (arguing that Religion Clauses have the "negative goal" of minimizing reli
gious conflict, and the "affirmative goal" of "creat[ing] a regime in which people of funda
mentally different views about religion can live together in a peaceful and self-governing
society").
307. See Tusmman & tenBroek, supra note 229, at 344 (arguing that the Equal Protection
Clause requires "that those who are similarly situated be similarly treated").
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- two different ways in which moral reason obtains to change the
predicate of rules - that together suffice to explain the entire
range of existing constitutional rights under the Free Speech
Clause, Free Exercise Clause, Equal Protection Clause and the sub
stantive component of the Due Process Clause, at least with respect
to the central case of conduct-regulating rules backed by sanctions.
These two schemas are the

Liberty Schema and the Discrimination

Schema. The Liberty Schema explains, in a crisp way, cases such as
FLAG DESECRATION, ABORTION, and CHILD PORNOGRAPHY that

together exemplify most (although not all)308 of the Court's free
speech case law, and all of its substantive due process case law. The
Discrimination Schema explains, in a crisp way, cases such as REsI
DENTIAL PICKETING, ALCOHOL, and ANIMAL SACRIFICE that to

gether exemplify the remainder of the free speech case law, and all
of the Court's equal protection and free exercise case law.

In saying that

these two schemas, the Liberty Schema and Dis

crimination Schema, suffice to explain the Court's free speech, etc.,
case law, I mean simply this: virtually all the cases in which the
Court has recognized claims of constitutional right under the free
speech, etc., clauses can be explained as cases in which the underly
ing rules fit the pattern of moral invalidity set forth by either the
Liberty Schema, the Discrimination Schema, or perhaps both.309
Further, as we shall see, the schemas are grounded upon plausible
and standard theories - articulated both by the Court and by con
stitutional scholars - about the right way to understand the moral
criteria of free speech, etc. What I do

not

mean to say that is

all

constitutional doctrine or dicta, under the free speech, etc., clauses,
are consistent with the Derivative Account. At a minimum, the
standard and oft-articulated doctrine that constitutional rights are
"personal" rights, in the sense elaborated by the Direct Account,
will have to be abandoned.310 Clearly - and indeed this is what
animates my article - the Derivative Account is in part

ary.

revision

It revises the standard view of constitutional rights, and

whatever doctrine or dicta depend upon it. But the Derivative Ac
count does not require revising our understanding of the moral cri
teria underlying constitutional law, or counting as misconceived
those cases in which the Court has in fact honored rights-claims.
308. The free speech decisions that are not explained by the Liberty Schema - the deci
sions exemplified by REsIDENTIAL PICKETING
are in part what motivate the Discrimina
tion Schema.
309. On "both," see infra note 369.
310. See supra note 148 (citing cases).
-
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if you are not convinced that the Liberty Schema and the

Discrimination Schema, together, adequately cohere with the moral
criteria of free speech, free exercise, equal protection, and substan

tive due process, and with the case law by which the Court has

fleshed out these criteria? Or, what if you are convinced of this but
further believe that the case law should be substantially over
hauled? Then you may well want to develop some other schema or

schemas for morally invalid rules: a distributive-justice schema, a

balanced-debate schema, or whatever. You will flesh out the Deriv

ative Account in a way that is, in its details, significantly different
from my account. What you will

not want

to do is return to the

Direct Account, unless you think that Part II's criticisms of that

Account were ineffective. To accept those criticisms, but disagree

with my two schemas, is not to reject the basic argument of this
article: that constitutional adjudication essentially involves the in

validation of rules. For if you accept those criticisms, then you com

mit yourself to developing one or more schemas that explain how

rules go morally awry, and cohere with plausible theories of the

underlying moral criteria and (depending on your analytic project)
with the constitutional case law as well.311

This section makes a two-stage argument. I demonstrate first, in

sections III.A.1 and III.A.2, that rules can go morally awry - spe
cifically, by violating the Liberty or Discrimination Schema. Moral

reason can obtain to change, in some measure, the predicate of

rules; this is true for each of the rules in our stylized cases. Then, in

section ill .A.3, I return to the puzzle with which we began the arti
cle, and which the facts of our stylized cases are meant to exemplify:

How can it violate X's constitutional rights to sanction or coerce
her pursuant to rule R, even though the very same action for which
she is sanctioned, or which she is coerced not to perform, is prop

erly sanctioned or coerced under another rule? I resolve this puzzle

and explain all of the stylized cases, as follows: X's action can fall
outside R', where R' is the judicial revision of rule R'' which the

court issues after concluding that R breaches a constitutional rule

validity schema. The Direct Account proved unable to explain any
of the stylized cases (except the

B

and

W variants

of

ALcoHoL),

311. My analytic project is to show, not just that the Derivative Account is constitution
ally better, but that it is a better account of current practices. Thus, I develop and argue for
two rule-validity schemas that fit with and, together, fully explain the existing case law. I
further believe that the schemas are justifiable in the light of constitutional criteria, quite
apart from the case law - that will be evident in the presentation - but do not mean to
claim that no other schemas are.
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but the Derivative Account explains each and every one of them in
a plausible way.
One final preliminary point. I should emphasize that the notion
of moral reason obtaining to change the predicate of rules - the
notion I will flesh out in a moment, using the Liberty Schema and
the Discrimination Schema - does not presuppose a particular
normative theory of authority. Let me distinguish between (1) the
nonmoral or "social" fact that state officials do take enacted legal
rules in the U.S. legal system as authoritative, sanctioning actions
that fall within these rules' scope by virtue of the rules' enactment;
and

(2) the moral fact that state officials ought to take enacted legal

rules as authoritative, either because legal rules by their enactment
create reasons for belief, or because legal rules by their enactment
create reasons for action.312 The Derivative Account presupposes

(1)

or something like it, but not

(2),

and is therefore neutral be

tween the various normative theories of authority that explain why
and to what extent

(2)

obtains. When, for example, the State of

Texas has in force a legal rule prohibiting "procur[ing] an abortion"

- the rule that was challenged in Roe

v.

Wade,313

and that ABOR

TION stylizes - it is true as a matter of nonmoral fact that some

Texan officials will prosecute women and doctors pursuant to this
rule, whether or not these officials have moral reason to do so apart
from, or together with, the rule's enactment.314 Some women and
doctors, anticipating their prosecution, will refrain from performing
abortions that, all things considered, they ought to be at liberty to
perform. Thus, moral reason obtains to invalidate Texas's rule in
some measure (that is, moral reason obtains for a legal body, per
haps a court, to issue a legal utterance the Texan officials will take
to deprive the invalidated rule of its authority) , quite apart from the
normative authority that the rule may truly have or lack. The idea
of legal rules going morally awry, which grounds the Derivative Ac
count, assumes that the enactment of legal rules changes the behav
ior of actors and state officials, to conform with the description of
prohibited

or

required

actions

set

forth

by

rule-predicates.

312. See GREEN, supra note 279, at 60 (distinguishing between de facto authority and
legitimate authority); RAz, supra note 169, at 46 (same).
313. 410 U.S. 113, 117-18 (1973).
314. It is itself a general if not universal legal rule, at least within the federal system, that
" 'adjudication of the constitutionality of [statutes is] beyond the jurisdiction of administra·
tive agencies.' " Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 215 (1994) (quoting Johnson
v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 368 (1974)). This sort of basic rule limits the extent to which en·
forcement officials are (legally) permitted to inquire into the moral authority of the rules
they enforce.
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Whether this change should morally occur, or indeed why precisely
it does occur as a nonmoral fact, are matters that I need not
address.

1.

The Liberty Schema

One way that rules can go morally awry is by violating liberties.
Consider the case with which we began the article, and which I have
stylized as

FLAG DESECRATION: Texas

v.

Johnson,

where a flag

burner was sanctioned for violating a rule that provided, " 'A per
son commits an offense

if he intentionally or knowingly desecrates

. . . a state or national flag.' "315 This rule includes within its scope
some

otherwise-innocent

speech-acts - speech-acts that are not

harmful or wrongful apart from what they say. The rule includes,
for example, the particular action of a flag-desecrator Y who spits
upon and bums his own pollutant-free flag, within the confines of
his own property, with no persons next to him but lots of offended
onlookers. Y's action is not an action of battery, trespass, pollution,
arson or destroying government property; it is simply an action of
and not harmful or wrongful beyond that.
But speech is one kind of constitutionally protected liberty.316

speech,

To say this just

means

-

on a standard and plausible account of

"liberty" and, specifically, "free speech" - that there is sufficient,
indeed strong moral reason that actors be left free to perform
otherwise-innocent speech-acts,317 excepting only speech-acts
315. 491 U.S. 397, 400 n.1 (1989) (quoting Tux. PENAL ConE ANN. § 42.09 (West 1989)).
316. See U.S. CoNST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech" (emphasis added)).
317. See FEINBERG, supra note 57, at 7-9 (defining liberty as absence of legal coercion;
stating that "[l]iberty should be the norm; coercion always needs some special justification";
and noting possibility of moral reasons that sometimes override liberty and justify coercion).
The Liberty Schema I will present does not entail Feinberg's robust claim that liberties are
only infringed by coercion - merely that coercion is one way of infringing them. The focus
of this article just is duty-conferring rules backed by sanctions; my analysis, and the Liberty
Schema, is agnostic on whether (pace Feinberg) other sorts of laws, e.g., laws denying bene
fits, can infringe liberties.
Nor does the Liberty Schema entail Feinberg's robust claim that every type of action is a
"liberty" (in the sense of demanding some overriding reason to be coerced). See DwoRKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 1, at 266-72 (arguing against general right to liberty).
Rather, the Liberty Schema entails the existence of certain act-types, such as speech-acts (or,
more finely, political-speech-acts, or speech-acts-that-are-not-obscene, etc.), delineated by
the liberty-protecting provisions of the Constitution, such that coercing actors not to perform
these is morally and constitutionally impermissible, absent overriding reason.
And the standard explication of the First Amendment "free speech" clause - unlike, for
example, the current doctrinal explication of the "free exercise" clause, see Employment Div.
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) - does indeed construe the "free speech" clause as liberty
protecting, in this sense. It is seen, standardly, to be important that persons have the liberty
to speak (or, more finely, that they have the liberty to perform certain types of speech-acts)
- whether because of the intrinsic benefits for the speaker, or the instrumental benefits of
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within a so-called "low-value" category (such as obscene speech,
libel, incitement, or fighting words)318 and, to some extent, except
ing speech-acts within the category of "commercial speech."319 As
the Court stated in

Texas v. Johnson: "If there is

a bedrock princi

ple underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may
not prohibit the expression of

an

idea simply because society finds

the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."320 Therefore, by virtue of
the moral concept of "free speech" set forth in the First Amend
ment, there is sufficient moral reason to change the scope of the
:flag:desecration rule. For by keeping the rule fully in force, in its
current form, otherwise-innocent actors within the scope of the rule
-

Y, and similar actors - are coerced not to speak. In particular,

there is sufficient moral reason to narrow the rule, so as to exclude
otherwise-innocent actions of :flag-desecration; and likely there is
sufficient moral reason to invalidate the rule entirely, because any
actions of :flag-desecration that are harmful or wrongful because of
their nonexpressive properties will fall within the scope of the in
dependent rules against "battery," "arson" and so forth. A similar
analysis works readily for the rule in CHILD PORNOGRAPHY: some
actions of photo-display are neither obscene nor nonexpressively
harmful or wrongful, for example, the action of a loving parent who
places a photo of a naked infant in a family album, and displays the
album to family members and close friends.
The idea I am articulating here - that free speech rights are
violated by rules that include within their scope otherwise-innocent
speech-acts - should be familiar to anyone acquainted \vith the
Court's free speech jurisprudence. This idea is reflected, again and
again, in the various free speech doctrines that require laws regulatspeech in facilitating knowledge and democracy. For a survey and synthesis of standard "free
speech" theory, see Thomas Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72
ALE LJ. 877, 878 (1963) (defending free speech as necessary inter alia "(1) as assuring
individual self-fulfillment, (2) as a means of attaining the truth, [and] (3) as a method of
securing participation by the members of the society in social, including political, decision
making"); see also FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH! A PHILOSOPHICAL INoUIRY 15-72
(1982) (surveying, to some extent critically, the view that free speech serves truth, democ
racy, individual well-being, and individual autonomy).

Y

318. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1992) (identifying main low
value categories); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the
State Crime Victims Bd.,
502 U.S. 105, 127 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (same). The term "low
value" should be used advisedly, since the properties that bring speech-acts within some of
these categories might make those actions worthless, rather than merely overriding their
worth. See infra note 329 (distinguishing between canceling and overriding properties).

N.Y.

319. See Central Hudson Gas & Blee. Corp. v. Public Serv. Commn., 447 U.S. 557, 563-64
(1980) (setting out intermediate test for laws regulating commercial speech).
320. 491

U.S. at 414.
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ing speech to be more or less "narrowly tailored."321 For exam le,

under the strict scrutiny component of free speech doctrine (which

is generally triggered by rules that pick out expressive properties of
actions and that are "content based"), the State must show that the

" 'regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and
that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. ' "322 Under the "time,

place or manner" component of free speech doctrine (which is gen
erally triggered by rules that pick out expressive properties of ac

tions and that are "content neutral"), a law must be "justified

without reference to the content of the regulated speech, [must be]

narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest,

and

[must] leave open ample alternative channels for communication of

the information."323 Under the "expressive conduct" component of
free speech doctrine (which is generally triggered by rules that pick

out nonexpressive properties of actions), a law must "further[ ] an

important or substantial governmental interest; [must be] unrelated
to the suppression of free expression; [and] the incidental restric

tion on alleged First Amendment freedoms [must be]

than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. "324

no greater

Finally, under

the "commercial speech" component of free speech doctrine (which

is triggered by rules that pick out actions under the description of
communicating a commercial message, e.g., as an "advertisement"

or an action of "so�citation"), the " 'asserted governmental interest
[must be] substantial [and] the regulation [must] directly advance[ ]

the governmental interest asserted [and be no]

more extensive than

is necessary to serve that interest. ' "325

Let me formalize, and make more rigorous, the idea that I take

to be embodied in these various "narrow tailoring" doctrines un

derlying the free speech case law. A rule that includes speech-acts

or other types of liberties within its scope must be narrowly tailored
to a sufficiently important interest: that is, the rule-predicate must

pick out some property of action such that, for the speech-acts or
other liberties within the rule's scope, those encompassed liberties

321. See Monaghan, supra note 44, at 37-38 (noting centrality of "least restrictive alterna
tive" concept to First Amendment doctrine); Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amend
ment, 78 YALE LJ. 464 (1969) (same, but criticizing concept).
322. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (emphasis added) (quoting Perry Educ.
Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
323. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (emphasis
added).
324. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (emphasis added).
325. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 482 (1995) (emphasis added) (quoting
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Commn., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).
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are connected to some harm or wrong sufficient to warrant prohib·
iting (or requiring) their performance. This is one schema or pat·
tern for how rules might go morally awry; I will call it the Liberty
Schema.

The Liberty Schema
A duty-imposing rule should be changed in scope (in particu
lar, it should be narrowed, or invalidated entirely),

if the

duty

includes within its current scope some subclass of "liberties"
such that, all things considered, there is not sufficient reason to
prohibit (or require) the performance of this subclass, under
current law. "Liberties" are that class of actions, defined by
the aggregate of liberty-protecting provisions in the Bill of
Rights (free speech, substantive due process, . . . ), such that
actors should be left free by government to perform actions
within this class, absent sufficient reason.326
Note a number of features of this schema designed to maximize its
applicability. First, the schema leaves open why, precisely, a given
type of action is understood to fall within the class of constitutional
"liberties." It might be because the freedom to perform that type
of action is important for the actor's own well-being (as on the fa
miliar view that restricting X's freedom to speak violates her "au
tonomy");321 or it might be because the freedom to perform that
type of action is important for the well-being of others (as on the
familiar view that restricting X's freedom to speak deprives others
of important information).328 The schema also leaves open how,
326. Note that this definition is, strictly speaking, consistent both with the highly coarse
grained view of act individuation that I use in my analysis - for example, in speaking of "the
very same" action being an action of speech and of battery, trespass, and arson - and with
finer-grained views. See MooRE, supra note 64, at 366-74 (discussing more or less coarse
grained views). A constitutional "liberty" delineates a complicated type of action. If an ac
tor's performance of some instance of that type of action would violate a rule, then the rule
includes liberties within its scope, whether one prefers to say that (1) the very same action of
his would be an action of liberty, and an action of the kind identified in the rule-predicate; or
(2) the very same bodily movement that would be the performance of the liberty, also would
be the performance of the action identified in the rule-predicate. Because I see little to be
gained, for purposes of my analysis, in (2), I stick to (1).
327. For well-known statements of this sort of view, see C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the
First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REv. 964 (1978); and David A.J.
Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment,
123 U. PA. L. REv. 45 (1974).
328. Alexander Meiklejohn's famous defense of free speech, which points to the central
ity of political debate to democratic government, falls partly in this category - insofar as,
within a Meiklejohnian theory, the moral importance of X's political statement lies (partly)
in the information it brings X's interlocutors. See ALExANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL
FREEDOM 24-28 (1960); see also RAz, supra note 169, at 245-63 (arguing that political liber
ties, such as liberty of speech, are often grounded in collective interests, and not merely in the
interest of the actor).
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precisely, the class of "liberties" is defined. For example, one might
define the speech portion of this class as (1) all speech-acts, or (2)
all speech-acts except obscenity, incitement, libel, and "fighting
words," or even (3) all speech-acts except obscenity, incitement, li
bel, and "fighting words," and except speech-acts that are harmful
or wrongful because of nonexpressive properties. The choice be
tween these alternatives depends upon whether you think the act
properties enumerated in definitions two and three merely override
the value of speech, or cancel it entirely.329 Whatever the precise
definition of the speech portion of the liberty-class, there is reason
to invalidate, in some measure, the rules in FLA G
and

CHILD

DESECRATION

PORNOGRAPHY.

The Liberty Schema further leaves open what "sufficient rea
son" means - what kinds of considerations are morally sufficient
for government to prohibit (or require) the performance of liber
ties. At a minimum, government can prohibit liberties and other
actions if they seriously harm others: the subclass of speech-acts
comprised by speech-acts-that-also-constitute-battery or speech
acts-that-also-constitute-arson are surely proscribable (at least
under a non-discriminatory rule, a point we will return to below).
But liberties and other actions may additionally, perhaps, be pro
hibited

if

they constitute some kind of harmless wrong: say, the

wrong of defacing the graves of the dead.33° Finally, there may be
sufficient reason to prohibit a harmless and innocent subclass of lib
erties, under some rule R, if R also includes within its scope harmful
or wrongful actions and there is no feasible way, given the epistemic
limitations of state officials and actors, to exclude the subclass of
harmless and innocent liberties without also excluding some of the
proscribable actions.331

This is why the Liberty Schema asks

whether sufficient reason obtains to proscribe the subclass of liber
ties within a rule's scope,

under current law.

I recognize that, for a

given subclass, the moral reasons to prohibit that subclass may de
pend upon, and be changed by, the shape of current law insofar as it
covers other types of actions. One example is the one I just gave:
329. See RAz, supra note 54, at 27 (noting that "[t]he notion of one reason overriding
another should be carefully distinguished from that of a reason being canceled by a canceling
condition").
330. See FEINBERG, supra note 57, at 10-14 {distinguishing between harm and harmless
wrong).
331. See Alexander, supra note 7, at 552 (noting that " 'conduct unbecoming an officer' is
a phrase sufficiently vague to cover and deter speech . . . [b]ut the government's . . . interest
in deterring all conduct on the unprotected side of that line may justify a law that chills,
protected speech" (footnote omitted)).
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where the epistemic limitations of actors and officials in identifying
certain harmful or wrongful actions may justify a rule that picks out
both these actions and certain liberties as well.332 Another example
is where the subclass of liberties produces only a marginal harm,
but is part of a larger class of actions that together produce much
harm; prohibiting the subclass may be justifiable only as part of a
general prohibition on the larger class.333
I do not intend my Liberty Schema to resolve any of these inter
esting issues - the kind of issues that constitutional and moral the
orists hotly debate. Rather, my intention is simply to articulate one
straightforward way in which morality might require changing the
scope of a rule. Whatever the theorist's specific view about the role
of liberties in benefitting the actors versus benefitting others; about
the kinds of actions that are indeed protected liberties; and about
the kinds of considerations that justify prohibiting (or requiring)
the performance of liberties, the theorist should be able to agree
that the Liberty Schema can explain how rules go morally awry.
Further, and somewhat less fundamentally, I wish to suggest
that the Liberty Schema in fact maps onto a good bit of the consti
tutional case law. First, I suggest that most (although not all) of the
decisions in which the Court has found violations of the right to free
speech fit the Liberty Schema. Most (although not all) of these
cases involved rules that included within their scope some subclass
of constitutionally protected speech-acts such that sufficient reason
did not obtain to prohibit (or require) the performance of this sub
class. This is true, I suggest, whether or not the Court explicitly
invoked a "narrow tailoring" doctrine; it is true whether the claim
ant raised a retrospective challenge to a sanction, or a prospective
challenge to a duty; it is true whether the rule at stake picked out
expressive or nonexpressive properties of actions; it is true for cases
involving all the different categories of speech, such as core speech,
commercial speech, and "low-value" speech; and it is true both for
so-called "facial" challenges under the First Amendment, and for
so-called "as-applied" challenges. Consider some illustrative exam332. See also Adler, supra note 4, at 775 n.52 (noting that the moral propriety of rules
may depend upon epistemic and other deficits of state institutions).
333. It has become a truism within the literature on authority that the moral reasons
against performing a particular action may depend upon whether other actions are prohib·
ited. See GREEN, supra note 279, at 89-157 (discussing possible role of law in solving coordi
nation problems and prisoners' dilemmas). For a possible example, within free speech case
law, see Rubin v. Coors, 514 U.S. 476, 488-89 (1995) (invalidating ban on the disclosure of
alcohol content by beer labels, notwithstanding government's argument that ban prevented
"strength wars" in beer market, because no such ban existed for beer advertisements or for
wine and spirit labels).
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pies, drawn from the current case law, to supplement the FLAG
DESECRATION and CHILD PORNOGRAPHY examples.

Boos

v. Barry:334 a prospective challenge to a rule that the
Court analyzed as content-based;335 the rule prohibited the dis

play of signs, within 500 feet of a foreign government's em
bassy, that bring that government into disrepute.

Ladue

v.

Gilleo:336

a prospective challenge to a rule that the

Court analyzed as content-neutral; the rule prohibited the dis
play of residential signs.

United States v. Eichman:337

a retrospective challenge to a rule

picking out nonexpressive properties of actions; the rule,
passed by the federal government subsequent to

son,

Texas v. John

prohibited the action of mutilating flags, independent of

whether the mutilation was expressive.338

Rubin v. Coors:339

a prospective challenge to a rule regulating

commercial speech; the rule prohibited the disclosure of alco
hol content on beer labels.

Houston

v.

Hill:340

a prospective challenge to a rule that im

perfectly described a category of "low-value" speech-acts, in
334. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
335. See Boos, 485 U.S. at 318-21 (discussing difference between content-based and
content-neutral laws). This article will not attempt to analyze that distinction or take a posi
tion on its cogency. The distinction is a distinction within the broader category of laws that
pick out expressive properties of actions.
336. 512 U.S. 43 (1994).
337. 496 U.S. 310 (1990). Technically, the statute in Eichman made it unlawful to " 'muti
late[ ], deface[ ], physically defile[ ], burn[ ], maintain[ ] on the floor or ground, or trample[ ]
upon any flag of the United States.' " Eichman, 496 U.S. at 314 (quoting Flag Protection Act
of 1989, 18 U.S.C. § 700(a)(l) (1994)). For simplicity, and without lack of generality, I de
scribe and discuss Eichman as concerning a statute prohibiting flag mutilation.
338. Cf. 496 U.S. at 315, 318 (noting that the challenged rule "proscribes conduct (other
than disposal) that damages or mistreats a flag, without regard to the actor's motive, his
intended message, or the likely effects of his conduct on onlookers" but applying strict scru
tiny because the rule "cannot be 'justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech' " (quoting Boos, 485 U.S. at 320)). These two inquiries - (1) whether a rule picks
out expressive properties of actions, and (2) whether a rule can be adequately justified in
dependent of the expressive properties of actions within its scope - should be kept distinct.
A rule may survive (1) but fail (2), as indeed was true of the rule in Eichman. The Liberty
Schema makes good sense of this. To say that speech is a liberty means that persons should
be free to speak, absent sufficient reason; it further and relatedly means that, in general, what
they say is not a sufficient reason for restricting this liberty. A rule may restrict speech by
picking out expressive act-properties (as in Texas v. Johnson) or nonexpressive properties (as
in Eichman); in either event, the problem of finding sufficient reason will come into play.
339. 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
340. 482 U.S. 451 (1987).
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this case the category of fighting words; the rule prohibited in
terrupting a police officer in the performance of his duties.

In re R.M.J.:341 a retrospective, as-applied case: the Court in
validated a rule prohibiting lawyer advertising, as applied to
the claimant's advertisements.
For each one of these illustrative rules, one can readily show how
the rule goes awry under the Liberty Schema. This is trivial in Boos
and Ladue: some actions of displaying signs are independently
harmful (for example, displaying a sign laced with poisonous evapo
rate); some actions of displaying signs fall within a "low-value" cat
egory (for example, displaying a sign with an obscene picture); but
most are neither. A liberty analysis works readily for Eichman
(some actions of flag-mutilation are both expressive and harmless
apart from the disrespect they communicate), as well as for Coors
and Houston.
Finally, my interpretation of In re R.M.J., the as-applied case, is
as follows: This decision invalidated the no-advertising rule with
respect to the class of actions bearing the features specified by the
Court in its analysis of the claimant's advertisements, viz., truthful
and non-misleading advertisements.342 In short, on the Derivative
Account, so-called "as-applied" decisions are simply partial invali
dations. The no-advertising rule ran afoul of the Liberty Schema,
by including truthful, non-misleading, and otherwise innocent ad
vertisements within its scope. The Court partly invalidated the rule,
so as to cure the rule's moral flaw. I will discuss the partial vs. facial
invalidation issue at greater length below, in section III.A.3. The
Derivative Account can readily accommodate partial invalidations;
what it cannot accommodate is a true "as-applied" invalidation that is, a judicial decision to overturn X's sanction or duty in
dependent of further invalidating rule R. So-called "as-applied" de
cisions must be interpreted, within the Derivative Account, as
partial invalidations. The In re R.M.J. example is meant to show
the plausibility of this interpretation.
In sum, the Liberty Schema explains much of the free speech
case law. It also explains the entirety of the substantive due process
case law. Substantive due process cases, like free speech cases, are
standardly defended on the grounds that the Due Process Clause
delineates a class of liberties in the sense of my schema: a class of
actions that persons ought to be free to perform (at a minimum,
341. 455 U.S. 191 {1982).
342. See In re RM.I., 455 U.S. at 205·07.
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free from government coercion) absent overriding reason.343 This

is the class of actions falling within what the Court, in
called the "zone of privacy."344 The Court in

Casey

Griswold,

reaffirmed the

status of such actions as constitutional liberties, albeit without using
the term "privacy":

Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relat
ing to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child
rearing, and education. Our cases recognize "the right of the individ
ual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental in
trusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child." . . . These matters, involv
ing the most intimate and personal choices a person may make fu a
lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central
to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.345
Here, as with free speech, the specifics of the class of liberties de
marcated by

Griswold,

and reaffirmed by

Casey,

are open to debate

- as are the specific moral grounds for counting the exercise of a
liberty more important than (some range of) conflicting considera
tions.

In particular, we

might say that the constitutional liberty of

abortion would obtain even in a world of gender equality; or we

might say, in line with some recent scholarship on the abortion

right, that it now obtains by virtue of the existence of gender ine
quality.346 Similarly, we might disagree about whether measures

short of prohibiting abortion - for example, waiting periods and

informed-consent provisions - count as infringing the liberty of
abortion or not.347

·Bracketing these disagreements, it is quite straightforward to

explicate the Due Process Clause as liberty-protecting, and to inter
pret the cases in which the Court has sustained substantive due pro343. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 lIAR.v. L. REv.
(summarizing, but criticizing, standard view and citing literature).

737, 742-54 (1989)

344. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
345. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (emphasis and citation omit
ted) (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)).
346. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 304, at 279 ("The argument for an abortion right built on
principles of sex equality is thus straightforward. Restrictions on abortion burden only
women and are therefore impermissible unless persuasively justified in gender-neutral
terms. . . . [I]n our world [adequate justifications] are not [available] in light of the fact that
the burden of bodily use, properly understood, is imposed only on women, [and] could not be
enacted in the absence of unacceptable stereotypes about women's appropriate role . . . .") .
Sunstein states: "[M]ovements in the direction of sexual equality - before, during, and after
conception, including after birth - unquestionably weaken the case for an abortion right."
Id. at 280.
347. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 881-87 (upholding requirement of informed consent and 24hour waiting period).
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cess claims as cases where the underlying rules violated the Liberty
Schema. To give the leading examples:

Roe v. Wade:348

the basis for ABORTION; an anticipatory chal

lenge to a rule that prohibited procuring an abortion.

Planned Parenthood v. Casey:349

an anticipatory challenge to a

rule that prohibited doctors from performing an abortion with
out obtaining spousal consent.

Griswold

v.

Connecticut:350

a retrospective challenge by doc

tors to a rule that prohibited using contraceptives or assisting
others in doing so.
And to give a case in which, many believe, the Court should have
sustained the constitutional challenge:

Bowers

v.

Hardwick:351

a prospective challenge to a rule

prohibiting sodomy.
For each of these cases, one can readily say: the rule includes,
within its scope, some subclass of liberties (where the Due Process
Clause liberties are understood to include actions by physicians of
prescribing contraceptives or performing abortions)352 such that for
this subclass, sufficient reason does not obtain, at least under cur
rent law, to prohibit them. And the doctrinal formulations that the
Court has used in its substantive due process case law - not only
the "narrow tailoring" doctrine invoked in the early cases, but also
the "undue burden" standard invoked more recently in

Casey353 -

can readily be understood as fleshing out the Liberty Schema.
* * *

My interpretive claims about the free speech and substantive
due process case law are, to be sure, open to debate. In particular,
one might argue that the central concept for free speech is

nation,

not liberty. After all, the Court surely

does

discrimi

moot the prob

lem of content- and viewpoint-discrimination in its cases;354 and as
348. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
349. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
350. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
351. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
352.

See infra text accompanying notes 559-73 (discussing jus terti1).

353. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 869-80. The shift to this standard seems largely meant to
signal the acceptability of fetal life as a moral reason for pre-viability abortion requirements
that are not too burdensome. Thus it signals a change in the Court's assessment of the moral
reasons pro and con pre-viability abortion regulation, but not in the status of abortion as a
liberty.
354.

See Williams, supra note 226, at 622-24.
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we shall see below, there are some free speech decisions that can
only be explained on a Discrimination Schema. For the discrimina
tion theorist, the Free Speech Clause is centrally concerned with
rules that set forth a morally irrelevant property - the property
that the actor is speaking - rather than rules that include innocent
speech-acts within their scope.355 This theorist will interpret the
pervasive "narrow tailoring" doctrines within free speech law as
testing whether "discrimination" - understood broadly, to mean
the enactment of rules targeting speech356 - is justified, not as test
ing whether sufficient reason obtains to prohibit the speech-acts
within a rule's scope. Thus, the discrimination theorist will not
want to recognize free speech claims against rules that pick out
nonexpressive properties of actions: for example, the rule in Eich
man, or, to use the clearer and classic example of Marsh v. Ala
bama,351 a rule that prohibits "trespass" and is applied to the
trespassory actions of protesters, religious proselytizers, and other
speakers within the boundaries of a company town. And it will be a
matter of indifference, for the discrimination theorist, whether a
rule prohibiting some kind of speech is reworked by invalidating
the rule, or instead by extending the prohibition to cover some
larger category of actions that is defined in nonexpressive terms and
that includes all of the actions within the scope of the original,
speech-targeted rule. For example, the discrimination theorist will
be satisfied if a rule prohibiting "political demonstrations within
355. See infra text accompanying notes 385-89 (discussing centrality of morally irrelevant
properties to Discrimination Schema).
356. This broad construal would be needed to make sense of the cases in which the Court
strikes down "content-neutral" laws regulating speech, see, e.g., Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43
(1994). The discrimination theorist who wants to explain these cases will say that the poten
tially irrelevant property she is concerned with is the actor's property of speaking, and thus
that a speech-targeted, content-neutral, but unjustified rule counts as "discriminatory" for
her.
Alternately, she may think the cases striking down content-neutral laws are wrongly de
cided. Cf. Larry Alexander, Trouble on Track Two: Incidental Regulations of Speech and
Free Speech Theory, 44 HASTINGS LJ. 921, 923 (1993) (arguing that courts should not strike
down "track two" laws under the Free Speech Clause - laws "concerned with the noncom
municative impact of speech" - including laws picking out both nonexpressive and expres
sive properties).

357. 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (overturning trespass conviction of Jehovah's Witness who dis
tributed religious literature within "company town"). Admittedly, the Court in recent years
has not struck down laws picking out nonexpressive properties, on free speech grounds, see
Michael Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HAR.v. L. REv. 1175, 1200-11
(1996) (surveying case law), but the test for such laws remains an intermediate-scrutiny test,
see Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293-99 (1984), and if the
Liberty Schema truly reflects part of the content of "free speech," this test should not be a
dead letter. Cf. Lee v. International Socy. for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. 830 (1992)
(per curiam) (invalidating ban on distribution of literature in airport terminals, despite al
leged risks of congestion posed by distribution).
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public parks" is broadened to prohibit "all activities that produce a
noise level above sixty decibels within public parks," even though
political demonstrations, stump speeches, and so forth cannot feasi
bly take place at a noise level below sixty decibels.
I believe it is a mistake to view the Free Speech Clause as fo
cused solely on discrimination. Standard moral accounts of free
speech point to the benefits, for the actor X or her audience, of X's
being free to engage in speech.358 The concept of discrimination
does not exhaust such accounts: the would-be protester, stump
speaker, or proselytizer is no less coerced by an applicable rule
prohibiting trespass or noisemaking than by a speech-targeted rule.
And, relatedly, it would not be a matter of indifference, within the
standard accounts, for government to restrict speech that has low
level nonexpressive effects (producing noise, damaging the grass in
the public parks, or intruding onto private property) by stringently
regulating all activities with those effects.359 Finally, the reason that
rules picking out more serious nonexpressive act-properties - such
as arson, battery, or pollution - do not violate First Amendment
rights is simply that those harms are sufficiently serious to justify
restricting speech-acts that produce them, particularly since it is
(normally)360 feasible for speakers to say what they want to in a less
harmful manner.
The best argument for reducing the Free Speech Clause to an
antidiscrimination principle, and for dispensing with a separate lib
erty principle here, is that judicial attempts to protect the liberty of
speech are self-defeating. The argument might be expressed as fol
lows: The Liberty Schema entails judicial balancing of the nonex
pressive harms and wrongs that speech-acts cause against the value
of speech; yet this sort of balancing is the very kind of governmen358.

See sources cited supra notes 317, 327-28.

359. See, e.g., Thomas Scanlon, A Theory ofFreedom ofExpression, 1 PHIL. & Pun. AFF.
204, 222 (1972) {"The Millian Principle [that speech ought not be prohibited by virtue of

harms that flow from the expressive properties of speech-acts] is obviously incapable of ac
counting for all of the cases that strike us as infringements of freedom of expression. On the
basis of this principle alone we could raise no objection against a government that banned all
parades and demonstrations (they interfere with traffic), outlawed posters and handbills (too
messy), banned public meetings of more than ten people (likely to be unruly), and restricted
newspaper publication to one page per week (to save trees). Yet such policies surely strike
us as intolerable.").
360. See Clark, 468 U.S. at 293 (stating that "time, place, or manner" restrictions on ex
pression are valid if, inter alia, they leave open "ample alternative channels for communica
tion"); 468 U.S. at 298 (stating that the "time, place, or manner" test is little different from
the test under United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), for the "regulation of expressive
conduct," i.e., for laws picking out nonexpressive act-properties).
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tal valuation of speech that the First Amendment prohibits.361 But

if it violates the First Amendment for courts to distinguish between

the serious nonexpressive wrongs and harms that justify prohibiting

speech, and the less serious nonexpressive wrongs and harms that

do not, then a fortiori it should violate the First Amendment for
courts to distinguish between different categories of expression, say,

between obscene and non-obscene speech,362 or between recklessly
false and non-recklessly false statements about public figures,363 or

between misleading and non-misleading advertisements.364 The im

plication of this argument against the Liberty Schema is that courts
should automatically strike down

any law

picking out expressive

act-properties. Unless that implication is correct - and

I

do not

believe it is - a Liberty Schema for speech is not self-defeating.

What about a discrimination account of the abortion case law?
One might argue that legislators are typically confused or mistaken

about the moral relevance of the act-property "abortion" (for ex

ample, because legislators are motivated by religious views about

abortion, which ought not figure in its regulation365); that courts
invalidate no-abortion laws only by virtue of their greater compe

tence to determine the moral relevance of this act-property; and
therefore that a rule must target abortion in order to trigger the

Due Process Clause. On this account, a rule requiring all abortions

to be performed in hospitals rather than clinics might be unconstitu

tional; but a rule requiring all medical procedures to be performed

in hospitals rather than clinics would not be unconstitutional, even
as applied to the medical procedure of aborting a fetus.366 Indeed,

given the distinct moral features of abortion - the involvement of

a fetus - a liberty account of the abortion right may be problem-

361. See Alexander, supra note 356, at 932 (claiming that "the value of speech cannot be
balanced against the government's track two interests in any way that is principled and that
respects the very freedom of thought that the First Amendment itself protects"). There is
also a standard critical line that disputes the special role of speech, as opposed to nonexpres
sive conduct, in self-fulfillment, see Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amend
ment Problems, 47 lNo. LJ. 1 (1971), but this critique leaves untouched the argument for a
constitutional liberty, at least, of political speech.
362.'

See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).

363.

See New York Tlllles v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

364.

See Central Hudson Gas & Blee. Corp. v. Public Serv. Commn., 447 U.S. 557 (1980).

365. Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT .ABORTION,
EUTHANASIA, AND lNoIVIDUAL FREEDOM 10-29 (1993) (arguing that opposition to abortion
is plausibly grounded not in "derivative" view that fetus has rights and interests, but in "de
tached" view that life is sacred).
366. See Dorf,
privacy).

supra note 357, at 1219-33 (discussing incidental burdens on right to
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atic.367 But a general reduction of substantive due process case law
from liberty to discrimination is neither doctrinally required (by
contrast with the parallel reduction for free exercise) nor morally
warranted. The idea of a zone of "privacy" - at a minimum, of
self-regarding choices such that the freedom to make these is nor
mally constitutive of autonomy (self-authorship) and fundamental
to well-being - is morally plausible, indeed compelling.368
Liberty, not just discrimination, is central to free speech and
substantive due process jurisprudence.369 But even if I am incorrect
in advancing this claim, my error does not undermine the Deriva
tive Account or the project of interpreting the constitutional case
law within it. If the Liberty Schema is misplaced, then the right
response is to reinterpret ABORTION, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY, FLAG
DESECRATION, and the jurisprudence these stylized cases exem
plify, within a second schema for how rules go morally awry. The
best objections to a libertarian reading of free speech and substan
tive due process are objections that simply propel us forward - to
a different, but equally derivative and rule-centered understanding
of the moral content of constitutional rights.

I call this the Discrim

ination Schema.

2.

The Discrimination Schema

My claim has been that the Liberty Schema lays bare the moral
content of constitutional rights in the large portion of the free
speech case law epitomized by the stylized cases, FLAG DESECRA
TION and CHILD PORNOGRAPHY, and in the entirety of the substan
tive due process case law, as epitomized by ABORTION. But what of
367. Cf. SUNSTEIN, supra note 304, at 272 (claiming that "those who stress 'liberty' [in
defending the abortion right] seem to have no way to respond to those who believe that
abortion involves the death of a human being").
368. On self-regarding choices, see DONALD VANDEVEER, PATERNALISTIC
lNrERVENTION: THE MORAL BOUNDS OF BENEVOLENCE 58·63 (1986). On autonomy as self
authorship, and the connection between autonomy and well-being, see RAz, supra note 169,
at 369-99. I include the "self-regarding" proviso here to make the notion of a distinct zone of
privacy maximally plausible; whether that proviso is truly needed is a separate question, see
LAURENCE TRIBE, AMErucAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 1302-14 (2d ed. 1988), which I leave
open by saying that "at a minimum" self-regarding choices fall within the zone.
369. In saying this, I do not mean to ignore the possibility that the Liberty and Discrimi
nation schema might overlap. A rule might go awry both because (1) the rule includes liber
ties 'vithin its scope without sufficient reason, and (2) the rule is discriminatory (in a sense to
be made more precise below). Indeed, this may be true of most rules that give rise to suc
cessful free speech or abortion claims. But the moral difficulties with such doubly problem
atic rules will not be exhausted by their discriminatory cast; and extending their prohibitory
scope will not (normally) be a moral cure. For a case that clearly illuminates this point, see
Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 51-59 (1994) (invalidating rule prohibiting residential signs, but
not under "discrimination" rationale, because such rationale would leave open possibility of
curing rule by broadening it).
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the remaining stylized cases: ALcoHoL, ANIMAL SACRIFICE, and
RESIDENTIAL PICKETING? ALCOHOL is drawn directly from the
Court's decision in Craig v. Boren,31o and exemplifies the current
structure of equal protection doctrine: it is close to a necessary con
dition for a successful equal protection claim that the rule-predicate
employ a "suspect" act-property (such as race or gender) or, failing
that, employ an act-property that is deliberately selected by the leg
islature to match the scope of a "suspect" property.371 ANIMAL
SACRIFICE is drawn directly from the Court's decision in

the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.

v.

City of Hialeah, 372

Church of

and exemplifies

the current structure of free exercise doctrine, which is now isomor
phic to equal protection doctrine.373 Unless and until the Court
reverses its holding in the watershed

Smith

case,374 it will be a nec

essary condition for a successful free exercise challenge that the
rule-predicate pick out actions by virtue of their

religious

cast, or,

failing that, be designed to fall along religious lines. As the Court
explained in

Smith:

[T]he right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obli
gation to comply with a "valid and neutral law of general applicability
on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his
religion prescribes (or proscribes)."375
370. 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (holding gender-discriminatory ban on alcohol sales unconstitutional under Equal Protection Clause).
371. See supra text accompanying notes 98-108 (discussing current structure of equal pro
tection doctrine).
372. 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (holding unconstitutional, under Free Exercise Clause, ordi
nance that prohibited animal killing and was targeted at Santeria religion).
373. See supra text accompanying notes 109-13 (discussing current structure of free exer
cise doctrine).
374. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S.
Ct. 2157, 2160-61 (1997) (reaffirming Smith).
375. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment)). I note, again, the special proviso for neutral laws
that allow for individualized exemptions. See supra note 110. The existence of this proviso
does not suffice to bring free exercise jurisprudence within the Liberty Schema. If religiously
motivated actions were constitutional "liberties" in the sense I've defined, i.e., a type of ac
tion that persons must be constitutionally free to perform absent sufficient reason, then a
neutral law with no allowance for individualized exemptions could readily encompass and
constitutionally infringe such liberties.
Why not argue that Smith is wrongly decided, and that the Free Exercise Clause creates
"liberties," no less so than the Free Speech Clause and the substantive component of the Due
Process Clause? See Laycock, supra note 306, at 313 ("Religious liberty is first and foremost
a guarantee of liberty."). Smith may indeed be wrongly decided, but my basic claim here is
that the Liberty Schema and the Discrimination Schema make sense of the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence on free speech, free exercise, equal protection, and substantive due process,
and fit with plausible construals of the underlying moral criteria. That claim does not depend
upon Smith's being wrong, and so I will not argue that it is.
Of course, if Smith were overruled, my claim would remain true; we would, then, simply
swap the Discrimination Schema for the Liberty Schema as the basic schema for free
exercise.
·
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As for RESIDENTIAL PICKETING, that is drawn directly from the
Court's decision in Carey v. Brown,376 and illustrates an important
strand of the free speech case law: cases where the unconstitutional
rule prohibits actions bearing a conjunction of two or more proper
ties (such as residential picketing plus non-labor speech), even
though a broader rule formed by deleting one of these properties
would not be unconstitutional. The Mosley case377 and the majority
opinion in R.A. V. provide further examples of this puzzling, but sig
nificant part of First Amendment jurisprudence.378
The Liberty Schema cannot account for ALCOHOL, ANIMAL
SACRIFICE, or RESIDENTIAL PICKETING. In order to subsume the
rules in these stylized cases under the Liberty Schema, we would
need to identify appropriate subclasses of liberties that the rules
encompassed without sufficient reason. But what subclasses would
those be? The Equal Protection Clause is not standardly defended
as delineating liberties - it protects blacks, women, and men from
discriminatory rules; it does not protect actions by blacks, by
women, or by men379 - and in any event the puzzle would remain
that a rule prohibiting the purchase of alcohol by blacks (or women
or men) between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one can be cured
by extending the prohibition to all persons in that age group.3s0 If
the initial rule went awry by including within its scope actions that,
absent sufficient reason, persons should be free to perform, then
extension would not (normally)381 constitute a moral improvement.
Given the structural isomorphism between equal protection and
free exercise, the same points can be made about free exercise
376. 447 U.S. 455 {1980) {holding unconstitutional, under Free Speech and Equal Protec
tion Clauses, statute that prohibited residential picketing but exempted labor picketing).
377. See Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 {1972) (striking down, under Free Speech
and Equal Protection Clauses, rule prohibiting picketing near school except peaceful labor
picketing).
378. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391-96 (1992) (striking down ordinance
prohibiting hate speech, as content- and viewpoint-discriminatory, despite assumption that
ordinance had been narrowed to cover only "fighting words"). See generally Kagan, supra
note 216, at 32-45, 39 (surveying this portion of free speech case law, viz., "content-based
underinclusion": "the question [in such cases] is whether the government may voluntarily
promote or protect some (but not all) speech on the basis of content, when none of the
speech, considered in and of itself, has a constitutional claim to promotion or protection").
379. See supra section II.B (surveying theories of equal protection).
380. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 n.24 {1976). See generally Candace Kovacic,
Remedying Underinclusive Statutes, 33 WAYNE L. REv. 39, 40-46 {1986) (noting and discuss
ing proposition that rules violating equal protection, or equality guarantees of statutory law
or state constitutional law, can be cured through nullification or extension).
381. I say "normally" to leave open the unusual scenario where broadening a rule that
violates the Liberty Schema has the effect of strengthening the moral reasons for prohibiting
the liberties that fall within the rule's scope, and thereby tips the moral balance in favor of
their prohibition. See supra text accompanying note 333 (noting this possibility).
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the Court decisively rejected the proposition that

In Smith,

the Free Exercise Clause delineates a class of liberties in the sense
required by the Liberty Schema; relatedly, it is clear post-Smith that
a rule prohibiting "the killing of animals for religious purposes"
could be cured by replacing it with a prohibition against "the killing
of animals for any purposes, except by a licensed producer of food."
Finally, what makes a case like REsmENTIAL PICKETING puzzling,
for free speech purposes, is that this case is structurally distinct
from FLAG DESECRATION and CmLD PORNOGRAPHY, and structur
ally similar to .ALCOHOL and ANIMAL SACRIFICE.382 There is suffi
cient reason to justify prohibiting the class of speech acts,
"picketing a residence''; indeed, the Court determined precisely
that in

Frisby

v.

Schultz,

where it upheld a general prohibition on

residential picketing over First Amendment challenge.383 B ut if this
is true, then it should also (normally) be true that no First Amend
ment liberties are violated by prohibiting any proper subclass of the

Frisby class, particularly the subclass

"picketing a residence by non

labor speakers."

I suggest that ALCOHOL, ANIMAL SACRIFICE,

and RESIDENTIAL

PICKETING should instead be explained by the following schema.

The Discrimination Schema
A rule the predicate of which contains some "morally irrele
vant" property
forth property

I of
I in

actions - that is, the rule expressly sets
delineating the actions that persons are

obliged not to perform (or to perform), and that state officials
are authorized to sanction - may have the wrong predicate.
There may be sufficient reason, all things considered, to nar
row the rule, or to extend it, or even to replace the predicate
with a different but coextensive act-description.

If so,

constitu

tional reviewing courts should invalidate the rule. "Morally ir
relevant" properties are properties such that

(1)

some moral

criterion in the Bill of Rights is best understood to stand for
the proposition that

(2)

an action's having that property does

382. It is this puzzle that, in part, explains the flurry of scholarly reactions to the R.A. V.
decision. See Akhil Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
106 HAR.v. L. REv. 124 (1992); Kagan, supra note 216; Elena Kagan, Regulation of Hate
Speech and Pornography after R.A.V., 60 U. Cm. L. REv. 873 (1993); Symposium, Hate
Speech after R.A.V.: More Conflict Between Free Speech and Equality?, 18 WM. MITCHELL
L. REv. 889 (1991); Laurence Tribe, The Mystery of Motive, Private and Public: Some Notes
Inspired by the Problems of Hate Crime and Animal Sacrifice, 1993 SUP. CT. REv. 1.
383.

See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
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increase the moral case for sanc

tioning or prohibiting it.384
Note a few points about this schema. First, and most importantly, I
intend it to provide a unified account of the equal protection case
law, the (post Smith) free exercise case law, and the free speech
-

case law epitomized by REsmENTIAL PICKETING. The basic idea is
that an actor's race, his or her gender, his or her religion, and the
viewpoint he or she expresses, is "morally irrelevant," at least in a
certain way. Black persons and women are not moral inferiors to
white men, and white men are not moral superiors to black persons
and women. For none is it the case that, by virtue of his or her race
or gender, his or her well-being counts for less or more. (Thus for
none is it the case that his or her actions are the actions of a moral
inferior or superior, and therefore more or less properly coerced or
sanctioned.) The "moral irrelevance" of race and gender in this
fundamental sense - what Dworkin calls the moral right to "equal
concern and respect"385 - has been a central theme in scholarship
about the Equal Protection Clause.386 My suggestion is that we
might plausibly develop similar notions of "moral irrelevance" for
the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses. At the very minimum,
these clauses mean that the actions of a religiously-motivated actor
are not morally worse,

qua

his religious motivation, and similarly

that the actions of an actor expressing viewpoint V rather than
are not morally worse,

qua

his expression of V.

W

Anyone who

384. This schema could be broadened to include facially neutral rules that are motivated
by a discriminatory purpose, see Personnel Admr. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271-80 {1979)
(stating that such rules trigger heightened equal protection scrutiny) - for example, by un
derstanding "discriminatory purpose" as the intention of legislators, in enacting the neutral
rule, to match the extension of some rule having irrelevant property I in its predicate. For
simplicity, however, I will not broaden the schema in this way.
385. See DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 1, at 272-78, 273 ("[Govern
ment] must not distribute goods or opportunities unequally on the ground that some citizens
are entitled to more because they are worthy of more concern.").
386. Besides Dworkin, see, e.g., Brest, supra note 238, at 6 {"Race-dependent decisions
are irrational insofar as they reflect the assumption that members of one race are less worthy
than other people."); ELY, supra note 253, at 82 (stating that the Equal Protection Clause
"preclude[s] a refusal to represent [minorities], the denial to minorities of what Professor
Dworkin has called 'equal concern and respect' " (footnote omitted)); Fiss, supra note 108, at
155 ("Blacks are what might be called a specially disadvantaged group, and I would view the
Equal Protection Clause as a protection for such groups."); KOPPELMAN, supra note 219, at 9
("Stigmatized social status and the concomitant withholding of respect are . . . the central evil
the [antidiscrimination] project seek to remedy . . • .") ; SUNSTEIN, supra note 304, at 338-46
{arguing that the Equal Protection Clause incorporates anti-caste principle). Obviously,
these authors develop specific theories of equal protection doctrine that are quite diverse and indeed some develop theories focused upon race discrimination, rather than gender dis
crimination, see ELY, supra, at 164-70 - but the point remains that the moral equality of
group Z (races or genders or other groups) is an animating principle behind each author's
defense of an equal-protection doctrine protecting group Z.
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adopts a more robust construal of the clauses - for example, as
delineating "liberties" in the sense sketched out by the Liberty
Schema, as protecting us from religious strife, or as guaranteeing a
vie\vp oint-balanced public debate - can surely agree to this mini
mum claim.
Note, however, that the Discrimination Schema is quite careful
not to define precisely what "moral irrelevance" means. For exam
ple, it is indisputable that race and gender are "morally irrelevant,"
in the sense of not constituting persons as inferior or superior, and
further that moral irrelevance in this foundational sense is part of
the best understanding of the equal protection guarantee set forth
in the Fourteenth Amendment. Whether race and gender are also
"morally irrelevant" in the further sense that (1) these characteris
tics are never correlated with proscribable characteristics,387 (2) ra
cist and sexist preferences have no weight, within a utilitarian
calculus,388 or (3) the needs and capacities of men and women are
no different, are matters for debate. Relatedly, the schema does
not say that race or gender are "morally irrelevant" in the sense of
never being properly set forth by a rule. That is clearly not the case
for gender, in the Court's view; the Court has upheld gender
discriminatory laws.389 Someone who wants wrongful gender
discriminatory rules to be invalidated, by constitutional reviewing
courts, is not committed to the claim that rules should never dis
criminate by gender. All he is committed to is some, more founda
tional, sense of "moral irrelevance" such that the rightness or
wrongness of gender discrimination is an appropriate issue for con
stitutional courts to consider.
Finally, the schema is careful not to specify exactly why suffi
cient reason obtains to change the predicate of some rule setting
forth an irrelevant property L Most simply: if a rule prohibits ac
tions with properties I & W, and I neither serves in any way to
make actions worse, nor correlates in any way with wrong-making
properties, then there is presumably sufficient moral reason to nar
row or extend the rule (with the moral choice of narrowing vs. ex387. See Brest, supra note 238, at 6 (claiming possible statistical correlation between race
and legitimate bases for government regulation).
388. See ScARRE, supra note 46, at 162-66 (arguing that a debased preference,
paradigmatically a preference to harm someone whom the holder takes not to be equally
human, is not constitutive of happiness and therefore does not count within a utilitarian
calculus).
389. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding draft registration of
men but not women); Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (upholding gender
discriminatory statutory rape law); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (upholding
gender-discriminatory provision of Social Security Act).
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W

alone).

But the

schema also leaves open the possibility that a rule-predicate setting
forth I should be changed
properties. The Court

even if I is correlated with wrong-making
in Craig v. Boren apparently did just this,

striking down Oklahoma's law prohibiting the sale of low-alcohol
beer to men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one, even
though Oklahoma's statistics suggested that men were significantly
more likely to drink and drive than women.39° One might explain

Craig

by appealing to the notion of stigma, or to the exemplary

effects of gender-discrimination; one might say that, even though
gender

is

a good proxy for Oklahoma, the Oklahoma law would

serve as an (unfortunate) example that would encourage unjustified
discrimination by other actors. The conditions under which the
state properly relies upon race, gender, religion, or viewpoint as the
basis for regulating actions is a matter for substantive debate within
the jurisprudence of equality, religion, and speech.

I mean the Dis

crimination Schema to anticipate, not to resolve such debates.
How else might cases like ALcoHOL, ANIMAL SACRIFICE, and
RESIDENTIAL PICKETING be explained, within the Derivative Ac
count, if not by appeal to the Discrimination Schema? One alterna
tive is to describe particular, unwanted

outcomes,

one or another of

which the rules in these cases allegedly produce; these rules stigma
tize women or blacks, exacerbate the distributive injustice already
suffered by low-status groups, skew public debate, ignite religious
strife, and so on, or so the outcome theorist might argue.391 The
difficulty here is as follows: unless the outcome theorist can pro
duce outcomes that are essentially connected to a rule's using par
ticular, "suspect" predicates such as race, gender, religion, or
viewpoint, she has not satisfactorily explained the case law. Stigma
is this kind of outcome, but only works for ALcoHOL. The further
outcomes I have listed - and others that plausibly fit the moral
concepts of equal protection, free speech, and free exercise - are
not essentially connected to particular rule-predicates. A race
neutral law can have a disproportionate impact on blacks;392 a
390. See Simons, supra note 231, at 479 n.107 (discussing Craig) ("In the state's view,
statistics indicated that 2% of the males posed the harm [drunk driving], but only 0.18% of
the females. If the statistics were valid {and there were some serious problems with them)
they indicated a ten fold geometric differential harm . . . . ).
391. See supra text accompanying notes 304-07 (noting possible outcomes, to ground pos
sible rule-validity schema within constitutional law).
392. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (upholding race-neutral qualifying
exam, which had disproportionate impact upon blacks); Personnel Admr. v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256 (1979) (upholding gender-neutral civil service preference for veterans, which had dispro
portionate impact upon women).
"
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viewpoint-neutral law can have a disproportionate impact on speak
ers with a particular viewpoint;393 a neutral law that burdens one
group's religious practices might well be perceived by that group as
unfair.394
The reader might object that the case law is crazy; any decent
rule-invalidity schema, she might claim, will identify certain impor
tant types of actions (liberties) that persons should be free to per
form, or certain bad outcomes that there is strong moral reason to
avoid, but not certain types of descriptions under which rules
wrongly regulate actions. Yet I fail to see the craziness. A given
rule-invalidity schema must, at a minimum, be one that courts are
epistemically and otherwise competent to enforce.395 Further, it
must be tied to the moral criteria set forth in the Bill of Rights. So
we can argue about which liberties are thus tied (liberty of con
tract? liberty of religion?), and which act-properties are thus tied
(viewpoint? religion? race?). But it is not crazy to think that the
Bill of Rights, besides protecting certain liberties or safeguarding
against certain outcomes, also stands for certain moral propositions:
the propositions that particular natural or conventional properties
of actors and actions do, or do not, have moral relevance, in various
ways. To recur to Dworkin: the Equal Protection Clause might
guarantee, not equal treatment, but equal concern and respect.396
It might require, not that blacks and whites be treated equally well,
but that governmental decisions not be grounded upon the proposiSimilarly, a race-neutral law can lead to the unequal treatment of blacks and whites,
within a Tus=anltenBroek type theory. Imagine that the law is both irrational, relative to
valid purposes, and has a disparate impact upon blacks.
393. A plausible example is United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (upholding pro
hibition on destruction of draft cards), which presumably had a disproportionate impact upon
anti-war speech. The outcome theorist might respond that courts are epistemically poorly
suited to determine whether neutral laws skew debate; but unless they are epistemically well
placed to distinguish between speech-targeted laws that do and do not skew debate (which
seems implausible, given the initial premise) this outcome theory turns out to be both exten
sionally equivalent to my Discrimination Schema, and a cruder explanation of the jurispru
dence. Consider a case such as R.A.V.; it is very hard to believe that an imbalance in the
class of viewpoints expressed by speakers of "fighting words" is a constitutionally problem
atic outcome as such. Rather, a morally suboptimal rule that picks out a viewpoint-based
subclass of "fighting words" is unconstitutional because its predicate employs the morally
irrelevant property of viewpoint. (How could such a rule be morally suboptimal? If, for
example, the utterance of fighting words is truly harmful, extending the rule to include all
speakers of fighting words would presumably constitute a moral improvement).
394. A plausible example is Smith itself. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
890 (1990) (upholding sanctions against Native Americans who used peyote for sacramental
purposes).
395. See Adler, supra note 4, at 771-80 (arguing that epistemic and other institutional
defects are grounds to limit judicial enforcement of constitutional criteria).
396. See DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 1, at 227 (distinguishing be
tween these two versions of "equality").
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tion that blacks and whites are morally different simply by virtue of
their race. Unless the concept of discrimination is constitutionally
crazy, my schema and the case law are not. The concept of a rule or
decision being discriminatory just is the concept of the decision hav
ing a particular unwarranted basis, grounds, or predicate, rather
than having a particular unwarranted outcome.397
A rule must produce some kind of unwarranted outcome to sat
isfy the Discrimination Schema; there must be sufficient reason to
change the predicate of the rule in some measure. But my schema
is not tied to particular outcomes; it is tied, in a way that fits the
case law, to a rule's use of "irrelevant" predicates such that, in the
end, the rule somehow goes awry. The account is perched, as it
were, between outcome theories and process theories of discrimina
tion.398 Outcome theories are problematic, for the reasons I have
just adduced. Process theories are even worse. At best the process
theorist might try to defend the Direct A�count, as against the De
rivative Account. But this is morally dilutive, for reasons I have
already explained. And once she moves to the framework of the
Derivative Account - once she concedes that reviewing courts are
essentially concerned with the repeal or amendment of rules, not
the treatment of particular litigants - the process theory becomes
even weaker. A rule such that (a) false beliefs figured in the enact
ment of the rule, but (b) the rule-predicate turns out, coinciden
tally, to be morally perfect, is not a rule that reviewing courts
should repeal or amend. It is a rule that courts should affirm, inso
far as courts can reliably determine the rule's perfection! False leg
islative beliefs should matter to reviewing courts just insofar as
these beliefs lead legislatures to enact flawed outcomes, or partly
constitute flawed outcomes (as in the case of stigma), or evidence
flawed outcomes. They do not matter as such.
The only way around this is to argue that process is intrinsically
valuable for groups, and that false beliefs about these groups hin
ders their political participation. This is one of the variants of pro
cess theory, which I briefly mentioned above.399 But this sort of
participation-enhancing process theory has the deeply counterintui
tive consequence that, if blacks and whites in a segregated society
I

397. See Brest, supra note 238, at 1 {"By the 'antidiscrimination principle' mean the
general principle disfavoring classifications and other decisions and practices that depend on
the race (or ethnic origin) of the parties affected.").
398. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 219, at 16 (distinguishing between these two types of
theories).
399. See supra text accompanying notes 251-55.
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share prejudices against blacks, and together participate in the pro
cess of enacting a racially discriminatory law that, morally, ought to
be changed, no violation of the Equal Protection Clause has en
sued. A racially discriminatory rule can be morally wrong, and con
stitutionally awry, independent of black participation.4oo

3. Rights for Wrongdoers
Let us now return to the puzzle that my stylized cases are meant
to exemplify, and that the Direct Account proved unable to resolve:
How can it violate X's constitutional rights to sanction him for per
forming a particular action A, or to coerce
action, pursuant to rule

R,

even

him not to perform that
if that very action is wrongful and

thus properly sanctioned or coerced pursuant to a different rule?
An initial point bears mention here. Nothing in the Derivative
Account itself entails that the

only persons who can secure the judi

cial invalidation of sanction-backed, duty-conferring rules are per
sons who secure the invalidation of their own sanctions or duties.
To say that some rule

R

"violates X's constitutional rights," within

the Derivative Account, simply means that (a) the rule

R

fails a

constitutional rule-validity schema (such as the Liberty Schema, the
Discrimination Schema, or some other); such that (b) the court
properly invalidates

R, by issuing a revised rule R' (either a narrow

ing amendment, or a wholesale repeal, or even an extension401), at
the instance of X X might, in theory, be just a concerned citizen.402
Or X might be a victim of wrongdoers, who hopes to
scope of

R. 403

broaden

the

Or X might be an actor sanctioned pursuant to

R,

which the Court partly invalidates, but without invalidating the por400. More precisely, this objection is problematic for an intrinsic-process theory that pur
ports to be an exclusive theory of constitutional antidiscrimination norms. What about devel
oping such a theory as a supplement to my Discrimination Schema, along the following lines:
a morally optimal rule, such that prejudices among the rule-formulators hindered (intrinsi
cally valuable) participation by disfavored groups in the rule-formulation process, is uncon
stitutional and should be invalidated? Whatever the independent merits of this
supplementary theory, it is not a particularly good account of the case law insofar as that
relies upon judicial assessment of rule-predicates rather than direct historical evidence of the
beliefs that figured in the formulation of rules - for if a rule-predicate is morally optimal,
the fact that it contains a morally irrelevant property I is little evidence of a prejudiced rule
formulation process.
401. See Kovacic, supra note 380, at 40-46 (noting that courts frequently remedy benefit
conferring rules that violate equal protection by extending their coverage).
402. But see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (rejecting, on standing
grounds, challenge to administrative regulation despite statutory provision authorizing "any
person" to bring suit).
403. But see Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973) (holding that mother has no
standing to seek broader scope of criminal prohibition against nonpayment of child support).
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tion of the rule applicable to X 404 These possibilities are not ruled
out by the logic of the Derivative Account, itself. They may, to
some extent, be ruled out by the standing component of Article
of the Constitution405 - but this standing requirement is

III
extrinsic

to the Derivative Account, in the sense that a personal setback to X
himself is, on the Derivative Account, no precondition for X's
power to secure the judicial invalidation of a constitutionally invalid
rule.

I believe,

in truth, that Article

III

does

not require X to

secure

an improvement in her own legal position (that is, judicial relief
from a sanction or duty) for a court to invalidate rule

R

at X's in

stance.406 Whatever else standing requires, it does not require that.
But

I will not attempt to defend this view of standing, for the Deriv

ative Account is, strictly, agnostic on the issue407 - and, in any
event, all of the constitutional cases in which the Court has invali
dated sanction-backed, duty-conferring rules

have been cases where

the claimant's own legal position was improved.408 This is the sce
nario that our stylized cases are meant to exemplify - the scenario
in which X's

sanction or duty pursuant to rule R violates her consti
that means not
merely that (a) the rule R fails a constitutional rule-validity schema
tutional rights. On the Derivative Account, to say

(such as the Liberty Schema, the Discrimination Schema, or some
other); and that (b) the court properly invalidates

R,

by issuing a

revised rule R' (either a narrowing amendment, or a wholesale re
peal, or even an extension), at the instance of X; but that further (c)
X's

treatment (her sanction or duty) is not authorized by R'.

Why

does (c) occur, in our stylized cases?
404. Cf. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Assn., 486 U.S. 466, 472-80 {1988) {holding that rule
regulating direct-mail solicitation by lawyers violated commercial-speech test, and then sepa
rately considering whether claimant's own letter was "particularly overreaching," viz.,
whether that letter fell outside the properly-invalidated portion of the rule).
405. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-52 {1984) (setting forth and explaining
black-letter standing doctrine under Article III).
406. I say that, in part, because otherwise judicial nullification rather than extension of
benefit-conferring rules also would violate Article III. See Kovacic, supra note 380, at 40-46
(noting that nullification sometimes chosen as remedy for benefit-conferring rules). But see
Dorf, supra note 38, at 294 {claiming that "any constitutional challenge to a statute . . . is as
applied in the sense that adjudication in federal court . . . requires that the statute be applied
to the litigant to create a case or controversy").
407. This is not to say that the truth of the Derivative Account has no implications for
standing doctrine. It is rather to say that standing limitations must be defended on grounds
other than the nature of constitutional rights. This very fact - the fact that standing is ex
trinsic to the Derivative Account, by contrast with the Direct Account - has very important
implications. I discuss those implications a bit more below. See infra text accompanying
notes 573-86.
408. I know of no counterexample.

See infra

note 426 and accompanying text.
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Take FLAG DESECRATION as an example. A rule

R

provides

that "no person shall desecrate a flag of the United States." X
bums a flag, and in the course of doing so batters a bystander, com
mits arson, and pollutes the environment. She is sanctioned pursu
ant to R, and brings suit challenging the rule and, specifically, her
sanction. Rule R is unconstitutional: it violates the Liberty
Schema. So on the Derivative Account the reviewing court should
repeal, narrow, or perhaps even extend R: it should issue a revision

R'.

But what is R'? And why doesn't it authorize X's sanction?

Consider these possibilities:

- R' might be a retroactive and prospective repeal of R. If so,
X's sanction is not authorized by R' (which has zero scope),
and the court overturns X's sanction as part of its replacement
of R with R'. FLAG DESECRATION is explained by the Deriva
tive Account.

- R' might be a prospective-only repeal of R. If so, X's sanc
tion is authorized by R' - R' is identical to R for past actions
such as X's - and the court does not overturn X's sanction as
part of its replacement of R with R'. FLAG DESECRATION is
not explained by the Derivative Account.

- R' might be a retroactive and prospective amendment of R,
to the following effect: "No person shall desecrate a flag of the
United States, if in the course of doing so she commits trespass,
battery, arson, or pollution."
by

R',

If

so, X's sanction

is

authorized

and the court does not overturn that sanction as part of

its replacement of

R

with

R'.

FLAG DESECRATION is

not

ex

plained by the Derivative Account.

In

short, to explain the stylized cases, we need a view about

that is, a

remedial view.

R'

-

We need a view about the kind of revisions

to an unconstitutional rule that a reviewing court should promul
gate, once the court has determined that the rule fails a rule-validity
schema.
A remedial view will have two components. One component, as
the above examples suggest, is

temporal.

We need to decide

whether the amendment, extension, or repeal of R should be solely
prospective, retrospective as well as prospective, solely retrospec
tive, or perhaps some esoteric combination (for example, prospec
tive in general, retrospective for X as a incentive payment). This
temporal structure might be the same across rule-validity schema;
or it might vary from schema to schema. I noted earlier that the
concept of liberty, and therewith the Liberty Schema, is essentially
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forward-looking.409 A rule violates the Liberty Schema by coercing

feture actors not to perform some subclass of liberties such that,

all

things considered, the actors should be free to perform these. This
cuts in favor of a prospective-only view of

R',

at least for the Lib

erty Schema. On the other hand, an incentive argument may suffi
ciently explain why, for some X who is sanctioned pursuant to a
rule that (solely) fails the Liberty Schema, X's own sanction should
be overturned (and not just X's prospective duty, along with every

one else's) .410

It is well beyond the scope of this article to develop a specific
theory of the temporal structure of judicial remedies in constitu
tional cases. It is plausible - although

I will not develop or defend

a firm position on this - that the correct theory makes remedies at
least retroactive to the constitutional litigant. No less an authority
than Ronald Dworkin has sketched out the pragmatic grounds for
adjudicative retroactivity.
[I]f the pragmatist judge thinks the matter through, he will . . . reject
[the] technique of "prospective-only" rulemaking, except in very spe
cial circumstances. For he will realize that if this technique became
popular, people who might benefit from new, forward-looking rules
would lose their incentive to bring to court novel cases in which these
new rules might be announced for the future. People litigate such
cases {which is both risky and expensive) only because they believe
that if they succeed in persuading some judge that a new rule [for our
purposes, a new ruling that a statute, etc., is unconstitutional] would
be in the public interest, that new rule will be applied retrospectively
in their own favor.411

Further, the Discrimination Schema - in my view a central part of
constitutional law, along with the Liberty Schema - is
tially prospective.

The pattern of

sanctions

not

essen

produced by a law

prohibiting "the purchase of alcohol by men between eighteen and
twenty-one" or "the sacrifice of animals for religious purposes," or
"residential picketing by non-labor groups" is morally suboptimal.
Such a pattern obtains because state officials have followed a deci
sion rule that overweights the moral relevance of gender, religion,
or speech. And the same can be said about the pattern of sanctions
produced by ABORTION,

CHILD

PORNOGRAPHY, and FLAG DESE

CRATION, to the extent the rules here are seen to fail both the Lib409.

See supra

text accompanying notes 211-13.

410. See Jill E. F!Sch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110
HARv. L. REv. 1055, 1083 & n.172 (1997) (noting incentive argument for retroactivity of
judicial remedies).
411.

RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 156 (1986).
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erty Schema and the Discrimination Schema.412 Finally (although
this doctrinal point may well rest, in part, upon a robust view of
adjudication inconsistent with the Derivative Account) it is now
Supreme Court doctrine for both criminal and civil cases that the
federal courts cannot announce legal rights nonretroactively.413 For
all these reasons, it is likely or at least plausible that the remedies in
our stylized cases

will be retroactive;

there

will be no temporal bar

to overturning X's sanction, assuming his action A falls outside the
predicate of R'.
But will it? The second component of the remedial view is pred
a view about the appropriate judicial revision to the predi

icative:

cate of R. 414 The possibilities, here, are myriad but the two most
salient alternatives are as follows. First, the court might facially

validate

in

R: it might issue an utterance which renders R a nullity

(within the proper temporal range).415 This could be a permanent
nullification of R. More plausibly, though, the court's facial invali
dation of R will leave open the possibility that the body responsible
for issuing authoritative interpretations of R (be it an agency or a
state supreme court) can cure R's constitutional defects, and revive
its legal authority, through a narrowing interpretation.416 Second,
the court might

optimally revise

R. The court might promulgate

what it takes to be the morally optimal revision to R, whether that
be a facial invalidation, a partial invalidation, an extension, a partial
invalidation plus a partial extension, or a predicate-change without
a scope change - subject again perhaps to subsequent re-revision
by R's authoritative interpreter.417
412. See supra note 369 (discussing possibility of double violation).
413. See FISch, supra note 410, at 1059-63 (summarizing doctrine).
414. The classic discussion of this remedial issue remains Robert Stem, Separability and
Separability Clauses in the Supreme Court, 51 HARv. L. REv. 76, 82-106 (1937).
415. See Dorf, supra note 38, at 251-81 (discussing Court's actual use of facial invalidation
in various contexts, including free speech, privacy, and equal protection).

416. See Fallon, supra note 83, at 854-55 ("All that the Supreme Court says when it holds
a state statute overbroad, and all that it could say, is that the statute as authoritatively con
strued by the state courts prior to the Supreme Court's judgment is too sweeping to be en
forced through the imposition of civil or criminal penalties. Following the Court's decision, it
remains within the discretion of state authorities to seek limiting constructions of the affected
statute in state court actions for declaratory judgments."). This proviso is irrelevant where
the federal court is, itself, the body responsible for authoritatively construing the statute, see
id. at 853 n.3, although it is seriously questionable whether - given the Court's decision in
Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) - that is ever the case.
See, e.g., Dan Kahan, ls Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARv. L. REv. 469
(1996) (arguing for Chevron deference to Department of Justice with respect to federal crimi
nal statutes).
417. I stress that this is a salient possibility - the purest alternative to a facial
invalidation view. Obviously, there are intermediate possibilities between facial invalidation
and optimal revision, for example, that a court should either (1) prom.ulgate a standard type
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The moral considerations in favor of the facial-invalidation view
go to the epistemic benefits of specialization. Society is made bet
ter off, morally, by having different legal bodies specialize in differ
ent types of moral questions. 4 1 8 Plausibly, then, federal
constitutional courts should

only be legally responsible for deciding

whether a rule fails some rule-validity schema grounded in the Bill
of Rights; while legislatures, agencies, and other bodies responsible
for enacting or authoritatively interpreting rules should have the
task of choosing between alternative rules, all of which satisfy the
constitutional rule-validity schema.419 For example, the advocate of
this view will say, it is not the proper judicial role to decide whether
the rule in

.ALcoHoL

("no black person between eighteen and

twenty-one may purchase alcohol") should be extended to "no per
son between eighteen and twenty-one may purchase alcohol," or
repealed (leaving intact a background prohibition on alcohol
purchase by all persons under eighteen). Both of these alternatives
satisfy the Discrimination Schema and Liberty Schema, as does the
alternative of repealing both the rule

and the background prohibi
that is not a

tion; only one of these three is morally optimal, but

constitutional question. Rather, the court should facially invalidate
the racially discriminatory no-alcohol rule, leaving the choice be
tween the various racially neutral alternatives to the legislature or
agency. A constitutional reviewing court has no reliable basis to
make this latter choice - or so the advocate of facial invalidation
will argue.
The moral considerations in favor of the

optimal-revision

view

go to the moral losses that ensue from facial invalidation of rules.420
of narrowing amendment to R, if such amendment cures R; or (2) failing that, facially invali·
date R only if that is a moral improvement over R. Something like this intermediate possibil
ity seems, in fact, to map onto current remedial practices within the free speech case law.
The Court frequently relies here on facial invalidation, see infra note 425, but it does not do
so universally, see id. (citing partial invalidations), and the requirement of "substantial" over
breadth, see Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615-16 (1973), might be understood to
map onto (2). See also Note, The Firsi Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REv.
844, 882-911 (1970) (arguing for facial invalidation of substantially overbroad rules, except
where there exists a clear, per se category within free speech doctrine such that a judicial
narrowing of the rule to exempt that category cures the rule).
418. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 169, 282-86 (discussing epistemic basis for legal
authority).
419. For a recent and exemplary expression of this kind of view, see Reno v. ACLU, 117
S. Ct. 2329, 2350-51 (1997) (facially rather than partly invalidating law restricting speech on
internet, and arguing that to do otherwise would amount to an "invasion of the legislative
domain," absent a "clear line" for redrafting the statute evident from its text or legislative
history).
420. See, e.g., Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, 472 U.S. 491, 501-07 (1985) (stating that
partial, rather than facial invalidation is normally the proper judicial response to an unconsti
tutional statute); Stem, supra note 414, at 101 ("[In remedying unconstitutional statutes] the
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Facially invalidating the rule in ALcoHOL would leave persons be
tween eighteen and twenty-one free to purchase alcohol; facially
invalidating the rule in R.EsIDENTIAL PICKETING would leave
householders at the mercy of picketers; facially invalidating the rule
in CHILD PORNOGRAPHY would leave child pornographers free to
exploit children; facially invalidating the rule in ABORTION would
leave viable fetuses unprotected. These considerations are particu
larly pressing where the morally optimal revision of an unconstitu
tional rule is, or seems to be, a relatively small revision relative to
the set of actions covered by the rule. For example, the morally
optimal revision of a rule that picks out nonexpressive properties of
actions, but violates the Liberty Schema by encompassing speech
acts, is normally to exclude speech from the rule rather than to re
peal the rule entirely. No one wants to get rid of the trespass
laws,421 not even those who want proselytizers and political protes
ters to be free to trespass.
It is, again, beyond the scope of this article to choose among the
facial-invalidation view, the optimal-revision view, and something
in between. The issue merits an article on its own. Among other
difficulties,

I

should note that the appropriate view may well de- -

pend on the constitutional clause or rule-validity schema at stake;422
on the strategic incentives of actors who can secure facial, as op
posed to partial invalidations of rules;423 and on the existence of a
statutory or regulatory severability clause for R (guiding its revision
in the event R is held unconstitutional).424 Let me merely suggest
here that the facial-invalidation view is plausibly the correct one for
a substantial portion of the rules that reviewing courts review.
(This suggestion, like my temporal suggestion, is borne out by the
Court's actual practices: many, perhaps even most of the cases in
which the Court has sustained claims of constitutional right, against
conduct-regulating rules, have been facial invalidations rather than
Court should look to the policy sought to be effectuated by the statute and decide whether
that policy will be more nearly attained by partial application or by complete nullification of
the law.").
421.

See Alexander, supra note 7,

at 552.

422. See supra note 144 (discussing Court's reliance on as-applied challenges within free
speech, but not equal protection case law).
423. Cf. JERRY MAsHAw, GREED, CHAos AND GoVERNANCE 177 (1997) (noting, in
administrative-law context, that parties may use preenforcement review to thwart necessary
rulemaking, given the cheapness of preenforcement litigation as opposed to compliance).
424. See Stem, supra note 414, at 100-01. For recent discussions of severability clauses,
see Mark Movsesian, Severability in Statutes and Contracts, 30 GA. L. REv. 41 (1995); John
Copeland Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L. REv. 203 (1993); Adrian Vermeule, Saving
Constructions, 85 GEo. LJ. 1945 (1997).
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partial invalidations.425 And the Court has never, to my knowl
edge, extended a conduct-regulating rule.426) To the extent that the
facial-invalidation view holds good, we have a simple explanation of
the stylized cases. These rules go morally awry, breaching constitu
tional rule-validity schema. The reviewing court's legal role is to
repeal (facially invalidate) a rule that does so, rather than changing
the rule's predicate to what the court takes to be morally optimal.
particular, it is not the court's legal role to decide whether the
optimal cure of R encompasses X's particular action A. Therefore,

In

X has the legal right to trigger the complete repeal of rule

R

and

therewith the invalidation of his own sanction, quite independent of
whether X's

action happens

to

be

wrongful

under

another

description.
425. To check the frequency of facial invalidation, I identified and examined the cases
during the 10 Terms from 1987-88 to 1996-97 in which the Court invalidated conduct-regulat
ing rules against private parties, under the Free Speech Clause (leaving aside vagueness),
Free Exercise Clause, Equal Protection Clause, and the substantive component of the Due
Process Clause. I identified 23 such cases. Fourteen, a majority, are best categorized as facial
invalidations (i.e., cases where the Court invalidated an entire provision or sentence, an en
tire textually-defined portion thereof, or some other block of canonical text). See Reno v.
' ACLU, 117 S. Ct 2329 (1997); Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518
U.S. 727 (1996); 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996); Mcintyre v. Ohio Elec
tions Comm., 514 U.S. 334 (1995); Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994); Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992); Lee v. International Socy. for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. 830 (1992);
R.A.V. v. City of St Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the
N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417
(1990); Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989); Riley v. National Fedn. of
the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
Nine, a minority, are best categorized as partial invalidations. See Colorado Republican
Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S.
476 (1995); Ibanez v. Florida Dept. of Bus. & Profl. Regulation, 512 U.S. 136 (1994); Eden·
field v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410
(1993); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disci·
plinary Commn., 496 U.S. 91 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Shapero v. Ken·
tucky Bar Assn., 486 U.S. 466 (1988). Notably, all nine are free-speech cases.
Obviously, this is a small sample, and (even within this sample) categorizing judicial hold·
ings as facial versus partial invalidations involves some judgment, but the results still suggest
that many, perhaps even most of the Court's constitutional decisions sustaining rights-claims
against conduct-regulating rules are facial invalidations. I should stress that my definition of
"facial" invalidation, here - invalidating an entire rule, on some kind of text-based individu·
ation criterion - is considerably broader than the special definition appropriate for the no·
tion of "facial" invalidation within the context of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty and
other legislature-centered arguments for judicial restraint. See Adler, supra note 4, at 794
n.104.
426. See Kovacic, supra note 380, at 42. Cf. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 543
(1942) (holding unconstitutional a state statute providing for sterilization of habitual
criminals, under Equal Protection Clause, and remanding for state supreme court to decide
whether to cure unconstitutionality by extension or invalidation of statute); People v.
Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567 (N.Y. 1984) (holding unconstitutional state rape and sodomy statutes
exempting married persons and women, under Equal Protection Clause, and curing unconsti·
tutionality by extension).
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Is this appeal to judicial role question-begging? No and yes.
No, in the following sense.

In

this article, I have discussed various

possible legal practices - various specific conceptions of the legal
practice of judicial review. One possible practice is act-shielding:
constitutional courts determine whether particular actions should
be protected by legal shields and, if so, issue shielding orders. An
other possible practice is rule-centered: constitutional courts deter
mine whether particular rules should be invalidated and,

if so, issue

invalidation orders. The facial-invalidation practice is a specific
variant of this latter, rule-centered view; the optimal-revision prac
tice is another.

As between these various possible practices, we can

decide which one is morally optimal. Would a world in which
courts follow Practice1 be better or worse, morally, than a world in
which they follow Practicei? I assume there are good arguments in
favor of the rule-centered practice, since that is, in fact, ours; I fur
ther suggest that there are good arguments in favor of the facial
invalidation version of a rule-centered practice.
Let us assume these arguments are right. The facial-invalidation
practice is morally optimal, as between the various review-practices.
The Supreme Court, or some other body which possesses legal
power to define the practice of judicial review, promulgates this
one. It still remains an open

moral question why a particular judge,
adhere to this legally binding

faced with a particular litigant, should

(and, by hypothesis, morally optimal) practice.427 This is just the
problem of legal authority, in another guise. What if the particular
judge is a moral expert, and knows that about himself, and further
knows that X has done wrong, and finally knows that upholding X's
particular sanction is more important morally than invalidating the
particular rule

R

at stake, even though

in general a

(retrospective)

facial-invalidation practice is morally optimal? Nothing in my
moral arguments for the optimality of promulgating this practice
guarantees that each and every participant in the practice in fact
has conclusive, moral reason to adhere to it. How to generate
moral reasons at the participant-level, from moral reasons at the
practice-level, remains one of the deepest and most difficult ques
tions of jurisprudence. I will not try to answer

that question.

What

427. See SCHAUER, supra note 58, at 128-34, 129 (discussing "asymmetry of authority":
the existence of "a (good moral) reason for imposing" a rule does not, or may not, entail the
existence of "a (good moral) reason for obeying" it); Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, The
Deceptive Nature ofRules, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 1191 (1994) (discussing "asymmetry of author
ity" and concomitant use of "deception" by rule-formulator); see also Rawls, supra note 198,
at 3 (distinguishing between moral justification for a general practice, and moral justification
for a particular application of the practice).
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if our expert judge upholds X's sanction despite

the official promulgation of a retrospective, facial-invalidation prac
tice, the judge has acted

illegally.

He may have acted morally, but

the facial-invalidation practice, by its terms, contains no moral
escape clause) the judge has not honored X's legal rights.

(if

In

short: I cannot show, and will not suggest, that particular

judges, faced with particular litigants, always have conclusive moral
reason to honor the litigant's legal rights. What I might show, and
suggest, is that it is plausibly morally best for litigants to have

will

the following legal right: the legal right to trigger a retrospective
facial invalidation of rules that fail constitutional rule-validity
schema.
But what if this latter suggestion is wrong? The Supreme Court
does not universally follow a facial-invalidation practice. Some
times the Court partly invalidates rules instead of wholly repealing
them;428 and, albeit not in the case of conduct-regulating rules, the
Court sometimes remedies an unconstitutional rule by

extending

the rule's scope.429 I have synthesized these various alternatives, to
a facial-invalidation practice, with the notion of an optimal-revision
practice. Optimal revision, again, says this: the proper judicial rem
edy, upon a judicial determination that a rule

R

breaches one or

another constitutional rule-validity schema, is to issue an utterance
promulgating

(if

only temporarily, pending legislative or adminis

trative action) a rule
optimal revision to

If this practice

R',

which the court takes to be the morally

R.

(or something close to it) obtains, we will have a

RESIDENTIAL PICKETING and CHILD POR
The optimal R' in RESIDENTIAL PICKETING is likely a

difficult -time explaining
NOGRAPHY.

rule that prohibits "residential picketing," rather than no rule at
all;430 the optimal R' in

CmLo PORNOGRAPHY is likely a rule that is

tailored to cover obscene displays of naked children, rather than no
rule at all.431 Thus, in both these cases, the action A of our stylized
X remains covered by the optimal revision R'; it will not be the case
that X's sanction should be overturned, as part of the judicial issu
ance of R'. But the remaining cases can perhaps be explained, even
on an optimal-revision view. The optimal revision

R' of the rule in

See supra note 425.
See Kovacic, supra note 380, at 40-46.
430. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (upholding law banning residential
picketing).
431. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 112-14 (1990) (upholding rule designed to com
bat child pornography); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764-74 (1982) (same).
428.
429.
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ABORTION is likely "no person may procure an abortion of a viable

fetus except for maternal life or health" (or something narrower
than that), not "no person may procure an abortion of a viable fetus
except for maternal life or health, or an abortion of a non-viable
fetus by means of coercive threats." The optimal revision R' of the
rule in FLAG DESECRATION is likely a repeal, as opposed to "no
persons shall desecrate flags, if they do so by means of arson, bat
tery, or pollution." As for ALcoHoL, it seems that the optimal revi
sion R' is either a general extension of R to include all persons
between eighteen and twenty-one, or a repeal; it is not a rule that
provides, "persons between eighteen and twenty-one may not
purchase alcohol, if they do so fraudulently." Similarly, the optimal
revision R' in ANIMAL SACRIFICE is likely either a general exten
sion to prohibit the killing of any animals, or a repeal; it is

not a rule

that prohibits "the killing of pandas" or "cougars" or "eagles" (the
specific animal killed in ANIMAL SACRIFICE), given the existence of
a preexisting rule prohibiting the killing of endangered species.

If

repeal is morally better than general extension, in ALcoHOL and
ANIMAL SACRIFICE

-

and that is, at least, a real possibility - then

X's action in these cases

R',

will not be covered by the optimal revision
will have the legal right to have his sanction overturned.
me put the point this way. X's action A is harmful or

and he
Let

wrongful in our stylized cases; that is their very essence. But given
the epistemic limitations of actors and state officials, it is likely or at
least plausible that the optimal revision R' does not include A. This
is likely the case in FLAG DESECRATION and ABORTION, and may
well be the case in ANIMAL SACRIFICE and ALCOHOL (if, in fact,
the actions of animal-killing and alcohol-purchase-by-a-person
between-eighteen-and-twenty-one are, without more, not harmful
or wrongful). An action of battering flag-desecration is wrongful,
because it is battery, not because it is flag-desecration.
And enacting a rule that prohibits "flag-desecration by battery"

but only

would be silly. The existence of this rule would increase legal com
plexity, without apparent countervailing benefit. Given the episte
mic limitations of state officials and actors, legal complexity without
countervailing benefit is not morally indifferent, but morally nega
tive. (Speakers might be deterred from desecrating flags,

if

they

knew that the flag-desecration laws remained on the books with
various complex provisos.432)

Similarly for the remaining rules:

432. Cf. Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, supra note 83, at 883-84 (ar
guing that "rule of privilege" applied to revise overbroad statute must be sufficiently clear to
enable an actor to predict whether her conduct falls within revised rule).
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provisions that cover "abortions of non-viable fetuses, by means of
coercive threats," "the fraudulent purchase of alcohol by persons
between eighteen and twenty-one" or "the killing of pandas" would
not figure in the various

R',

because these hypothetical provisions

are not needed to cover any harmful or wrongful actions that other
wise would escape legal rules. If legal terms were costless to apply,
and if officials applied them perfectly, and if actors anticipated that
state officials would apply provisions perfectly, then the hypotheti
cal provisions would not matter, morally. But given the epistemic
limitations of actors and state officials, moral reason obtains not to
include the provisions in
stylized cases, X

R'. Therefore, for at least some of the
will plausibly have the legal right to overturn his

sanction, even though his action is wrongful or harmful, and even if
a court's legal role is to enact what it takes to be the morally opti
mal revision

R' of the

invalid rule

B.

R.

Institutional Objections

I have completed the moral defense of the Derivative Account.
Moral reason can obtain to change, in some measure, the predicate
of rules - specifically, of rules that fail the Liberty Schema or the
Discrimination Schema. This explains why the rules in our stylized
cases are unconstitutional. And, on plausible remedial views (such
as a retroactive facial-invalidation view or even a retroactive
optimal-revision view), X can have a legal right to secure the invali
dation of a rule, including his own sanction or duty, even

if X's very

action is properly sanctioned or coerced under a different descrip
tion. This explains why, on the facts of our stylized cases, the ac
tors' constitutional rights are violated.
What is there left for the defender of the Direct Account to say?
She might raise certain

institutional objections to the Derivative Ac

count.433 She might concede the moral plausibility of the account,
but argue that courts are the wrong institutions for invalidating
rules. Thus we must return to the Direct Account, however morally
implausible it might be.

In the remainder of this section, I will con

sider and rebut two institutional objections to the Derivative Ac
count: (1) that the concept of "adjudication" embodied in Article
III of the Constitution requires constitutional rights to be morally
433. On the importance of institutional considerations in shaping and limiting the prac·
tice of judicial review, see Adler, supra note 4, at 771-80; Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure:
The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1212, 1213-20
(1978); David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity ofProphylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 190, 190-95
(1988).
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direct, not morally derivative; and (2) that even if this is untrue, the
remedies employed by reviewing courts in constitutional cases are
too weak for the Derivative Account.

1. Article III and the Concept of Adjudication
Imagine that Congress enacts the following act, styled the "In
validation Act."

The Invalidation Act
Any person whose conduct is regulated by a state or federal
statute (currently in force) that is subject to a colorable chal
lenge under the First Amendment, the Equal Protection
Clause, or the Due Process Clause may,

if

subject to a clear

threat of prosecution under the statute, bring suit in federal
district court against the officials responsible for enforcing the
statute.

If the plaintiff adequately represents

the class of per

sons subject to the challenged statute, the court shall certify the
suit as a class action; shall hear the suit; and,

if the

court con

cludes that the challenged statute is morally invalid under the
First Amendment, etc., shall enter appropriate declaratory and
injunctive relief in favor of the class of persons subject to the
statute.
The position I am advancing in this article is that constitutional
rights, in general, are neither more nor less morally robust than the
legal rights conferred by this hypothetical Invalidation Act. The
Invalidation-Act plaintiff has the legal right to secure the judicial
invalidation of a (state or federal) statute that goes morally awry independent of the

full details of her own conduct and the strength

of her personal moral claim. My position is that constitutional
rights are, in general, legal rights with precisely this moral content.
As an initial matter one might object that constitutional
"rights," thus conceptualized, are not really rights at all. The objec
tion might be framed thus: Rights are, by definition, trumps; a
right, by definition, identifies some aspect of the rights-holder's

own moral position - for example, an important interest of hers, or
a valid claim she possesses under corrective or distributive justice
- that outweighs the general good.434 But surely the Derivative
434. Cf. DwoRKIN, TAKING R.IGHrS SERIOUSLY, supra note 1, at xi ("Individual rights are
political trumps held by individuals. Individuals have rights when, for some reason, a collec
tive goal is not a sufficient justification for . . . imposing some loss or injury upon them."). In
fact, I do not believe that Dworkin's subtle conceptualization of rights-as-trumps supports
the Direct Account. A rights-as-trumps thesis does so only if legal rights must incorporate
moral trumps. But to require this conflates the legal and the moral. See WELLMAN, supra
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Account should not be defeated at the definitional stage, through a
narrow and demanding definition of "rights." As I explained ear
lier, in Part I, my concept of a constitutional right is deliberately
catholic; it is designed to leave open, for substantive debate, the
merits of the Direct and Derivative Accounts. A constitutional
right, understood in this catholic sense, is simply a legal power to
secure the invalidation, in some measure, of a rule - of the rights
holder's own treatment under the rule, on the Direct Account, and
of the rule overall, on the Derivative Account. It is a legal "right"
in the broad sense of constituting a legal advantage: a Hohfeldian
position that is advantageous to the holder.435

If

the defender of the Direct Account insists that legal advan

tages are not truly rights unless they fit a more narrow and demand
ing definition, then my response is that "constitutional rights" are
not necessarily rights within the meaning of a more narrow and de
manding definition. Nothing in the so-called "Bill of Rights"436 a name the Constitution itself does not use - demands that the
legal mechanism by which to secure the values of free speech, free
exercise, equal protection, and due process must be a mechanism
that provides narrowly-defined rights to narrowly-defined rights
holders. Indeed, the relevant provisions of the "Bill of Rights" are
framed, not as "rights," but as moral constraints upon government
decisionmaking. The First Amendment says, "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press."437 The Fifth Amendment provides that "No person shall . . .
note 45, at 3-11 {distinguishing between legal and moral rights); DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY, supra note 1, at 90-94 {distinguishing between institutional and background
rights); id. at 94-95 (noting that an institutional right to free speech is possible within a back·
ground theory of utilitarianism).
In any event, my claim here does not rest upon the best exegesis of Dworkin's rights-as
trumps thesis, or the best understanding of "rights." If legal "rights" must indeed incorpo
rate moral trumps, then the Free Speech Clause, Free Exercise Clause, Equal Protection
Clause, and the substantive component of the Due Process Clause ground legal powers, and
other legal advantages for claimants, but not "rights."

435. See supra note 45; supra text accompanying notes 90-91.
436. Dworkin himself has taken some care on this textual point. See DWORKIN,
FREEDOM'S LAw, supra note 1, at 7 {"The clauses of the American Constitution that protect
individuals and minorities from government are found mainly in the so-called Bill of Rights
- the first several amendments to the document - and the further amendments added after
the Civil War."). But cf. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.").

437. U.S. CoNST. amend. I. The First Amendment goes on, of course, to refer to the
"right of the people peaceably to assemble," U.S. CONST. amend. I, but this cuts against the
Direct Account. If the advocate of the Direct Account wants to argue that {l) rights are
morally robust, and (2) the text of the Constitution creates morally robust rights, then the
First Amendment's reference to the "right" of assembly, but not the "right" of free speech or
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be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law."438 The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[no] State
[shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws."439 The Derivative Account is per
fectly consistent with these provisions, standing alone - that is,
taken apart from Article III of the Constitution.
The better objection to the Derivative Account is one that re
lies, not upon the concept of constitutional rights, but rather upon
the concept of adjudication embodied in Article III. What the De
rivative Account claims is not merely that
awry; and not merely that

(2)

(1)

rules can go morally

persons can possess legal powers

(which are "rights" in my catholic sense) to secure the invalidation
of rules that go morally awry; but further that (3) the rights-holder
is entitled to secure the invalidation of a morally invalid rule

federal court.

by a

How is this last part of the Derivative Account con

sistent with the institutional limits on federal courts that are set
forth by Article III of the Constitution? Article III constrains fed
eral courts to be adjudicatory bodies; it vests them with the ."judicial
Power of the United States,"440 and authorizes them only to hear
"Cases" or " Controversies."441 How is it consistent with Article III,
and the concept of adjudication therein embodied, to conceptualize
the practice of judicial review by federal courts as th.e invalidation
of rules?
This question brings us back to my hypothetical Invalidation
Act. The Invalidation Act creates a mechanism by which federal
courts effectively invalidate rules: the anticipatory class-action that
culminates in a declaratory judgment and injunction. A declaratory
judgment and injunction against an invalid rule, when entered in
favor of the entire

class

of persons subject to the rule, will operate

roughly like a repeal of the rule: this remedy will rescind the legal
authority of enforcement officials to prosecute

anyone for violating

the rule, and will preclude future courts, under the principle of res

free exercise, hardly supports claim (2) with respect to free speech or free exercise. Tue best
that its advocate can say is that the First Amendment was loosely drafted.
438. U.S. CoNST. amend. V.
439. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV.
440. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish.").
441. See U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2.
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judicata, from sanctioning actors pursuant to the rule.442 Further,
the Invalidation-Act mechanism appears to comport with the vari
ous Article III constraints upon federal courts. The plaintiff's suit
will be constitutionally ripe, because the duty of compliance with
the challenged rule, backed by a clear threat of prosecution for its
breach, constitutes an immediate setback for her.443 The plaintiff
will have standing, because she can "allege personal injury fairly
traceable to the defendant's unlawful conduct" - the setback to
her own interests constituted by the sanction-backed duty that the
rule imposes upon her - such that this setback is "likely to be re
dressed by the requested relief."444 The suit will not be moot or
advisory, because the challenged rule is currently in force.445 Fi
nally, the plaintiff class-action has become a standard446 and consti-

442. See Fallon, supra note 83, at 880-81, 902-03 (discussing legal force of classwide relief
in constitutional challenges to state statutes); David Shapiro, State Courts and Federal Declar
atory Judgments, 14 Nw. U. L. REv. 759, 777-79 {1979) (same). My claim here about the legal
force of classwide relief should be qualified by a point I alluded to above, see supra text
accompanying notes 416-17: the classwide declaratory judgment and injunction may explic
itly, and arguably should implicitly, leave open the possibility of a salvaging narrowing con
struction of the rule by its authoritative interpreter.
443. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fedn., 497 U.S. 871, 891 {1990) {"The major exception
[to ripeness constraints on preenforcement review] is a substantive rule which as a practical
matter requires the plaintiff to adjust his conduct immediately. Such agency action is 'ripe'
for review at once . . . ." (citing Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967))). The Abbott
Laboratories ripeness test also looks to the temporal fitness of the legal issues raised by the
claimant, see 387 U.S. at 149, but this latter component of ripeness is arguably prudential not
constitutional, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 290, § 2.4.1, at 116, and in any event the ques
tion whether the challenged rule satisfies a constitutional rule-validity schema is temporally
"fit." I have added the proviso that there be a "clear threat" of prosecution, so as to assure
the ripeness of the preenforcement Invalidation-Act suit even under a ripeness doctrine
more stringent than current doctrine. See infra text accompanying notes 587-98 (further dis
cussing ripeness).
444. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) {"The requirement of standing
has
a core component derived directly from [Article III of] the Constitution. A plaintiff must
allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and
likely to be redressed by the requested relief."). On the existence of standing for the Invali
dation-Act plaintiff, which hypothetical statute I will argue below just embodies the over
breadth doctrine, see Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, supra note 83, at
847-48 ("An overbreadth claimant must ask that normal rules of standing be relaxed, only if
'standing' is taken to include canons about the kinds of constitutional claims a party may
raise, as well as such basic requisites of a justiciable controversy as actual grievance and a
lively dispute. The former conception of standing is not a deduction from article III." (foot
note omitted)); Fallon, supra note 83, at 868-69 (same).
. • .

445. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 290, §§ 2.2, 2.5 (discussing Article III
prohibitions on a federal court's issuance of an advisory opinion, or its adjudication of a moot
dispute).
446. See Shapiro, supra note 442, at 777 (noting, but criticizing, frequent use of class
action device in constitutional challenges to state statutes).
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tutionally unremarkable447 device by which federal courts properly
consolidate the adjudication of legal rights.448
Nonetheless, it might be objected, the Invalidation Act violates
Article ill. The violation is subtle, but important - or so the de
fender of the Direct Account might argue. The argument would
run as follows: "The legal rights that federal courts adjudicate must,
by virtue of Article ill , have a minimally robust moral content.
Where a plaintiff P1 brings a meritorious nonclass suit in federal
court against some defendant D, claiming a violation of a legal
right, and seeking a remedy that benefits only her, the following
holds true: there exists a moral reason sufficient to provide P1 that
remedy, independent of the remedies provided to other plaintiffs
Pi, P3
Pn against D or against other defendants. The ancient,
common-law rights that courts classically adjudicate - the com
mon-law right of an injured person to collect damages from a
tortfeasor; the common-law right of a disappointed promisee to col
lect damages from the breaching promisor - do indeed have this
kind of robust moral content. These common-law rights are the ex
emplars for the types of legal rights that federal courts may permis
sibly adjudicate. Now, if there exists a class of plaintiffs Pb Pi, P3
. . . Pn such that each P; standing alone can advance a robust legal
right against the same defendant D, and there are common issues of
law or fact, the federal courts can consolidate the plaintiffs' suits
through the class-action device. But it would subvert the very con
cept of adjudication, and the constraints set forth in Article III, to
aggregate the moral claims of the class of persons purportedly rep
resented by the Invalidation-Act plaintiff, and effectuate a remedy
that is morally justified in the aggregate - repealing a morally
invalid rule - even though the plaintiff herself may have no moral
claim to a personal remedy." Or so the argument might go.449
It is plausible to think that the classic, common-law rights of the
injured tort victim, or the disappointed promisee, do indeed have a
fairly robust moral content. Consider, for example, the corrective
justice theory of tort law that Jules Coleman has recently <;lefended
•

•

•

447. See, e.g., Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 697-706 (1979) (upholding certification
of nationwide class and entry of injunctive relief in suit, predicated on Due Process Clause,
against federal agency).
448. See generally Douglas Laycock, Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The
Need for Prospective Relief, 1977 SUP. CT. REv. 193 (describing and defending federal pro
spective relief -including class relief - against state criminal statutes).
449. See Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Offi
cials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys Genera� 88 CoLUM. L. REv. 247, 309-12
(1988) (noting possible Article III objections to the adjudication of a class action, where
individual class members do not, standing alone, have justiciable cases).
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in his book Risks and Wrongs.45° Coleman argues, plausibly, that
the plaintiff's legal claim in a classic torts case has the following
moral content: the plaintiff P claims that the defendant D is a
moral wrongdoer who has the distinct moral responsibility, by vir
tue of corrective justice, to repair the losses to P that her wrongdo
ing has occasioned.
In the typical action tort suits bring victim-plaintiffs together with
injurer-defendants, and only within this structure do questions regard
ing who should bear a particular accident's costs arise. That is, the
goals of tort law are pursued only within a structure of case-by-case
adjudication between individual victims and their respective injurers.
It is not as if victims are free to bring suit against anybody. Normally,
the victim is not free to �rgue that he should be compensated for his
loss by someone simply because that person is a good risk spreader or
reducer. . . . Instead, the injurer is held liable simply because she is
responsible for the loss. She is the one who has the duty in corrective
justice to make good the loss.451

We might construct a parallel corrective-justice account for the
contract-law rights or property-law rights that courts classically ad
judicate.452 But it would be mistake, I suggest, for constitutional
scholars to extrapolate from the private-law analogy and insist that
court-enforced constitutional rights must be equally robust. The
concept of adjudication, insofar as it figures in Article III, does not
require the legal rights that federal courts adjudicate to possess the
kind of moral content that private-law rights typically, or some
times, possess.
In defending the Derivative Account from the Article III objec
tion, I will rely upon the view of Article III famously developed by
Owen Fiss, most trenchantly in his 1978 article The Forms of Jus
tice. 453 Fiss's aim in The Forms ofJustice was to vindicate what he
called the "structural reform"454 suit: the kind of suit, exemplified
by desegregation suits against school systems and by prison-reform
litigation, "in which a judge, confronting a state bureaucracy over
values of constitutional dimension, undertakes to restructure the
organization to eliminate a threat to those values posed by the pres
ent institutional arrangements. The injunction is the means by
450. CoLEMAN, supra note 189.
451. Id. at 374.
452. Cf. Moore, supra note 171, at 182 (grouping together deontological theories of the
institutions of punishment, tort compensation, property, and contract as alternatives to utili·
tarian accounts of these institutions).
453. FISs, supra note 20. A contemporaneous article that, like Fiss's, famously rejects a
dispute-resolution view of federal adjudication, is Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in
Public Law Litigation, 89 HAR.v. L. REv. 1281 (1976).
454. Fiss, supra note 20, at 2.
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which these reconstructive directives are transmitted."455 Specifi
cally, Fiss wanted to vindicate the procedural devices characteristic
to the structural-reform suit - the class-action form, and the entry
of a permanent injunctive decree against the defendant bureaucracy
(by which to create an ongoing supervisory role for the federal
judge).456
Fiss's analysis of the class action helps the Derivative Account
tremendously. As Fiss put it: "The victim of a structural suit is not
an individual, but a group."457
Once we take the group perspective on the victim, it . . . becomes
clear that the spokesman need not - indeed, cannot - be the victim.
A group needs people to speak on its behalf. An individual member
of the victim group can be a spokesman, but there is no reason why
individual membership should be required, or for that mat�er even
preferred . . . .
. . . [Thus] certain technical qualifications for the victim - that he
be subject to a risk of future harm, or that he be subject to irreparable
injury - need not be satisfied by the spokesman. For the structural
suit it is sufficient if these requirements are satisfied by the victim
group. What the court must ask of the spokesm� is whether he is an
adequate representative . . . .458

The Fissian view - of the structural-reform plaintiff as a represen
tative for a class of persons to whom the state has done moral injury
- is just the kind of view set forth by the Derivative Account.459
But how can we square this representative conception of the struc
tural-reform plaintiff with the concept of adjudication and the re
quirements of Article III? Fiss's answer was to reconceptualize
adjudication itself - to deny that a more traditional conception,
what Fiss called the "dispute-resolution" view of adjudication, was
the right one.
Id.
See id. at 18-22, 27-28, 44-58.
457. Id. at 19.
458. Id. at 19-20 (footnotes omitted).

455.
456.

459. With the exception, of course, that the Derivative Account need not include a
FISsian conceptualization of the class as a "group" in the strong sense of FISs's work on equal
protection. See FISs, supra note 20, at 147-70 (defining groups as "natural" entities distinct
from their members, and defending "group-disadvantaging principle"). For example, the
class of persons protected by the plaintiff who challenges a rule that violates the Liberty
Schema is simply those persons within the scope of the rule who are coerced not to perform
actions that, constitutionally, they should be free to perform. See supra text accompanying
notes 315-33 (discussing Liberty Schema). They need not, and likely do not, have a "group"
identity in FISs's strong sense. And indeed, while FISs adverts to this strong conceptualization
of groups in The Forms ofJustice, he also weakens it somewhat. See Fiss, supra note 20, at 19
(noting that group benefitted by structural-reform suit may have an identity apart from the
suit-targeted institution, or may be defined in terms of the institution, e.g., as "welfare
recipients").
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There is nothing in the text of article III
in the rather incidental use
of the words "cases" or "controversies" - that constitutionally con
stricts the federal courts to dispute resolution. The late eighteenth
century was the heyday for the common law, and . . . the function of
courts under the common law was paradigmatically not dispute reso
lution, but to give meaning to public values through the enforcement
and creation of public norms, such as those embodied in the criminal
law and the rules regarding property, contracts, and torts. . . . The
judicial function implied by contemporary constitutional litigation, of
which structural reform is part, is continuous with and maybe even
identical to that of the common law.460
-

In short, for Fiss, "[t]he function of a judge is to give concrete
meaning and application to our constitutional values."461
Think of this as a custodial, rather than a structural view of adju
dication.462 On the Fissian view, the legal body we call a "court" is
defined by the particular moral criteria that are entrusted to this
body for protection and care - what Fiss calls "constitutional val
ues" or "public values"463 - and not by the particular moral rela
tions that may obtain between plaintiffs and defendants, or by the
fact that judicial activity may be occasioned by concrete disputes.
Now, I should emphasize that the exponent of the Derivative
Account need not adopt a wholly Fissian view of adjudication and
the requirements of Article III. Fiss's claim is particularly strong.
He claims that "adjudication" is nothing but a custodial concept,
and that Article III constrains federal courts only to eschew those
procedures and devices that undermine their care for and protec
tion of "constitutional values."464 This may or may not be true, but,
in any event, all that the Derivative Account requires is a weaker
claim: The concept of adjudication, standing alone, does not take
lexical priority, over the custodial role offederal courts, in the inter
pretation of Article III. Imagine that the concept of adjudication,
standing alone, does entail a robust moral relation between plaintiff
and defendant of the kind Coleman describes. Even so, Article III
cannot be read on its own, any more than other constitutional pro460. FlSs, supra note 20, at 36-37 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
461. Id. at 9.
462. See id. at 36 (distinguishing between "form" and "function" of adjudication, and

giving conceptual priority to latter).

463. See generally id. at 5-17 (defending "public values" or "constitutional values" view of
adjudication).
464. See id. at 13 (defending certain formal features of adjudication, e.g., existence of
judicial opinion, and absence of judge's control over her agenda, as integral to judicial
function).
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visions.465 Federal courts have the dominant or at least a co-equal
role466 in safeguarding, from governmental infringement, the parts
of morality set forth with sufficient specificity in the Bill of
Rights.467 Article ID should not be interpreted to compromise this
role in a serious way. But I have demonstrated that the Direct Ac
count does indeed seriously dilute and compromise the moral crite
ria set forth in the Bill of Rights. Therefore, the Derivative
Account does not violate Article III, all things considered.
I have formulated the argument this way so as to avoid a lengthy
detour into the theory of adjudication. Fiss might be right: the con
cept of adjudication must just be custodial. Or, Fiss might be
wrong, but the proper non-custodial concept might not entail a ro
bust moral relation between plaintiff and defendant. (For example,
in his well-known article The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 468
Lon Fuller focuses upon participation as the essential ingredient of
adjudication - "[a]djudication is a process of decision that grants
to the affected party a form of participation that consists in the op
portunity to present proofs and reasoned arguments"469 - and not
upon the moral robustness of the participants' legal claims.) The
exponent of the Derivative Account can, if she wishes, develop a
matching theory of adjudication. I will not try to do that, for my
point is that - given the moral flaws in the Direct Account - Arti
cle III and the Bill of Rights should not, jointly, be read to require
it.
Note that a negative response to the Article III objection is
well-supported by existing doctrines. If the Article III objection
holds true, then my hypothetical Invalidation Act is unconstitu
tional. But of course the Invalidation Act is not unconstitutional!
465. See generally CHAru.Es L. BLACK, STRUCIURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CoNsTITU
TIONAL LAW (1965) (arguing that the Constitution should be read holistically, not as se
quence of discrete provisions).
466. The advocate of judicial supremacy will say that courts have the dominant role. The
advocate of departmentalism will say that other institutions, such as Congress, or the Presi
dent, have a coequal role. See infra text accompanying notes 503-05 (discussing depart
mentalism). The Derivative Account is consistent with both. See id. But to accord courts
the truncated role accorded by the Direct Account - safeguarding the epistemic rights of
particular claimants - while Congress and the President repeal or amend rules that do
nonepistemic wrong, is to make courts neither dominant nor coequal.
467. Let me emphasize again that the originalism-nonoriginalism debate, and other such
debates about the requisite specificity, etc., of constitutionalized moral criteria, see Adler,
supra note 4, at 780-85, are independent of the debate between direct and derivative views of
constitutional rights. The advocate of the Derivative Account can, if she wishes, demand a
highly specific textual warrant for the criteria that courts enforce against rules, and require
them to enforce the Framers' rather than their own conceptions of those criteria.
468. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits ofAdjudication, 92 HARv. L. REv. 353 (1978).
469. Id. at 369.
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This hypothetical act is simply the First Amendment overbreadth
doctrine in a thin disguise. The legal rights held by Invalidation Act
plaintiffs have precisely the moral content of the legal rights that
federal courts actually

do

enforce, under the rubric of the over

breadth doctrine. The official exegesis of that doctrine runs as
follows:
It has long been recognized that the First Amendment needs
breathing space and that statutes attempting to restrict or burden the
exercise of First Amendment rights must be narrowly drawn and rep
resent a considered legislative judgment that a particular mode of ex
pression has to give way to other compelling needs of society . . . .
Litigants, therefore, are permitted to challenge a statute not because
their own rights offree expression are violated, but because of a judi
cial prediction or assumption that the statute's very existence may
cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally pro
tected speech or expression.
The consequence [of the overbreadth doctrine] is that any en
forcement of a statute [declared overbroad] is totally forbidden until
and unless a limiting construction or partial invalidation so narrows it
as to remove the seeming threat or deterrence to constitutionally pro
tected expression.470

Thus the Court in Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the font of current over
breadth doctrine.471 To be sure, that doctrine is seen as an "excep
tion" to the normal type of constitutional right - the overbreadth
litigant is seen to rely, exceptionally, upon the moral claims of other
persons covered by the statute she challenges, rather than upon her
own moral claims - but my point here is that this purported excep
tion must nonetheless be consistent with Article III. Exceptional or
not, the overbreadth doctrine conceives the litigant as holding a
legal power to secure the invalidation of the rule under which she
falls, despite the absence of moral reason to protect

her.

Indeed, the idea of courts invalidating statutes goes back well
before the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, which entered
the Court's jurisprudence after the New Deal. The idea was suffi
ciently entrenched, by

1935,

to prompt the legal scholar Oliver

Field to write an entire treatise on the topic,

constitutional Statute.

The Effect of an Un

Field began the treatise by observing that:

470. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-13 (1973) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
471. For similar statements by the Court, which go both to the proposition that the over
breadth claimant is not asserting his own moral claims and to the related proposition that an
overbreadth holding prevents the enforcement of the invalidated statute against anyone, see
cases cited supra note 148. The classic scholarly statement of this view is Note, The First
Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, supra note 83, at 844-47, 852-58.
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"For over a hundred years, state and federal courts in the United
States have been declaring statutes unconstitutional."472 Field con
trasted the view that a statute declared unconstitutional is "void ab
initio" - "entirely abrogated, except for the formality of a re
peal"473 - with the view that courts merely invalidate the applica
tion of statutes to particular litigants. Strikingly, Field found the
first view to be dominant.474 As Field put it: "It is no exaggeration
to say that this theory that an unconstitutional statute is void ab
initio is the traditional doctrine of American courts as to the effect
of an unconstitutional statute."475 And he continued: "[U]nder the
void ab initio view . . . the rule is properly applied that a statute,
once declared unconstitutional, need not be pleaded and assailed in
subsequent cases. "476
To be sure, specifying the conditions under which courts exer
cise the sweeping power described by Field has, both before and
since the New Deal, been a matter of some dispute. In particular,
there has been a heated and long-running controversy about the
conditions for federal judicial invalidation of state statutes.477 The
dispute goes back to the Court's 1908 decision in Ex parte Young,478
which crafted an Eleventh Amendment fiction to permit federal
courts to enjoin state officials from enforcing statutes. It continued,
in the pre-New Deal period, with the enactment of three-judge
court acts (requiring injunctions to be entered by panels of judges,
rather than a single federal judge) and then the passage of the De
claratory Judgment Act479 (intended in part as a less coercive tech
nique for judicial invalidation of state statutes).480 And it was
carried forward, in the post-New Deal period, with the line of cases
from Dombrowski v. Pfister481 to Younger v. Harris482 to, finally,
472. OLIVER P. FIELD, THE EFFECT OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE 1 (1935).
473. Id. at 10.
474. See id. at 2-8.
475. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
476. Id. at 4.
477. See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 134-36
(1991) (describing this long-running controversy).
478. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
479. 28

u.s.c. §§ 2201-02 (1994).

480. See Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 112-15 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (discussing history and purpose of three-judge-court acts and Declara
tory Judgment Act).
481. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
482. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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Steffel v. Thompson, 483 and Wooley v. Maynard484 (all of which con
cern the proper timing of federal injunctive and declaratory relief
against the state).485 But this dispute merely proves my point. Its
fervor simply reflects the fact that a federal court's entry of a de
claratory or injunctive order prohibiting the enforcement of a state
statute, in a class-action suit or even (as we shall see in a moment)
in an individual suit, will effectively repeal the targeted statute.
The Court, in crafting the First Amendment overbreadth doc
trine, combined the judicial power to invalidate statutes, with the
notion that invalidation might be justified at the instance of a liti
gant whose own moral claims were attenuated. "[A]n individual
whose own speech or expressive conduct may validly be prohibited
or sanctioned is permitted to challenge a statute on its face because
it also threatens others not before the court - those who desire to
engage in legally protected expression but who may refrain from
doing so rather than risk prosecution . . . . "486 The proper scope of
this "exceptional" doctrine has, again, been a matter of considera
ble dispute: from the initial enthusiasm during the Warren Court,
to the Burger Court's retrenchment in cases such as Broadrick v.
Oklahoma487 and Brockett v. Spokane Arcades488 that require "sub
stantial" rather than merely some overbreadth.489 But the dispute
about the scope of overbreadth - among the Justices and among
constitutional scholars writing in this area490 - has generally taken
for granted the permissibility of some such doctrine, under Article
III.
To put the point another way: the official view sees constitu
tional rights as morally robust, but it does not see this robust cast as
entailed by Article III. The Direct Account is traditional, in main
taining the robust content of constitutional rights; but an Article Ill
defense of the Direct Account would dramatically revise the official
view, and rescind doctrines (such as overbreadth491) that presume
483. 415 U.S. 452 {1974).
484. 430 U.S. 705 {1977).
485. See CHEMERINsKY, supra note 290, ch. 13 {discussing Younger abstention, and avail·
ability of federal declaratory and injunctive relief absent pending state proceeding, as per
Steffel and Wooley).
486. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, 472 U.S. 491, 503 {1985).
487. 413 U.S. 601 {1973).
488. 472 U.S. 491 (1985).
489. See Redish, supra note 83 {describing this history).
490. See sources cited supra note 83.
491. Other "prophylactic" constitutional doctrines, such as the exclusionary rule, may be
similar to overbreadth, in conferring a legal right upon one person so as to protect the moral
rights of others. See Fallon, supra note 83, at 869 n.96 {discussing ubiquity of prophylactic
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the permissibility of morally minimal litigants. For the reasons

I

have discussed - the reasons most trenchantly articulated by Fiss
- the official view of Article III is right.

2.

The Strength of Judicial Remedies

The second institutional objection to the Derivative Account is
that the remedies employed by reviewing courts, in constitutional
cases, are too weak: the judicial decision simply reverses the treat
ment pursuant to a rule of a particular litigant, and does not gener
ally rescind the legal authority of state officials to enforce the rule,
or generally relieve actors of the duty to comply with it. This sec
ond objection is easily parried, now that

I

have rebutted the first

and deeper objection: that judicial invalidation of rules at the in

stance of morally minimal litigants violates Article III and the con
cept of adjudication therein embodied. Given the failure of the first

objection, the second objection becomes merely technical. For the
various kinds of constitutional cases in the federal courts - class
action cases, Supreme Court cases that are not class-actions, and
non-class cases in the lower federal courts

-

I

simply need to ex

plain how the remedies entered in these cases operate to repeal the
rules against which those remedies are targeted. The question,
now, is not whether courts

can

(consistent with Article

do.
I will

III)

invali

date rules, but merely how they
For the sake of simplicity,

focus on the techniques by

which federal courts invalidate state or federal statutes. My analysis
readily extends to the invalidation of non-statutory rules (for exam
ple, regulations enacted by state or federal agencies, or rules an
nounced in administrative adjudications) but because the thrust of
this article is theoretical, not technical, a discussion of the most sali
ent type of rule-invalidation - the invalidation of statutes should suffice.492 Further, because the standard judicial remedy
with respect to conduct-regulating rules (at least as evidenced by
Supreme Court case law) is a facial or partial invalidation, not an
extension,

I will

not belabor matters by discussing the issue of ex

tension here.
Let us begin with the easiest case: a class-action suit in the fed
eral courts that challenges a state or federal statute on constiturules in constitutional law); Strauss, supra note 433 (same). Certainly the jus tertii doctrine is
similar to overbreadth in this way. See infra text accompanying notes 558-72 (discussing jus

terti1).
492. See Adler, supra note 4, at 806-10 (emphasizing that judicial review is not solely or
mainly comprised by the invalidation of statutes).

146

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 97:1

tional grounds and that terminates with declaratory and perhaps
injunctive relief. T,b.e declaratory judgment - to the effect that the
statute is either facially invalid, or partly invalid to the extent speci
fieg in the court's judgment493
will under accepted principles of
res judicata, protect the class members from being sanctioned pur
suant to the (invalidated portion of the) statute, in any subsequent
enforcement suits that state officials might try to bring.494 If the
Derivative Account is correct, then the following also holds true:
this class-wide declaratory judgment should be taken by enforce
ment officials as rescinding their legal authority to enforce the stat
ute (within its invalidated scope), and by actors (within that scope)
as rescinding their duty to comply with the statute. The declaratory
judgment may or may not be accompanied by a permanent injunc
tion - the effect of which would be to back up the court's rescis
sion of official authority, with the clear threat of criminal or civil
sanctions for contempt of court if state enforcement officials ignore
the rescission.495 It remains open to debate, within the Derivative
Account, whether injunctions should normally accompany declara
tions when courts invalidate statutes. (The Derivative Account will
reject a conceptual attack on injunctions, to the effect that courts
lack the power to rescind the powers of state officials, but there
might be pragmatic grounds against routine injunctive relief.496)
Further, the class-wide declaratory judgment, with or without in
junction, will not operate as a precise repeal of the targeted statute,
in the following sense: As scholars such as Richard Fallon and
David Shapiro have quite properly emphasized, this remedy should
not necessarily be taken to prevent enforcement officials from se
curing (through means other than an enforcement suit) an authori
tative and narrowing interpretation of the statute, from the bodies
responsible for interpreting it, that renders the thus-narrowed stat
ute constitutionally valid.497 But the Derivative Account can read-

,

493. See Shapiro, supra note 442, at 767 (noting this possibility).
494. See id. at 762-70 (generally discussing res judicata effect, for parties to a non·class
federal declaratory suit, of a declaratory judgment holding a state statute to be partly or
wholly unconstitutional); id. at 777-79 (extending discussion to class actions).
495. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 471 (1974) (noting that " 'noncompliance
[with a declaratory judgment] . . . is not contempt' " (quoting Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82,
126 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part))).
496. See 415 U.S. at 460-72 {describing differences between declaratory judgments and
injunctions, in particular less coercive cast of former).
497. See Fallon, supra note 83, at 854-55, 898-903; Shapiro, supra note 442, at 768-70.
Shapiro and Fallon agree - consistent with the Derivative Account - that the curative
effect of this narrowing interpretation should only be prospective.
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ily incorporate this point:498 the truly optimal response to a statute
that goes morally awry might be not its facial invalidation, nor the
revision R' that the reviewing court takes to be optimal, but the re
revision that the statute's authoritative interpreter subsequently
chooses under the rubric of statutory interpretation.
What about a non-class case that reaches the Supreme Court perhaps an appeal from a state or federal enforcement action, or
perhaps an appeal from a individual's declaratory or injunctive suit
in state or federal court? Here, too, the Derivative Account is
straightforward. A holding by the Supreme Court that a state or
federal statute is facially or partly invalid operates to rescind the
legal authority of enforcement officials and lower courts to apply
the statute (within the invalidated portion) to anyone, at least pend
ing an authoritative narrowing construction of the statute. Profes
sor Fallon, in his thorough recent study on overbreadth, explains:
"Supreme Court ho�dings of overbreadth . . . should confer immu
nity on all conduct occurring after the judgment is entered and
before a constitutionally adequate narrowing construction is ob
tained."499 The doctrinal basis for Fallon's rightful confidence in
the authority of the Supreme Court to invalidate state or federal
statutes is the Court's famous announcement in Cooper v. Aaron.500
The Court in Cooper, in the face of a defiant refusal by the
Arkansas authorities to desegregate the Arkansas schools, an
nounced that the holding of Brown

v.

Board of Education was bind

ing law for government officials everywhere, not just for the
particular parties in

Brown.

[T]he federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the
Constitution, and that principle has . . . been respected by this Court
and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our con
stitutional system. It follows that the interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the
supreme law of the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of
binding effect on the States "any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."501
498. As it can the proposition that a federal court should perhaps abstain, pending con
struction of the statute by its authoritative interpreter, or certify the interpretive question to
that body. See generally Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 117 S. Ct. 1055, 1072-74
(1997) (discussing techniques of certification and "Pullman" abstention to obtain authorita
tive constructions of state statutes challenged in federal courts on constitutional grounds).
499. Fallon, supra note 83, at 908. Professor Shapiro, who shares Professor Fallon's skep
ticism about the scope of judicial remedies in non-class suits in the lower federal courts,
agrees with Fallon about the broad scope of a Supreme Court holding. See Shapiro, supra
note 442, at 777.
500. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
501. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18.
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means that the Court's constitutional utterance has far

greater scope than, as a matter of res judicata alone, it should: the
utterance binds the world.
In recent years, the

Cooper doctrine has ignited a fair amount of

scholarly controversy. One, radical objection is that courts simply
cannot bind non-parties.s02 This objection trades upon a conceptual
point about "adjudication" and Article III, of the kind that, I have
already argued, we should reject. The second, less radical objection
points to the co-equal and "dialogic" role of institutions other than
the Supreme Court - for example Congress, or state legislatures
- in interpreting the Constitution.so3 The Derivative Account can
readily incorporate this less radical objection. It is consistent with
the Account to stipulate that Congress can permissibly engage in
constitutional dialogue with the Court by re-enacting the very same
statute that the Court has previously invalidated; or even perhaps
that the President can trigger a dialogue on his own, by directing
the Department of Justice to enforce an invalidated statute.504
What is inconsistent, and implausible, is the claim that govemmen·
tal bodies beneath this top tier - specifically, enforcement agencies
operating in the absence of a legislative, presidential or gubemato·
rial mandate to defy the Supreme Court, and lower state or federal
courts - are also free to ignore the Court's utterances, when the
Court declares statutes to be constitutionally invalid.sos
We come, finally, to the toughest case for the Derivative Ac·
count: a non-class case in the lower federal courts, whether an en·
502. For opposition to Cooper that trades upon a general opposition to the idea of judi
cial decisions binding non-parties (as against a specific opposition to decisions binding certain
institutions, e.g., legislatures), see Edwin Meese, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TuL. L.
REv. 979 (1987); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations
for Judgments, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 43 (1993). See also Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most
Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 272-76, 274-84
(1994) (arguing that judicial decisions do not bind executive branch with respect to nonpar
ties, but also asserting that judicial judgments are not binding against executive).
503. See RoBERT BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CoNFLicr (1992). For an overview of
departmentalism, including this less radical, "dialogic" view, see Walter F. Murphy, Who
Shall Interpret? The Quest for the Ultimate Constitutional Interpreter, 48 REv. PoL. 401
(1986).
504. Note, however, that a departmentalist who espouses some degree of Presidential
autonomy in interpreting the Constitution need not go so far. See Frank H. Easterbrook,
Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 905, 906-11, 913-16 (1989-90) (distinguishing
between less and more controversial types of presidential nonacquiescence).
505. I should note that Professors Estreicher and Revesz - the leading proponents of
federal agency nonacquiescence - are specifically concerned \vith agency nonacquiescence
in statutory decisions by federal courts, and have been unwilling to extend their arguments to
support agency nonacquiescence on constitutional matters. See Samuel Estreicher & Richard
Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 720 & n.214
(1989).
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forcement action, or a declaratory and injunctive action by the
claimant in federal district court, or an administrative review pro
ceeding commenced in the federal court of appeals, or a habeas suit
in district court. The difficulty here is that:

(1)

as a matter of res

judicata, the lower federal court's purported invalidation of the
statute (even in the shape of an injunction prohibiting its enforce
ment) binds state officials only with respect to the claimant, not
with respect to the other actors covered by the statute;506 and (2)

Cooper v. Aaron does not apply.507 As Professor Fallon notes, in
the case of a purported lower-court invalidation of a state statute
for overbreadth:
Because state courts and lower federal courts stand in a coordinate,
rather than a hierarchical, relationship, the binding effect of the fed
eral judgment extends no further than the parties to the lawsuit.
Against nonparties, the state remains free to lodge criminal prosecu
tions. Civil actions can also go forward.5os

Fallon concludes that "[t]he familiar vocabulary of 'voidness,' 'in
validation,' and 'striking down' thus does more to mislead than
describe. "509
But Fallon's skeptical conclusion must, somehow, be wrong.
The basic premise of the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine is
that a federal court, by invalidating a statute, protects nonparty
speakers within the statute's scope. If lower federal courts cannot,
in fact, invalidate statutes (outside of class actions), then an over
breadth challenge should be unavailable in lower federal court
(outside of a class action). That is not the official doctrine, at all.510
The way to avoid Fallon's skeptical conclusion, and more generally
to explain lower court utterances within the. Derivative Account, is
by conceptualizing these utterances as partial steps in a multi-step,
temporally extended process of judicial repeal. We might say, for
506. This is true, at least, if the res judicata effect of the federal judgment is itself a matter
of federal law, see Shapiro, supra note 442, at 763 (arguing that it is), and if the Supreme
Court's decision in the Mendoza case, see United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154 (1984)
(nonmutual collateral estoppel generally unavailable against federal government), protects
state governments as well, see Note, Nonmutual Issue Preclusion against States, 109 HARv. L.
REv. 792 (1996) (discussing applicability of Mendoza to state governments).
507. See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 38, at 283 n.219 (stating that "on questions of federal law,
the state courts are bound only by the United States Supreme Court, and not by the lower
federal courts," and citing sources).
508. Fallon, supra note 83, at 853-54 (footnotes omitted); accord, Shapiro, supra note 442,
at 770-76. The Supreme Court has said the same quite explicitly, see Doran v. Salem Inn, 422
U.S. 922, 931 (1975) (noting that "neither declaratory nor injunctive relief can directly inter
fere with enforcement of contested statutes or ordinances except with respect to the particu
lar federal plaintiffs, and the State is free to prosecute others who may violate the statute").
509. Fallon, supra note 83, at 854.
510.

See supra text accompanying

note 470 (official statement of doctrine).
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district court utterance purporting to invaliM

date a state statute is not generally binding on state officials, except
in the case of a class action, until the holding is concurred in by the
state supreme court or (some or all) of the state courts of appeals.
Or, for a federal statute, we might say that federal prosecutors, abM
sent a class action, are bound (beyond the scope of res judicata)
only to refrain from enforcing statutes that have been held unconM
stitutional in all, or a majority of, the federal circuits. The basic
idea is that, for a particular rule

R,

there are multiple lower courts

(by which I mean, here, courts other than the federal Supreme
Court) with jurisdiction to adjudicate a federal constitutional chalM

lenge to

R:

lower federal versus state courts, or lower federal

courts with different geographic jurisdictions. For epistemic reaM
sons, it may well make sense to require something approaching
unanimous agreement among the relevant lower courts, before enM
forcement officials should count themselves under a legal obligation
not to enforce the invalidated statute; and to use the federal
Supreme Court as the institution for resolving disagreements
among the lower courts. Legal scholars outside of constitutional
law, addressing the issue of federal agency nonacquiescence in the
non-constitutional rulings of federal appellate panels, have adM
vanced this kind of suggestion: the suggestion is that federal agen
cies are free to "nonacquiesce" in appellate rulings, but only given
nonunanimity among the circuits.s11
The idea of intertemporal repeal - of a voting process among
the relevant lower courts, those with jurisdiction over some rule

R

- fits comfortably with the Derivative Account. The proponent of
that account can concede the epistemic benefits of requiring someM
thing approaching unanimity among the relevant lower courts prior
to holding enforcement officials obligated (beyond the scope of res
judicata) not to enforce a rule. This helps explains why the law of
res judicata has not been changed:512 why judicial rulings against
the government are not, technically, res judicata beyond the particM
ular prevailing litigant. What the proponent of the Derivative AcM
count

will not concede

is that

if, for example,

both the state courts

511. I take this, essentially, to be the view of Professors Estreicher and Revesz. See
Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 505, at 753 (arguing that "agencies should not engage in
intracircuit nonacquiescence unless [inter alia] the agency is reasonably seeking the vindica
tion of its position both in the courts of appeals and before the Supreme Court").
512. It also explains perhaps why lower courts ought not automatically certify class ac
tions in constitutional cases, even assuming representative plaintiffs. See Shapiro, supra note
442, at 779 (arguing for judicial caution in certifying classes if that would "unfairly deprive
state courts of the opportunity to express their views"); Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 505,
at 721 n.218 (making a similar suggestion for statutory challenges to federal agency action).
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and the lower federal courts concur in deciding that a state statute
should be invalidated, and there is no reasonable chance of federal
Supreme Court review, state prosecutors should nonetheless con
sider themselves legally free to continue enforcing it. And Fallon
presents no argument to the contrary.513
It is a further question whether, absent a Supreme Court ruling
on point or a class-wide injunction, a state or federal official enforc
ing a statute that the relevant lower courts have declared invalid
should be subject to sanction in the shape of criminal penalties
under

18 U.S.C. § 241514
Bivens. 511

§ 1983516 and

and § 242,515 or monetary damages under
Perhaps the line between an incomplete

and a completed intertemporal repeal is too fuzzy to warrant sanc
tions against enforcement officials who may innocently stray across
the line. (Innocent straying may need to be corrected by a subse
quent class-action suit.518) Nonetheless, enforcement officials have
a constitutional, legal duty (sanction-backed or not) to observe the
line. Legal duties can exist without sanctions;519 for example, a
sanctionless duty could be a

legal duty because it is

grounded, via

the legally correct methods of derivation, in some legal text. The
Supreme Court, the legal body responsible for interpreting the Bill
of Rights, has announced (at least in the context of overbreadth
doctrine) that enforcement officials have a legal duty not to enforce
statutes that the federal courts invalidate. To quote the Court:
"The consequence of [a judicial declaration invalidating a statute as
overbroad] is that any enforcement ofa statute

totally forbidden

thus placed at issue is

until and unless a limiting construction or partial

invalidation so narrows it as to remove the seeming threat or deter
rence to constitutionally protected expression."520 And this an513. See Fallon, supra note 83, at 880-82 (discussing limited scope of lower court relief in
non-class cases).
514. See 18 U.S.C.
tional rights).

§ 241

(1994) (prohibiting conspiracy to deprive persons of constitu

515. See 18 U.S.C.
color of law).

§ 242

(1994) (prohibiting deprivation of constitutional rights under

516.

See 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(1994).

517. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971). See generally Kent Greenawalt, Constitutional Decisions and the Supreme Law,
58 CoLo. L. REv. 145, 171 (1987) (noting these possibilities, with respect to nonacquiescence
in Supreme Court decisions).
518. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 505, at 758 (stating that class-action device is
warranted in event of unjustified agency nonacquiescence).
519. See RAz, supra note 54, at 154-62, 158 (discussing generally the conceptual possibil
ity of sanctionless legal norms, and noting that, although mandatory norms addressed to ordi
nary individuals are always in practice sanction-backed, there exist "mandatory norms
addressed to officials which are not backed by sanctions").
520. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973) (emphasis added).
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nouncement is indeed legally correct. The legally correct method of
deriving legal rights and duties from the moral criteria set forth in
the

Bill of Rights is

(some kind of) moral reasoning; the Derivative

Account is the morally best account of those criteria; and the legal
implication of the Derivative Account is that state and federal offi
cials have a legal duty not to enforce statutes that the federal courts
have invalidated, whether through a class action, a Supreme Court
announcement, or what I have called an intertemporal lower-court
repeal.
Professor Fallon, who undertook an empirical survey of state
prosecutorial responses to lower-federal-court holdings of over
breadth, found the following:

45

[The survey identified]
cases [in the relevant time period] in which
lower federal courts held state statutes unconstitutionally overbroad,
but only three cases - two involving the same statute - in which
state prosecutors, following federal holdings of overbreadth, brought
actions to enforce the affected statutes . . . . This sample suggests . . .
that overbreadth holdings by lower federal courts may be far more
potent in practice than the surrounding legal doctrines would require
them to be.521

My conclusion would be a bit different. To my mind, the over
whelming incidence of prosecutorial compliance with lower-federal
court overbreadth holdings demonstrates that the remedial tech
niques available to the federal courts are, in practice, quite potent
enough to support what legal doctrine should be, namely, the De
rivative Account.
CONCLUSION
What is the moral focus of judicial review? Are constitutional
reviewing courts essentially concerned with the treatment of partic
ular litigants? Or is their task essentially legislative? Are they fo
cused, not on the morality of the particular sanction, duty, or other
negative treatment that the litigant at hand has received, but rather
on the moral reasons for and against the underlying rule? And is
the litigant's case, then, merely an occasion for judicial amendment
or repeal of rules that go morally awry? The aim of this article has
been to address and answer, as rigorously as possible, these founda
tional questions about the nature of judicial review. I have tried,
here, to get straight our basic picture of constitutional adjudication.
The right picture, unfamiliar though it may be, is what I have called
521. Fallon, supra note 83, at 888 n.219.
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the Derivative Account.522 Constitutional rights are morally deriv
ative, not morally direct (at least insofar as rights are substantively
infringed by sanctions or coercive duties, those most elementary
sources of rights-violation).523 And this revision to our basic pic
ture of constitutional adjudication should, in turn, have wide doctri
nal implications - for the wide variety of doctrines, both
procedural and substantive, that a basic picture informs. The avail
ability of facial challenges to rules; the contours, indeed very exist
ence, of the overbreadth doctrine; the proper timing for the
adjudication of constitutional claims; the proper parties to litigate
such claims; the scope of judicial remedies; the content of substan
tive constitutional doctrines governing the predicate and history of
rules under the Free Speech Clause, Free Exercise Clause, Equal
Protection Clause, and the substantive component of the Due Pro
cess Clause - these matters, and others, will depend crucially upon
whether the Direct Account or the Derivative Account of constitu
tional rights holds true.
Given the breadth and diversity of such matters, it is beyond the
scope of this article to specify, in detail, the doctrinal changes that
flow from the Derivative Account. A full discussion of the affected
doctrines would require at least as much space and effort as the
basic theorizing that this article has tried to complete. Rather, in
this Conclusion, I will simply describe, in a brief and general way,
the main areas of constitutional doctrine implicated by the morally
derivative cast of constitutional rights. It is these areas, principally,
that the Derivative Account will require us to rethink and to revise.
Let us begin with the problem of facial challenges. This is a
problem that, in recent years, has excited great controversy at the
Court, in areas of constitutional law ranging from commercial
speech, to political speech, to equal protection, the Establishment
Clause, the Takings Clause, and, finally, substantive due process
(both abortion rights and, just recently, assisted suicide).524 Indeed,
the controversy over facial challenges now rivals, in intensity and
breadth, the controversy over standing that became acute during
the 1980s.525 What triggered the now-familiar disputes over stand522. See supra Part II {arguing against Direct Account); supra Part ill (arguing in favor
of Derivative Account).
523. See supra text accompanying notes 56-57 {discussing and defending article's focus on
sanctions and sanction-backed duties).
524. See supra note 39 (citing cases in these areas).
525. The scholarly literature from this period that was animated by the resurgent impor
tance of the standing requirement includes: Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Reme
dies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. RE.v. 1
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ing was the Court's adoption of a highly restrictive approach - an
approach linked to the Direct Account - that threatened to close
the courthouse doors to large classes of constitutional litigants.526
Similarly, the current debates (equally ardent and wide-ranging)527
about facial challenges have been triggered by the Court's an
nouncement and repeated affirmation of a doctrinal test that threat
ens to eviscerate the practice of facial invalidation.
This is the Salemo test. In

United States v. Salemo, 528 the Court

announced:
A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most diffi
cult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must estab
lish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be
valid. The fact that the [statute reviewed in Salerno] might operate
unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is in
sufficient to render it wholly invalid, since we have not recognized an
"overbreadth" doctrine outside the limited context of the First
Amendment.529

says, or appears to say, the following: Given some rule R, a
court should facially invalidate R only if, for every person X against

Salemo

whom R might be enforced, the application of R to X would be
unconstitutional.530 And indeed this is the correct test if the Direct
Account holds true.

Salemo

starts with the notion that constitu-

(1984); William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE LJ. 221 (1988); Gene R.
Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. RBv. 635
(1985); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. RBv.
1432 (1988); Steven L. Wmter, The Metaphor of Standing, 40 STAN. L. RBv. 1371 (1988).
526. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (denying standing);
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (same); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983)
(same); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976) (same); Warth v. Sel·
din, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (same). On the link between a restrictive approach to standing and
the Direct Account, see infra text accompanying notes 584-85.
527. To be sure, the ardent and wide-ranging debates about facial challenges have, hith
erto, remained debates within the judiciary. There has not, yet, been a broad scholarly ap·
preciation of the depth and import of this judicial debate. Although there is a well
developed scholarly literature on overbreadth, see sources cited supra note 83, this focuses on
facial challenges in the First Amendment context, and largely predates the current judicial
debates. The only general scholarly piece on facial challenges is Professor Dorfs Facial Chal·
lenges to State and Federal Statutes. See Dorf, supra note 38. A number of student notes have
been written recently on the problem of facial challenges in the abortion area. See Ruth
Burdick, Note, The Casey Undue Burden Standard: Problems Predicted and Encountered,
and the Split over the Salemo Test, 23 HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 825 {1996); John Christopher
Ford, Note, The Casey Standard for Evaluating Facial Attacks on Abortion Statutes, 95 MICH.
L. RBv. 1443 (1997); Skye Gabel, Note, Casey "Versus" Salemo: Determining an Appropri·
ate Standard for Evaluating the Facial Constitutionality ofAbortion Statutes, 19 CARDOZO L.
RBv. 1825 (1998).
528. 481 U.S. 739 {1987).
529. Salemo, 481 U.S. at 745.
530. See Dorf, supra note 38, at 241 ("Under [Salerno's] 'no set of circumstances' test, the
government need only produce an example in which the statute could be applied constitu
tionally to defeat the facial challenge.").
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tional adjudication is, centrally, as-applied adjudication.531 What
concerns the reviewing court, first and foremost, is whether X's own
treatment is unconstitutional. If it turns out that the application of
rule R to X is not unconstitutional, then what claim - asks the

Salemo

Court - does X have to judicial relief? X's only claim

would be an overbreadth claim: a claim that

R

should be facially

invalidated because it is unconstitutional as applied to too many

other

litigants.

But, officially, there is no overbreadth doctrine

outside the First Am.endment;532 the Court has never said other
wise. So, outside the First Amendment, a rule should be sustained
over a facial challenge

if there

is some set of circumstances under

which an as-applied challenge to the rule fails. This is currently the
official doctrine for facial challenges, and it follows inexorably from
the morally direct cast of constitutional rights that the

Salemo

Court, quite standardly, takes to obtain.
To see the import of Salemo, consider a sweeping law regulating
abortion. I pick abortion as an example because the implications of

Salemo,

here, are particularly counterintuitive - at least for law

yers, scholars, and jurists who accept the justiciability of abortion
rights533 - and, relatedly, because the judicial disputes here about
facial challenges have been particularly fiery.534 Consider, for ex
ample, Guam's statute outlawing all abortions except in cases of
medical emergency, which the Ninth Circuit held to be facially inva
lid.535 The Supreme Court thereupon denied Guam's petition for
531. See Ada v. Guam Socy.of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 506 U.S.1011, 1012 (1992)
(Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (defending Salemo by describing as-applied
adjudication as central and standard type of judicial review).
532. See Ada, 506 U.S. at 1012 (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Salemo,
481 U.
S. at 745. In its First Amendment overbreadth cases, the Court has consistently de
scribed overbreadth as a First Amendment exception to the normal practice of adjudication.
See, e.g., Osborne v.Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 112 n.8 (1990); New York v.Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,
767-69 (1982); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S.601, 611-15 (1973); see also Ford, supra note
527, at 1450-55 (discussing Court's use of an unarticulated overbreadth doctrine in its abor
tion cases).
533. See Ford, supra note 527, at 1445-46 (noting that "[i]f the Supreme Court were faith
ful to Salemo, it would reject every facial attack on statutes restricting access to abortions").
534. See Janklow v.Planned Parenthood, 517 U.S.1174, 1175 (1996) (denying certiorari)
(memorandum of Stevens, J.
); Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Schafer, 507 U.S. 1013, 1013
(1993) (denying stay) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Ada, 506 U.S. at 1011 (denying certiorari)
(Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.833,
972-73 (1992) (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
Indeed, the problem of reconciling Salemo with the Court's willingness (most recently, in
Casey) to sustain facial challenges to laws restricting abortion has generated a circuit split.
See Burdick, supra note 527, at 872-75 (describing circuit split); Ford, supra note 527, at 144748 (same); Gabel, supra note 527, at 1837-41 (same).
535. See Guam Socy. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists v.Ada, 962 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir.),
cerl denied, 506 U.S. 1011 (1992).
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certiorari, prompting a vigorous dissent by Justice Scalia,536 who ar
gued that Salemo precluded a facial invalidation of even this highly
restrictive statute.
Under this Court's current abortion caselaw, including Casey, I see no
reason why the Guam law would not be constitutional at least in its
application to abortions conducted after the point at which the child
may live outside the womb. If that is so, the Ninth Circuit should
have dismissed the present, across-the-board challenge.537

The same might be said of a law prohibiting all previability abor
tions; we can imagine instances of previability abortion that would
be wrongful under other descriptions (for example, a previability
abortion secured through a coercive threat, as in ABORTION). Sa
lemo implies that most of the major cases, up to and including
Casey,538 in which the Court has sustained abortion-rights claims,
were wrongly decided - for most of these cases involved facial in
validation of rules that, one would imagine, had some morally ac
ceptable applications.539
Not surprisingly, then, the applicability of Salemo to laws regu
lating abortion has been rejected by Justice O'Connor, who (along
with Justices Souter and Kennedy) authored the joint opinion for
the Court in Casey. As Justice O'Connor has explained:
In striking down Pennsylvania's spousal-notice provision [in Casey],
we did not require petitioners to show that the provision would be
invalid in all circumstances. Rather, we made clear that a law restrict
ing abortions constitutes an undue burden, and hence is invalid, if, "in
a large fraction of the cases in which [the law] is relevant, it will oper
ate as a substantial obstacle to a woman's choice to undergo an
abortion. "540
536. See Ada, 506 U.S. at 1011 (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
537. 506 U.S. at 1013 (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
538. 505 U.S. at 887-99 (facially invalidating spousal-consent provision of statute regulat
ing abortion).
539. The cases I mean are: Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S.
417 (1990); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747
(1986); Planned Parenthood Association v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983); City ofAkron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Belloti v. Baird, 443 U.S.
622 (1979); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179
(1973); and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). All of these are, I suggest, best categorized as
involving facial invalidations.
The only exception to the Court's reliance on facial invalidation, in sustaining abortion
rights claims, is its occasional narrowing of statutes under the rubric of statutory interpreta
tion, see, e.g., Planned Parenthood Assn. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 490-93, which is properly
seen as a kind of partial invalidation, see generally Adler, supra note 4, at 834-39.
540. Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Schafer, 507 U.S. 1013, 1014 (1993) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in denial of stay and injunction) (second alteration in original) (quoting Casey,
505 U.S. at 895). Interestingly, Justice Souter joined Justice O'Connor's concurrence in
Fargo, but Justice Kennedy did not. See 507 U.S. at 1013.
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But the proponent of Salemo is entitled to ask: Why should Justice
O'Connor's be the test? Why should a rule be facially invalidated if
there is some context in which an as-applied challenge to the rule
would fail? Neither the judicial nor the scholarly critics of Salemo
have, in my view, given a satisfactory answer to that question. The
answer, I suggest, is simply this: There is no such thing as a true as
applied constitutional challenge.541 The very idea is a mistake. Un
til we get rid of that idea, our doctrines for adjudicating facial chal
lenges will remain confused. The concept of unconstitutionality
does not attach to the treatment of particular litigants; it attaches,
on the Derivative Account, to the enactment of statutes and other
rules. Salemo conceives of the facial invalidity of a rule as the limit
ing point of as-applied invalidity: a rule is facially invalid if, for
every application of the rule, that application is constitutionally in
valid. Justice O'Connor, in her response to Salemo, tries to soften
the test somewhat: a rule is facially invalid if, for many applications
of the rule, those are constitutionally invalid.542 But both tests are
mistaken, because both trade upon the mistaken, albeit standard,
notion that rule-applications can be properly described as
unconstitutional.
Let me put the point this way. On the Derivative Account,
every constitutional challenge involves the facial scrutiny of rules.
In every constitutional case (at least where claimants substantively
challenge sanctions or sanction-backed duties), the court's task is to
assess the predicate and history of the underlying rule against one
or more rule-validity schema. Substantive constitutional doctrines,
such as the narrow-tailoring doctrines familiar from free speech
541. By this I mean just that constitutional litigation does not concern the morality of the
application of a rule to a particular claimant; it does not concern whether the claimant's
treatment should be overturned, independent of further invalidating the rule. "As-applied"
adjudication in the (less robust) sense of adjudication that depends, in part, on facts about
the claimant rather than depending exclusively on the predicate and history of the rule, is
quite consistent with the Derivative Account, as I have already explained, see supra text
accompanying notes 140-45, 414-21.
542. One might object that Justice O'Connor's test means to ask, not whether a large
fraction of an abortion-regulating rule's applications are unconstitutional, but rather whether
a large fraction of the rule's applications (say, sanctions) are morally wrong. If so, the
O'Connor test is consistent with the facial rather than as-applied cast of constitutional adjudi
cation; but one can still debate whether the absolute or relative number of morally problem
atic applications should be a factor in constitutional rule-validity schema. A rule breaches
the Liberty Schema or the Discrimination Schema if the rule, without sufficient reason, re
stricts liberties or includes a discriminatory predicate, see supra text accompanying notes 326,
384; there is no further question of the rule being largely, or only a little bit, wrong. But
perhaps a further question of this kind is appropriate for courts to ask, e.g., if docket
congestion or the exigencies of judicial efficacy in constitutional cases, see GERALD N.
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 336 (1991) (questioning efficacy of judicial remedies), re
quire limiting judicial intervention to the most serious cases of morally problematic rules.
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law,543 the "undue burden" doctrine announced in

Casey for abor

tion rights,544 or the antidiscrimination doctrines for free exercise
and equal protection,545 are
sense:

all

facial doctrines, in the following

these doctrines serve to determine whether morality re

quires some change in the canonical language of the scrutinized
rule. Now, it remains an interesting

remedial problem

how the re

viewing court should remedy a rule that fails the moral scrutiny
subserved by these familiar rule-validity tests. This is the problem

I

adverted to in section III.A.3. One possible remedy is facial invali
dation, another is partial invalidation or even extension, and there
are pros and cons to each. Facial-challenge doctrine, properly un
derstood, is a .doctrine that addresses this remedial problem - and
no more than that. It is a doctrine that answers the question:
Where a rule is constitutionally invalid, should the revie\ving court

repeal the invalid rule, or should the court instead amend the rule in
some way? The answer might be that courts should never repeal
rules

if

there exists a narrower, curative amendment - which

would have the effect of making facial invalidation quite rare. But

if that is the correct answer, it is correct because of the moral losses
that flow from facial invalidation, the skill of courts in crafting cura
tive amendments, and so forth, and

not because

of the morally di

rect cast of constitutional rights.546
The flip side of the Court's confusion about facial challenges is
its confusion about the overbreadth doctrine.547 The overbreadth
doctrine, as the Court conceptualizes it, purports to create a special,
bonus right with respect to laws regulating speech. "Outside the
area of free speech, a litigant merely has the right to challenge the
application of a rule to himself.

However, in the area of free

speech, the litigant has the bonus right - a right he can invoke,
even

if

his as-applied challenge fails - that the reviewing court

facially invalidate a rule which is substantially overbroad." Or so
the standard conceptualization goes. As the Court has explained:
The First Amendment doctrine of overbreadth was designed as a
"departure from traditional rules of standing," to enable persons who
are themselves unharmed by the defect in a statute nevertheless "to
challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be ap543. See supra text accompanying notes 321-25.
544. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 869-79.
545. See supra text accompanying notes 98-113.
546. See supra text accompanying notes 414-21 (discussing pros and cons of facial vs.
partial invalidation of rules).
547. See supra notes 470-91 and accompanying text (describing overbreadth doctrine, and
citing leading cases and scholarly articles).
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plied unconstitutionally to others, in other situations not before the
Court." . . .

It is not the usual judicial practice . . . to proceed to an over
breadth issue unnecessarily - that is, before it is determined that the
statute would be valid as applied. . . . [T]he lawfulness of the particu
lar application of the law should ordinarily be decided first.548
But the overbreadth doctrine is just as empty as the idea of an as
applied challenge, and for the same reason. Every constitutional
claimant has one and the same type of legal right: a right to secure
the invalidation (whether a partial invalidation, a facial invalida
tion, or something else) of a rule that goes morally awry. This is the
kind of right that the overbreadth doctrine purports to describe, but
it is not in fact special to free speech, nor is it a bonus above and
beyond a more basic as-applied right. Consider our stylized case,
CHILD PoRNoGRAPHY, which is meant to exemplify a classic over
breadth case: the case where a child pornographer is sanctioned
pursuant to a sweeping rule that prohibits pictures of naked chil
dren. It is indeed true in CHILD PoRNOGRAPHY that the claimant
has no as-applied claim; moral reason does not obtain for a court to
invalidate the claimant's sanction, independent of further invalidat
ing the rule under which that sanction falls. But the same, I have
argued, is true of the claimants in FLAG DESECRATION, ABORTION,
RESIDENTIAL PICKETING, ALCOHOL, and ANIMAL SACRIFICE. And
the Derivative Account is correct, the same is always true (or
might be true) of every constitutional litigant. A constitutional liti

if

gant always lacks, or might lack, a valid moral claim; the strength of
the litigant's own moral claim is simply not an issue for the constitu
tional reviewing court; and therefore the idea of a special over
breadth right, for litigants whose own moral claims misfire, is
nonsense.
Indeed, I am not the first scholar to criticize the standard con
ceptualization of overbreadth. Henry Monaghan, in his well-known
article on

Overbreadth, has done just this.549

Monaghan argues that

laws regulating free speech, just like other rules, are unconstitu548. Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 484-85 (1989) (citations omitted) (quoting
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610, 613 (1973)) . For a similarly clear description of
the right to raise a First Amendment overbreadth challenge as a bonus right, additional to
the claimant's right to raise an as-applied challenge, see Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 323-24
(1991). And what Fox and Geary say explicitly is implicit in other standard discussions by the
Court of the overbreadth doctrine. See, e.g., Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491,
503 (1985) ("In [overbreadth] cases, an individual whose own speech or expressive conduct
may validly be prohibited or sanctioned [i.e., who lacks a successful as-applied challenge] is
permitted to challenge a statute on its face because it also threatens others not before the
court . . . .") .
549.

See Monaghan, supra note 44.
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tional if and only if they fail applicable rule-validity schemas.55o In
the area of free speech, the relevant schema simply demands that
the rule be narrowly tailored or (equivalently) that it not be over
broad. There is no special overbreadth doctrine for free speech,
above and beyond the basic requirement - true both of rules regu
lating speech and of other rules - that such rules be constitution
ally valid.
[T]he dominant idea [overbreadth] evokes is serious means scrutiny.
Wherever [the Constitution] mandates strict or intermediate scrutiny,
a requirement of regulatory precision is involved . . . . Thus the Court
has reacted interchangeably to "overbreadth" and "least restrictive
alternative" challenges both inside and outside the First Amendment
context.551

Like Monaghan, I agree that constitutional adjudication always and
only involves judicial assessment of the predicate and history of
rules against applicable rule-validity schema. Unlike Monaghan, I
think it is a grave mistake to conceptualize this judicial task as rest
ing upon the proposition that, in his words: "[A] litigant has always
had the right to be judged in accordance with a constitutionally
valid rule of law."552 This is the proposition that the Direct Ac
count tries to prove: the Direct Account tries to demonstrate that
sanctioning some X, pursuant to a rule that is constitutionally "in
valid," violates X's moral rights. But the Direct Account is unper
suasive - rule-validity schema are not best construed as identifying
improper features of rules such that to apply a rule with that kind of
feature is, itself, to violate a moral right of the sanctioned person,
independent of the proscribability of her action under another de
scription - and to attempt a rescue of Monaghan's claim by saying
that a litigant has the legal, if not moral, right to be judged in ac
cordance with a constitutionally valid rule of law is a confusion. A
litigant has that legal right only because, in turn, her case is an occa
sion for judicial repeal or amendment of the rule rather than merely
the litigant's own treatment.
550. As Monaghan puts it:
[There is] little support for viewing overbreadth as a special, speech-protective standing
doctrine. Rather, . . . overbreadth methodology simply applies the conventional princi
ple that any litigant may insist on not being burdened by a constitutionally invalid rule.
What is different from the conventional run-of-the mill case is not standing but the sub
stantive content of the applicable constitutional law.
Id. at 37.
551. Id. {footnotes omitted).
552. Id. at 3; see also Henry Monaghan, Harmless Error and the Valid Rule Requirement,
1989 SuP. CT. REv. 195, 196-97 {reiterating claim that litigant has the right to be judged in
accordance with a constitutionally valid rule); Dorf, supra note 38, at 242-49 (concurring in
Monaghan's claim); Fallon, supra note 83, at 874 (same).
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In short, the overbreadth doctrine is quite correct (pace
Monaghan) in stating that the role of reviewing courts is to repeal
and amend rules at the instance of morally minimal litigants.
Where the overbreadth doctrine goes wrong is in thinking that this
is a special role, reserved for the Free Speech Clause, and that the
ordinary role of reviewing courts outside the area of free speech is
something other than this.
Is there any way to salvage the overbreadth doctrine? Perhaps
it might be reconceptualized, not as a doctrine that confers bonus
rights upon litigants in the area of free speech, but as a special re
medial doctrine - a doctrine that makes facial invalidation an es
pecially accessible remedy here.

A Reconceptualized Overbreadth Doctrine?
If a law fails a rule-validity schema, except for a free-speech
schema, then facial invalidation is an appropriate remedy
under conditions Q. If, however, a law fails a free speech rule
validity schema, then facial invalidation is an appropriate rem
edy under conditions Q or Q'. ss3
But even this remedial reconceptualization of overbreadth is prob
lematic, given the Court's actual remedial practices. In practice,
many and perhaps most of the cases in which the Court has sus
tained constitutional challenges to conduct-regulating rules have
eventuated in facial invalidation: not just free speech cases, but
also abortion rights cases, free exercise cases, and equal protection
cases.ss4 And, even more strikingly, the overwhelming bulk of the
cases where the Court has cured invalid conduct-regulating rules
through some remedy other than facial invalidation, have in fact
been free speech casesisss The partial invalidation or, for that mat
ter, the extension of conduct-regulating rules that violate equal pro
tection is virtually unheard of;SS6 now that the Free Exercise Clause
closely parallels the Equal Protection Clause, the same should gen
erally hold true there; and, in practice, as I have already noted, the
standard remedy for conduct-regulating rules that violate substan553. Cf. Stem, supra note 414, at 82-106 (describing, circa 1937, Court's varying practices
of facial versus partial invalidation, and discussing the choice between those alternatives as a
remedial problem).
554. See supra note 425.
555. See supra note 425. Notably, these include not just commercial-speech cases, where
the overbreadth doctrine is formally inapplicable, see Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469
(1989), but "core" speech cases as well.
556. See supra note 144.
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tive due process has been facial invalidation.ss7 So a remedial
reconceptualization of First Amendment overbreadth is, at the very
least, quite problematic.
A third doctrine that - like the

Salerno

test for facial chal

lenges and the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine - must be
dramatically reconceptualized is the doctrine of jus

tertii

stand

ing.sss The Court has repeatedly invoked this doctrine in cases
where a person who falls within the scope of a conduct-regulating
rule seeks to invalidate the rule, even though that person is not, or
may not be, the moral beneficiary of the constitutional clause upon
which he relies. For example, the doctrine was invoked in

Gowan

v.

Maryland, ss9

Mc

where department store employees were

prosecuted for making sales in violation of a Maryland Sunday
closing statute, and challenged their convictions on free exercise
grounds;s60 in

Griswold

v.

Connecticut, S61

where doctors who pre

scribed contraceptives were sanctioned as "aider and abettors" pur
suant to a Connecticut statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives,
and challenged their sanctions on substantive due process
grounds;s6z in Eisenstadt v. Baird, S63 where a distributor of contra
ceptives was sanctioned for violating a Massachusetts statute that
prohibited their distribution (not their use), and raised an equal
protection challenge;s64 and in
prohibited the

sale

Craig v. Boren,s6s where the statute

of low-alcohol beer to men but not to women

557. The standard response in abortion cases, which have comprised the bulk of substan
tive due process cases with respect to conduct-regulating rules, has been facial invalidation.
See supra note 539. In other types of substantive due process scenarios, the Court has re
sorted to partial invalidation. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking
down law prohibiting contraception, with respect to use of contraceptives by married per
sons); Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (striking down law restricting
distribution and advertisement of contraceptives, with respect to nonprescription
contraceptives).
558. See generally Henry P. Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 CoLuM. L. RE.v. 277
(1984) (discussing jus tertii standing doctrine); Robert Allen Sedler, The Assertion of Consti
tutional Jus Tertii: A Substantive Approach, 70 CAL. L. RE.v. 1308 (1982) (same); Note,
Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Terti� 88 HAR.v. L. RE.v. 423 (1974) (same).
559. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
560. See McGowan, 366 U.S. at 429-30 (holding that employees lacked jus tertii standing
with respect to free exercise challenge).
561. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
562. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481 (holding that doctors had jus tertii standing).
563. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
564. See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 443-46 (holding that distributor had jus tertii standing);
see also Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 682-84 (1977) (holding that distributor
had jus tertii standing to challenge statute restricting distribution and advertisement of
contraceptives).
565. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one, and a beer vendor
challenged the statute on equal protection grounds.566
The Court has conceptualized these kind of cases as posing a
question of prudential (not Article III) standing:567 Did the em
ployee in McGowan, the doctor in Griswold, the distributor in

Eisenstadt, and the vendor in Craig have "third party" standing to
raise the constitutional rights of, respectively, the department store
patrons, the doctor's patients, the distributees of contraceptives,
and the vendor's customers? As the Court explained

in Craig:

The legal duties created by the statutory sections under challenge are
addressed directly to vendors such as appellant. She is obliged either
to heed the statutory [command], thereby incurring a direct economic
injury . . . or to disobey the statutory command and suffer . . . "sanc
tions and perhaps loss of license." This Court repeatedly has recog
nized that such requirements establish the threshold requirements of
a "case or controversy" mandated by Art. III.
As a vendor with [Article III] standing to challenge the lawfulness
of [the statute prohibiting the sale of beer, she] is entitled to assert
those concomitant rights of third parties that would be "diluted or
adversely affected" should her constitutional challenge fail and the
statutes remain in force. Otherwise, the threatened imposition of
governmental sanctions might deter [the vendor] from selling 3.2%
beer to young males, thereby ensuring that "enforcement of the chal
lenged restriction . . . would result indirectly in the violation of third
parties' rights."568
The Court concluded that the vendor had "standing to raise rele
vant equal protection challenges to Oklahoma's gender-based
law."569
But if the Derivative Account is correct, cases such as Craig,
Eisenstadt, Griswold, and McGowan do not create a standing prob
lem - any more than, say, R.A. V.570 (where a trespassory and as566. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 192-97 (holding that vendor had jus tertii standing). Tue doc
trine also arises in areas other than substantive challenges to conduct-regulating rules. For
recent examples, see Miller v. Albright, 118 S. Ct. 1428, 1442 (1998) (O'Connor, J., concur
ring) (arguing that child lacked jus tertii standing to raise equal protection claim of citizen
father with respect to naturalization scheme distinguishing between the children of citizen
fathers and citizen mothers); Campbell v. Louisiana, 118 S. Ct. 1419, 1422-24 (1998) (holding
that white criminal defendant had jus tertii standing to raise equal protection claim of dis
crimination against blacks in the selection of grand jurors).
567. On the prudential, rather than constitutional, nature of jus tertii standing doctrine,
see, e.g., Craig, 429 U.S. at 193 (stating that "limitations on a litigant's assertion of jus tertii
are not constitutionally mandated, but rather stem from a salutary 'rule of self-restraint'
designed to minimize unwarranted intervention into controversies where the applicable con
stitutional questions are ill-defined and speculative").
568. 429 U.S. at 194-95 (citations omitted) (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
479, 481 (1965)).

U.S. at 197.
See R.A.V. v. City

569. 429
570.

of

St.

Paul, 505

U.S.

377 (1992).
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saultive speaker was prosecuted pursuant to a no-hate-speech law)
or

Eichman571

(where flag burners who took and destroyed flags

belonging to others were prosecuted for flag mutilation).

In what
Eisenstadt,

sense is the vendor in

Griswold,

Craig, and her counterparts in
McGowan, relying on the "rights" of other persons,
"her own" rights? If "rights," here, are taken to be

and

rather than

moral rights, then the fact that the vendor and her counterparts are
not asserting their own moral rights is not distinct to these cases.
Rather, as I have argued at length, the morally derivative cast of
constitutional litigants is a pervasive feature of constitutional law.
What about saying that the vendor and her counterparts are not
asserting their own
cause

if the

legal rights? This, too, would be a mistake, be
Craig, Eisenstadt, Griswold, and McGowan

statutes in

do indeed violate constitutional rule-validity schema, there is no
reason to think that (morally-minimal) litigants

other than the per

sons sanctioned pursuant to those statutes should have the primary
legal right to secure the statutes' invalidation.

In short, the issue in Craig, Eisenstadt, Griswold,

and

McGowan

is simply an issue about the content of constitutional rule-validity
schema.

Does the substantive component of the Due Process

Clause merely proscribe a rule that prohibits the

use

of contracep

tives, or does it also proscribe a rule that prohibits the sale of con
traceptives? Does the Equal Protection Clause proscribe rules that
discriminate, not on the basis of the actor's race or gender, but
rather on the basis of the race or gender of the actor's customers or
clients? These are important questions, that go to the content of
·
the moral criteria set forth in the Bill of Rights, and to the role of
courts in enforcing these criteria - but the questions have nothing
to do with

jus tertii

standing. Framing them in "standing" terms

threatens to obscure their correct answers - for example, by sug
gesting that the vendor in Craig and her counterparts in Eisenstadt,
Griswold, and McGowan can only proceed to court if the "rights
holders" they purportedly represent are unable to do so them
selves. 572 On the Derivative Account, there is no better litigant to
571. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
572. See, e.g., Campbell v. Louisiana, 118 S. Ct. 1419, 1423 (1998) (stating that the pre
conditions for jus tertii standing are " 'injury in fact' " on the part of the claimant, a " 'close
relationship' " between her and the rights-holders, and "some hindrance to [their] asserting
their own rights"); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446 (1972) (stating that "the case for
according standing to assert third-party rights is strong( ] . . . because unmarried persons
denied access to contraceptives in Massachusetts . . . are not themselves subject to prosecu
tion and, to that extent, are denied a forum in which to assert their own rights"); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 430 (1961) (denyingjus tertii standing to employees because "(t]hose
persons whose religious rights are allegedly impaired by the statutes are not without effective
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challenge a law prohibiting sale, prescription, or distribution, than a

vendor, doctor, or distributor.

What about Article III standing itself? The Article III standing

requirement, as the Court announced in the leading case of Allen

v.

Wright,513 is the following: "A plaintiff must allege personal injury
fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and
likely to be redressed by the requested relief."574 Here, too, the

Derivative Account has important implications. There is no incon

sistency between that account and the existence of an Article III
standing requirement. One might say, for example, that it is impor

tant to have litigants with interests sufficiently affected by the rules
they challenge, so that these persons are likely to litigate with

full

vigor their claims that the challenged rules do not satisfy applicable
rule-validity schema.575

Crucially, however, as I have already

noted,576 a standing requirement is

extrinsic to

the Derivative Ac

count. Constitutional adjudication, intrinsically, involves the repeal
or amendment of rules, and X's "constitutional right" is a legal right

to secure the invalidation of an invalid rule; it is no entailment of
such a right that, further, X have a personal interest in that invalida
tion. X

could just

be a concerned citizen. By contrast, on the Di

rect Account, X's "constitutional right" is a legal right to secure the

invalidation of her own treatment;

if she fails to identify some such

treatment, some "personal injury," then a necessary condition for

the very practice of constitutional adjudication has failed.577 The

notion of standing is intrinsic to the Direct Account, but not the
Derivative Account, and this difference means that the proponents

of the two accounts are likely to flesh out Allen's standing require

ment in quite different ways.

ways to assert these rights"); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER's THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND nm FEDERAL SYSTEM 195 (4th ed. 1996) (noting that existence of
"obstacles to tbird parties' asserting their own rights" is a recurrent theme in jus tertii case
law).

573. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
574. Wright, 468 U.S.

at

751.

575.

Cf. Sunstein, supra note 525, at 1448 (noting that a standing requirement has been
defended, inter alia, as ensuring sincere and effective litigants, but denying that such a re
quirement is well-matched to that goal).

576. See supra text accompanying note 405.
577. For discussions by the Court that link the injury-in-fact, causation, or redressability
components of standing to the (allegedly) personal nature of adjudication, see, e.g., Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576-78 (1992); Wright, 468 U.S. at 759-61; Simon v. East
ern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 37-39 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975).
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The various aspects of Article III standing are too complex to
discuss seriatim here.578 Rather, I will illustrate my point about the
differing implications of the Direct and Derivative Accounts by dis
cussing one aspect that has been particularly salient and contested
in recent years. Tb.at concerns whether persons who seek more
stringent government regulation have Article III standing to chal
lenge a regulatory regime that, they claim, is not stringent
enough.579 For example, in Allen v. Wright itself, black schoolchil
dren claimed that the Internal Revenue Service's failure to ensure a
denial of tax exemptions to racially discriminatory private schools
violated the Equal Protection Clause as well as statutory require
ments. 580 The Court held that the schoolchildren lacked standing,
given the absence of a clear causal link between the IRS's tax
exemption policies and any concrete harm the schoolchildren might
suffer - for example, the harm of attending segregated public
schools.581 And a broadly similar scenario has arisen in other lead
ing Supreme Court standing cases, such as the recent

Lujan

case,

where again the Court denied standing to (alleged) beneficiaries
(this time, to environmentalists who challenged on statutory
grounds the government's failure to enforce the Endangered Spe
cies Act abroad);582 and in the

Akins

case last Term, where the

Court (over the dissent of three members) granted standing to vot
ers who challenged the Federal Election Commission's decision not
to proceed with an enforcement action against an alleged violator
of the election laws. 583
578. For a survey, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 290, § 2.3.
579. See generally Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561-62 (stating that Article III standing is much
more difficult to establish where the target of the challenged government action, or inaction,
is not the claimant herself, but some third party).
580. See Wright, 468 U.S. at 740-50.
581. See 468 U.S. at 752-61.
582. See Lujan, 504 U.S. 555.
583. See FEC v. Akins, 118 S. Ct. 1777 (1998). Other important standing cases where this
scenario has arisen include: Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426
U.S. 26 (1976) {denying standing) (challenge by indigents to favorable tax treatment, by IRS,
of hospitals that fail to provide full services to indigents); United States v. Students Challeng
ing Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 683-90 {1973) (granting standing)
(challenge by environmentalists to decision, by ICC, permitting surcharges by railroads);
Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 {1973) {denying standing) (equal protection challenge,
by mother of illegitimate child seeking support for that child, to Texas child-support statute
that covered only the parents of legitimate children); and Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727
(1972) (denying standing) (challenge by environmentalists to forest service's approval of plan
by an entertainment company to develop portion of national forest). See also Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Environment, 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998) (denying standing) (suit by envi
ronmental group against manufacturer pursuant to "citizen suit" provision of Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act). Technically, Sierra Club and SCRAP in
volved standing under the Administrative Procedure Act, but the issues involved in these
cases (injury-in-fact and causation) would now be understood as going to Article III standing.
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To put the problem in terms of our stylized cases: imagine that,

in ALcoHoL, a rule prohibiting the sale of alcohol to men (but not
to women) between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one is chal
lenged on equal protection grounds by an association of bicyclists.
The bicyclists believe that women under twenty-one, like men, are

prone to driving while intoxicated; they seek, optimally, a judicial
extension of the rule to women or, failing that, a judicial invalida
tion which (they hope) will in tum prompt a legislative extension.

Do the bicyclists have standing? The proponent of the Direct Ac
count is likely to say no, for two reasons. First, she will demaiid a

threshold showing of some setback to the bicyclists' interests, such
that (the bicyclists will then claim) moral reason obtains to reverse
that setback.

If,

for example, the bicyclists cannot show at the

threshold that women between eighteen and twenty-one are indeed

prone to drive while intoxicated, then the gender-discriminatory
scope of the rule does not affect their safety, and the bicyclists lack

the feature of a personal setback which - on the Direct Account

- is an integral feature of constitutional adjudication. Second whether this is seen as a problem of Article III or of prudential
standing - the question will arise whether the bicyclists are the
moral beneficiaries of the Equal Protection Clause.584 Imagine, for
example, that the Clause is seen to be animated by the morally un

warranted stigma that flows from discrimination, or by the exclu
sion of outside groups from political participation.585

Bicyclists

are

not stigmatized by the rule in ALCOHOL, nor have they been ex

cluded from the political process. Thus, at least on this reading of

the Equal Protection Clause, the proponent of the Direct Account
will find it anomalous to let the bicyclists challenge the no-alcohol
rule: even

if the rule does

cause them a personal setback, that set

back violates no constitutionalized moral right of

theirs.

By contrast, for the proponent of the Derivative Account, a per

sonal setback on the bicyclists' part is extrinsic to the process of
constitutional adjudication.

She may, at the threshold, require

some non-trivial probability that the scope of the no-alcohol rule

affects their interest in safety or some other suitably personal inter
est - as a means to ensure sufficiently adverse litigants, or perhaps

for other reasons - but she will likely eschew the elaborate thresh584. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153
(1970) (holding that standing requires, beyond the existence of a case or controversy, that
"the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of inter
ests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question").
585. For a discussion of possible defenses of the Direct Account grounded upon these
rationales, see supra section II.B.2; supra text accompanying notes 254-55.
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old inquiry into the litigant's personal setback that the Direct Ac
count requires, and that was evident in Allen and Lujan. 586 As for
the fact that the bicyclists, themselves, may not be the moral benefi
ciaries of the Equal Protection Clause: that is simply irrelevant for
the Derivative Account. The Equal Protection Clause, on that ac
count, simply identifies certain morally unwarranted rule-types; any
(sufficiently adverse) litigant has the legal right to secure the invali
dation of such rules. The bicyclist harmed by the discriminatory
rule may, himself, not have a moral claim to overturn that treat
ment grounded in the Equal Protection Clause; but, then again,
neither does the young man who breaches the no-alcohol rule by
purchasing beer with a stolen credit card.
A similar point can be made about a constitutional and pruden
tial doctrine closely related to standing: the doctrine of ripeness.
This doctrine concerns the

timing of judicial review.

It looks both

to the "hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration"
and to the "fitness of the issues for judicial decision."5S7 For the
proponent of the Direct Account, the ripeness doctrine - like
standing - is (at least in part) intrinsic to the very practice of con
stitutional adjudication.

If the litigant has not, yet, suffered "hard

ship," then there is not yet, for her, a personal setback to which her
claim of constitutional right can attach.
Preenforcement challenges to rules pose one major category of
ripeness problems.sss Can a claimant whose freedom is allegedly
restricted by a rule adjudicate her constitutional or statutory chal
lenges to the rule immediately upon its enactment, or must she wait
until the rule is enforced against her? The proponent of the Direct
Account may well make the claimant wait, at least absent specific
evidence that the rule has a coercive effect on the claimant. On the
Direct Account, the paradigmatic constitutional suit is a retrospec
tive challenge to some sanction the claimant has received for an
action she has already performed.

In

such a temporal posture,

. there can no question about the existence of a concrete setback to
the claimant. By contrast, in a preenforcement challenge the ques
tion remains open whether the rule's duty constitutes a true hard
ship for claimant: whether she really wants to perform an action
covered by the rule and,

if so, whether the chance of her being sane-

586. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562-71; Wright, 468 U.S. at 752-61.
587. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 {1967). See generally Gene R. Nichol,
Jr., Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 153 (1987) (surveying and discussing
ripeness jurisprudence).
588. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 290, § 2.4, at 115.
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tioned for that is significant. As the Court explained in United
Public Workers v. Mitchell,589 the high-water mark of a stringent
ripeness doctrine, where the Court declined to hear a preenforce
ment free speech challenge to the Hatch Act (prohibiting political
activity by government employees):59o
The power of courts, and ultimately of this Court, to pass upon the
constitutionality of acts of Congress arises only when the interests of
litigants require the use of this judicial authority for their protection
against actual interference. A hypothetical threat is not enough. We
can only speculate as to the kinds of political activity the appellants
desire to engage in or as to the contents of their proposed public
statements . . . It would not accord with judicial responsibility to
adjudge, in a matter involving constitutionality . . . except when defi
nite rights appear upon the one side and definite prejudicial interfer
ences upon the other.591
.

Strains of the Direct Account are clearly audible here.

In

the years following

Mitchell,

the Court considerably relaxed

the ripeness barrier to preenforcement challenges to rules - most
visibly in

Abbott Laboratories

v.

Gardner, 592

which permitted a

preenforcement statutory challenge to an FDA regulation, and
thereby opened the door to routine preenforcement review within
federal administrative law.593 A similar relaxation occurred for
constitutional suits. As one commentator has noted: "The Court
. . . routinely entertain[s] suits to declare statutes unconstitutional,
invoking the ripeness requirement only occasionally."594 But it is,
now, far from clear whether this relaxed ripeness regime will con
tinue. The Court took a sharp tum toward renewed stringency in
Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc., 595 where it sua sponte rejected
as unripe a preenforcement class-action challenge to a benefit
conferring rule.
" [I]njunctive and declaratory judgment remedies . . . are discretion
ary, and courts traditionally have been reluctant to apply them to ad
ministrative determinations unless these arise in the context of a
controversy 'ripe' for judicial resolution," that is to say, unless the

589. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
590. See Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 86-91 (declining to hear preenforcement challenge); 330
U.S. at 91-94 (agreeing to hear challenge by employee who had already been charged by Civil
Service Commission with political activity, and where the Commission had entered a pro
posed order for his removal).
591. 330 U.S. at 89-90.
592. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
593. See MAsHAw, supra note 423, at 179 (noting that "[p]reenforcement review has be
come the norm" within administrative law).
594. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 498 (2d ed. 1994).
595. 509 U.S. 43 (1993).
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effects of the administrative action challenged have been "felt in a
concrete way by the challenging parties." . . .
. . . [T]he promulgation of the challenged regulations did not itself
give each . . . class member a ripe claim; a class member's claim would
ripen only once he took the affirmative steps [of applying individually
for the benefit and being rejected].596

The Court has not, yet, extended Reno's renewed stringency to con

duct-regulating rules - but there are some hints that it may do just
that.597

The proponent of the Direct Account will be cheered by

Reno;

the proponent of the Derivative Account will be alarmed. Ripe
ness, like standing, is extrinsic to the Derivative Account. There is
no preference, within that account, for retrospective rather than an
ticipatory challenges. Just the opposite:

if a rule is morally and
ceteris paribus, the rule ought to be
soon as possible. I say "ceteris paribus"

constitutionally invalid, then,

repealed or amended as

because there may well be countervailing considerations, accepta

ble to the Derivative Account, that weigh in favor of postenforce

ment rather than preenforcement review. For example, as Jerry

Mashaw has noted, "review at the application stage . . . provid[ es] a

better information base."598 Further, by invoking the threat of

preenforcement review against an administrative agency, organized

litigants may be able to force changes, benefiting themselves, in the
terms of perfectly valid rules. These kind of considerations may,

perhaps, lead the proponent of the Derivative Account to concur in
a tightening of the ripeness requirements for anticipatory chal

lenges. What is the optimal timing for constitutional challenges,
such that invalid rules are maximally repaired, yet with minimal ju
dicial interference against the enforcement of valid rules?

upon

that

It is

question, and not upon some further preference for a

596. Catholic Social Servs., 509 U.S. at 57, 59 (footnote and citations omitted) (quoting
Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967)); cf. 509 U.S. at 67-70 (O'Connor J,
concurring in the judgment) (criticizing majority's ripeness holding); 509 U.S. at 77-83 (Ste
vens, J., dissenting) (same).
597. See 509 U.S. at 58 (suggesting that "a controversy concerning a regulation is not
ordinarily ripe for review
until the regulation has been applied to the claimant's situation
by some concrete action"); Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 320-23 (1991) (finding unripe antic
ipatory, free-speech challenge to provision of California Constitution - albeit enforceable
only by injunction - that prohibited political parties from endorsing candidates for nonparti
san offices); see also Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200 (1994) (holding that
statute precluded preenforcement challenge, by mine operator, to sanction-backed agency
order requiring operator to designate union members as representatives for safety inspec
tions at mine). For recent evidence, in other contexts, of the Court's seriousness about ripe
ness doctrine, see Texas v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1257 (1998), and Ohio Forestry
Association v. Sie"a Club, 118 S. Ct. 1665 (1998).
598. MAsHAw, supra note 423, at 179.
. • .
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maximally concrete harm to the litigant that, within the Derivative
Account, the viability of preenforcement review should hinge.
The points I am making here could be multiplied, and _applied to
other procedural doctrines besides ripeness, standing, and the
others I have discussed. Virtually any procedural doctrine will be
viewed one way within the Direct Account, and another way within
the Derivative Account. Consider, for example, .abstention doc
trine. The Court's announcement, in Younger v. Harris, 599 that a
federal court must abstain from issuing an injunction against a state
criminal statute where a prosecution of the claimant pursuant to
that statute has already begun, was clearly shaped by the view that
the sweeping relief effected by an injunction was not the kind of
relief inherent to constitutional rights: "The power and duty of the
judiciary to declare laws unconstitutional is in the final analysis de
rived from its responsibility for resolving concrete disputes brought
before the courts for decision. "600 Or consider nonacquiescence
doctrine, which I discussed above in section III.B.2. Here, it is the
Derivative Account, not the Direct Account, that makes an intrin
sic demand upon this procedural doctrine: intrinsic to the Deriva
tive Account is the proposition that (most or all) nonjudicial actors
should acquiesce in judicial decisions declaring statutes to be inva
lid, at least where the relevant courts are unanimous. By contrast,
the proponent of the Direct Account can be agnostic about
nonacquiescence.601
But it bears emphasis that the deepest implications of the Deriv
ative Account are substantive, not procedural. The Direct Account
makes stringent demands on the content of substantive constitu
tional doctrines. How can moral reason obtain to overturn X's own
treatment, independent of further invalidating the rule under which
that treatment falls? Someone who stipulates the existence of such
reason, as an entailment of X's constitutional right, must choose
one of two options. Either she abandons the Basic Structure en
tirely, and therewith the judicial focus on the predicate and history
of rules. In that event, constitutional adjudication changes radi599. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
600. Younger, 401 U.S. at 52. Relatedly, and even more fundamentally, the proponents
of the Direct and Derivative Accounts may well disagree about the proper scope of the fic
tion established by Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), permitting federal suits for prospec
tive relief against state officers despite the Eleventh Amendment. See Idaho v. Coeur
d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 2038-40 (1997) (opinion of Kennedy, J.) (arguing that
Ex parte Young should be applied on a case-by-case basis to suits for prospective relief,
rather than automatically).
601. See supra notes 499-513 and accompanying text (discussing nonacquiescence).
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cally, and becomes a moral inspection of X's action or actions
rather than of some rule that X challenges. Or, less radically, she
identifies some feature of rules such that sanctioning actors pursu
ant to rules with that feature violates their moral rights independent
of the proscribability of their actions under different descriptions.
But what would such a feature be? If anything, it would be the
discriminatory cast of a rule. Sanctioning X pursuant to a discrimi
natory rule can violate her nonepistemic moral rights, as in the case
of racial stigma. Failing that, it can arguably violate her epistemic
moral rights, insofar as discrimination evidences false beliefs,
among legislators,
predicate.602
So,

about

the

moral

relevance

of

the

rule

if the Direct Account obtains, constitutional law should be

come a series of antidiscrimination norms: norms that constrain
rules not to discriminate on the basis of gender, race, speech, or
religion. At a minimum, a right against discrimination should be
come the central and animating paradigm of a constitutional right.
And indeed, in recent years, the Court has become increasingly
concerned with the discriminatory cast of rules, to the exclusion of
other moral failings that the Derivative Account might recognize.
In Smith, 603 the Court reworked its free exercise doctrine so as to
eliminate any right of religious actors to be exempt from nondis
criminatory rules;604 in the area of free speech, too, "content dis
crimination" has become the major if not quite exclusive trigger for
judicial intervention.605 Has this trend, in fact, been caused by the
Justices' adherence to the Direct Account? Who knows. Should it
be reversed,

if the Derivative Account is instead correct?

Not nec

essarily - for there may be independent reasons why the Discrimi
nation Schema should be the sole or main rule-validity schema
within that account.
I tend to doubt that such reasons exist. The Liberty Schema,
not just the Discrimination Schema, is integral to constitutional law
- or so I have already argued.606 But the point I want to make
here is a more basic one. Assume, for example, that the constitu
tional criterion of "free speech" picks out some liberty (some type
602. See supra section II.B.2; supra text accompanying notes 218-19 (discussing possible
nonepistemic and epistemic defenses of Direct Account, linked to concept of discrimination).
603. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
604. See supra text accompanying notes 109-13 (discussing change in free exercise doc
trine worked by Smith).
605. See supra note 357 and accompanying text (noting increasing focus, in free speech
doctrine, on rules that discriminate against speech or speech-types).
606. See supra text accompanying notes 358-69.
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of action it is morally important for persons to be free to perform,
absent overriding reason); that judicial invalidation of rules abridg
ing the liberty of speech is not self-defeating; and that courts are
epistemically, democratically, and otherwise well placed to identify
some such rules.607 If so, courts should invalidate (some) rules that
violate the liberty of speech, whether or not those rules are discrim
inatory. There .is no bias, within the Derivative Account, toward
rule-validity schema that preserve the "personal" cast of constitu
tional rights, since constitutional rights do not have such a cast.
Discrimination may or may not be definitive of constitutional
rights; but on the Derivative Account, there is nothing about the
moral content of constitutional rights that requires it to be. The
Direct Account -

if

its implications were truly drawn - would

tightly constrain the ways in which rules can be constitutionally in
valid. In this sense, the Direct Account encapsulates an argument
for judicial restraint, within the very concept of a constitutional
right. The Derivative Account, the correct account, does not.

607. These are, within the Derivative Account, the individually necessary and jointly suf
ficient conditions for rules violating the liberty of speech (in the sense set forth by the Liberty
Schema) to be properly invalidated by constitutional reviewing courts. On the problem of
self-defeating review, see supra text accompanying notes 361-64; on the problem of the epi
stemic and remedial capacities of courts, see Adler, supra note 4, at 771-80.

